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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 146615 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-6615 
STEVEN E. HAUSKNECHT, * 
Charging Party, * 
vs. * 
KENNECOTT CORPORATION * 
Respondent. * 
********************************* 
The Industrial Commission of Utah ("Commission") reviews this 
Motion for Review pursuant to U.C.A. § 63-46b-16. The Respondent 
has requested review of the Administrative Law Judge's ("ALJ") 
Order of April 26, 1993 granting the Charging Party's request for 
a formal hearing to review de novo the Determination and Order of 
the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division ("UADD"). 
The Respondent asserts that the Charging Party's request for 
a hearing does not comply with the requirements of Utah law for 
granting a formal bearing from a determination and order entered by 
the UADD. Respondent asserts that the ALJ's order fails to specify 
the basis upon which it is granted and that the record does not 
support the grant of a formal hearing. 
U.C.A. § 34-35-7.1(5)(c) provides that "[a] party may file a 
written request to the director for an evidentiary hearing to 
review de novo the director's determination and order within 30 
days of the date of the determination and order." The UADD rules 
provide that "[a] request for an evidentiary hearing must state a 
reason why the hearing is necessary. A hearing will not be 
considered necessary if the hearing will not add to the evidence in 
the investigatory file or cause the evidence in the investigatory 
file to be viewed differently.1" The rule notes that "[i]n most 
cases, the need to cross examine the individuals who have submitted 
affidavits supportive of the initial finding or determination of 
the Commission will be considered a valid reason for granting a 
request for a hearing by the Commission.2" 
The Charging Party's request for a hearing asserts that a 
hearing is necessary so that a complete investigation can be done. 
The Charging Party asserts that evidence reasonably available to 
the investigator would show that the Charging Party did establish 
a prima facie case of age discrimination, that there is a need to 
take testimony from witnesses such as the Charging Party and the 
1
 U.A.C. R560-l-4(4) (1993). 
ORDER GRANTING 
MOTION FOR REVIEW 
UADD No. 92-0393 
EEOC No. 35C-92-0418 
2
 Id. 
STEVEN E. HAUSKNECHT 
ORDER 
PAGE TWO 
people involved in the decision to terminate him and notes that the 
investigator failed to interview witnesses or take affidavits. The 
Charging Party further claims that there was "evidence" presented 
in the charge that the Charging Party was terminated because his 
employer wanted to reduce staff in the facility where the Charging 
Party worked without having to pay severance benefits, an issue 
which was not addressed by the investigator. The Charging Party 
asserts that the Commission needs to take evidence regarding the 
Respondent's sexual harassment training policy and to investigate 
the allegations that the Charging Party sexually harassed his 
female co-workers. 
The Respondent asserts that the reasons proffered by the 
Charging Party are insufficient to warrant a grant of a formal 
hearing because the purpose of a formal hearing is not to conduct 
an investigation or collect evidence. 
In our review of the file, we find that the Charging Party 
failed to submit any evidence in support of his claim during the 
UADD's informal investigation. He did not complete and sign an 
affidavit upon filing his charge and submitted no documentation or 
evidence in support of his claim. Every document submitted by the 
Charging Party was argument not evidence. We believe that R560-1-4 
contemplates that the party seeking review has fully participated 
in the proceedings below. The evidence offered by the Charging 
Party appears to have been available during the UADD's investiga-
tion, but was not supplied at that time. Therefore, the Charging 
Party cannot assert that there is evidence which will support his 
claim which was not submitted during the investigation, although it 
was available at that time. 
It is an elementary concept in employment discrimination law 
that the burden of proof rests with the Charging Party.3 The 
3
 See Texas Dept. of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine. 67 L.Ed, ed 207 
(1981). Under Burdine, it is the plaintiff's burden to show that 
similarly situated employees were not treated equally and, 
ultimately, to show that the defendant intentionally discriminated 
against the plaintiff. Once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie 
case of discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant to 
articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse 
employment action. 
STEVEN E. HAUSKNECHT 
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Charging Party did not submit the names of witnesses that he wanted 
the investigator to interview and, apparently, made no effort to 
submit affidavits or other evidence in support of his charge. 
We do not think that a party should be allowed to obtain an 
evidentiary hearing by claiming that the UADD has failed to 
properly investigate the subject charge when the party requesting 
the hearing has failed to participate fully in the proceedings 
below. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. The Charging Party failed to submit evidence in support of 
his charge of discrimination during the investigative proceeding. 
2. The evidence the Charging Party seeks to submit at this 
time was available at the time of the UADD investigation. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
Therefore, for the above reasons, we find that the Charging 
Party has failed to show that an evidentiary hearing is necessary 
pursuant to the requirements of R560-1-4. Therefore, we hereby 
deny his request for a formal evidentiary hearing. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion for Review of the 
Order of the Administrative Law Judge dated April 26, 1993 is 
hereby denied. 
If you intend to appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals you must 
do so within 30 days of the date of this Order. If you want a 
transcript of the hearing for your appeal you must bear all the 
cost of preparing it. 
You also have the right to ask the Industrial Commission to 
reconsider this Order, under U.C.A. § 63-46b-13, but you must 
request reconsideration within 20 days of the date of this Order. 
STEVEN E. HAUSKNECHT 
ORDER 
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You do not have to request reconsideration before you file an 
appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
DATED this ^ZfJ^ day of (Q^tiX^^J 1993. 
Stephen M. Hadley 
•ZO£r\, 
^Cftai irman 
Colleen S. Colton, Commissioner 
I abstain due to my prior association with one of^ tehe parties. 
Thomas R. Carlson, Commissioner 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 146615 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-6615 
STEVEN E. HAUSKNECHT, * 
Charging Party, * 
vs. * 
KENNECOTT CORPORATION * 
Respondent. * 
********************************* 
On October 26, 1993 the Industrial Commission of Utah 
("Commission") issued an "Order Granting Motion for Review" 
("Order") in the above entitled case. It would appear that the 
Order is internally inconsistent in stating that the Motion for 
Review of the Order of the Administrative Law Judge is hereby 
denied. 
The Administrative Law Judge allowed a request for evidentiary 
hearing. Upon review of the file, the Commission concluded that an 
evidentiary hearing was not necessary under the circumstances of 
this case. We therefore issue this Order of Clarification sua 
sponte. 
The Order of the Commission dated October 26, 1993 should be 
amended to read as follows: 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Respondent's Motion for 
Review requesting that the evidentiary hearing be denied is hereby 
granted and the decision of the administrative law judge to grant 
the evidentiary hearing is hereby reversed. 
If you intend to appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals you must 
do so within 3 0 days of the date of this Order. If you want a 
transcript of the hearing for your appeal you must bear all the 
cost of preparing it. 
You also have the right to ask the Industrial Commission to 
reconsider this Order, under U.C.A. § 63-46b-13, but you must 
request reconsideration within 20 days of the date of this Order. 
ORDER OF CLARIFICATION 
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34-35-7,1. Procedure for aggrieved person to file claim — 
Investigations — Adjudicative proceedings — 
Settlement — Reconsideration — Determination, 
(1) (a) Any person claiming to be aggrieved by a discriminatory or prohib-
ited employment practice may by himself, his attorney, or his agent, 
make, sign, and file with the commission a request for agency action. 
(b) Every request for agency action shall be verified under oath or 
affirmation. 
(c) A request for agency action made under this section shall be filed 
within 180 days after the alleged discriminatory or prohibited employ-
ment practice occurred. 
(2) Any employer, labor organization, joint apprenticeship committee, or 
vocational school who has employees or members who refuse or threaten to 
refuse to comply with the provisions of this chapter may file with the commis-
sion a request for agency action asking the commission for assistance to ob-
tain their compliance by conciliation or other remedial action. 
(3) (a) Before a hearing is set or held as part of any adjudicative proceed-
ing, the commission shall promptly assign an investigator to attempt a 
settlement between the parties by conference, conciliation, or persuasion. 
(b) If no settlement is reached, the investigator shall make a prompt 
impartial investigation of all allegations made in the request for agency 
action. 
(c) The commission and its staff, agents, and employees shall conduct 
every investigation in fairness to all parties and agencies involved, and 
may not attempt a settlement between the parties if it is clear that no 
discriminatory or prohibited employment practice has occurred. 
(d) If the aggrieved party wishes to withdraw the request for agency 
action, he must do so prior to the issuance of a final order. 
(4) (a) If the initial attempts at settlement are unsuccessful, and the inves-
tigator uncovers insufficient evidence during his investigation to support 
the allegations of a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice set 
out in the request for agency action, the investigator shall formally report 
these findings to the director. 
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's report, the director may issue a 
determination and order for dismissal of the adjudicative proceeding. 
(c) A party may make a written request to the director for an eviden-
tiary hearing to review de novo the director's determination and order 
within 30 days of the date of the determination and order for dismissal. 
(d) If the director receives no timely request for a hearing, the determi-
nation and order issued by the director becomes the final order of the 
commission. 
(5) (a) If the initial attempts at settlement are unsuccessful and the inves-
tigator uncovers sufficient evidence during his investigation to support 
the allegations of a discriminatory or prohibited employment practice set 
out in the request for agency action, the investigator shall formally report 
these findings to the director. 
(b) Upon receipt of the investigator's report the director may issue a 
determination and order based on the investigator's report. 
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(c) A party may file a written request to the director for an evidentiary 
hearing to review de novo the director's determination and order within 
30 days of the date of the determination and order. 
(d) If the director receives no timely request for a hearing, the determi-
nation and order issued by the director requiring the respondent to cease 
any discriminatory or prohibited employment practice and to provide re-
lief to the aggrieved party becomes the final order of the commission. 
(6) In any adjudicative proceeding, the investigator who investigated the 
matter may not participate in a hearing except as a witness, nor may he 
participate in the deliberations of the presiding officer. 
(7) Prior to commencement of an evidentiary hearing, the party filing the 
request for agency action may reasonably and fairly amend any allegation, 
and the respondent may amend its answer. Those amendments may be made 
during or after a hearing but only with permission of the presiding officer. 
(8) (a) If, upon all the evidence at a hearing, the presiding officer finds that 
a respondent has not engaged in a discriminatory or prohibited employ-
ment practice, the presiding officer shall issue an order dismissing the 
request for agency action containing the allegation of a discriminatory or 
prohibited employment practice. 
(b) The presiding officer may order that the respondent be reimbursed 
by the complaining party for his attorneys' fees and costs. 
(9) If upon all the evidence at the hearing, the presiding officer finds that a 
respondent has engaged in a discriminatory or prohibited employment prac-
tice, the presiding officer shall issue an order requiring the respondent to 
cease any discriminatory or prohibited employment practice and to provide 
relief to the complaining party, including reinstatement, back pay and bene-
fits, and attorneys' fees and costs. 
(10) Conciliation between the parties is to be urged and facilitated at all 
stages of the adjudicative process. 
(11) (a) Either party may file a written request for review of the order 
issued by the presiding officer in accordance with Section 63-46b-12. 
(b) If there is no timely request for review the order issued by the 
presiding officer becomes the final order of the commission. 
(12) An order of the commission under Subsection (ll)(a) is subject to judi-
cial review as provided in Section 63-46b-16. 
(13) The commission shall have authority to make rules concerning proce-
dures under this chapter in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah 
Administrative Rulemaking Act. 
(14) The members of the commission and its staff may not divulge or make 
public any information gained from any investigation, settlement negotiation, 
or proceeding before the commission except in the following: 
(a) Information used by the director in making any determination may 
be provided to all interested parties for the purpose of preparation for and 
participation in proceedings before the commission. 
(b) General statistical information may be disclosed provided the iden-
tities of the individuals or parties are not disclosed. 
(c) Information may be disclosed for inspection by the attorney general 
or other legal representatives of the state or commission. 
(d) Information may be disclosed for information and reporting require-
ments of the federal government. 
29 
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(15) The procedures contained in this section are the exclusive remedy un-
der state law for employment discrimination based upon race, color, sex, retal-
iation, pregnancy, childbirth, or pregnancy-related conditions, age, religion, 
national origin, or handicap. 
(16) The commencement of an action under federal law for relief based 
upon any act prohibited by this chapter bars the commencement or continua-
tion of any adjudicative proceeding before the Utah Antidiscrimination Divi-
sion in connection with the same claims under this chapter. Nothing in this 
subsection is intended to alter, amend, modify, or impair the exclusive remedy 
provision set forth in Subsection (15). 
History: C. 1953, 34-35-7.1, enacted by L. 
1985, ch. 189, § 4; 1987, ch. 161, § 105; 1990, 
ch. 63, § 2; 1991, ch. 188, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment, effective April 23, 1990, inserted "for 
agency action" in Subsection (1Kb) and "for 
agency action made under this section" in Sub-
section (l)(c); substituted "request for agency 
action" for "written charge" in Subsection (2), 
"a hearing is set or held as part of any adjudi-
cative proceeding, the commission shall 
promptly assign an investigator" for "an adju-
dicative proceeding is set or held, the commis-
sion shall assign an investigator to the charge" 
in Subsection (3)(a), and "all allegations made 
in the request for agency action" for "the alle-
gations made in the charge" in Subsection 
(3Kb); deleted former Subsection (3)(c), relating 
to the disclosure of information or settlement 
ANALYSIS 
Exclusive remedy. 
No independent cause of action found. 
Exclusive remedy. 
Claims that assert a different injury than 
this statute covers, such as intentional tort 
claims, and perhaps certain state constitu-
tional claims, are not necessarily foreclosed by 
the exclusive remedy provision of Subsection 
(11) if an independent cause of action exists 
outside this chapter for such claims. Sauers v. 
Salt Lake County, 735 F. Supp. 381 (D. Utah 
1990). 
This chapter preempts common law causes of 
action for discharge in retaliation for com-
plaints of employment discrimination. 
Retherford v. AT & T Communications of the 
Mt. States, Inc., 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 21 (1992). 
This chapter does not preempt common law 
efforts; redesignated former Subsection (3)(d) 
as Subsection (3)(c); inserted Subsection (3)(d); 
and rewrote the remainder of the section to the 
extent that a detailed comparison would be im-
practicable. 
The 1991 amendment, effective April 29, 
1991, inserted "discriminatory or" near the end 
of Subsection (3)(c); added Subsection (4)(d); 
substituted all of the present language of Sub-
section (8)(a) beginning with "request" for "di-
rector's determination and ending the adjudi-
cative proceeding"; deleted "If a director's de-
termination is dismissed" at the beginning of 
Subsection (8Kb); added "and costs" at the end 
of Subsection (9); substituted "issued by the 
presiding officer" for "by the commission" in 
Subsection (HXa); rewrote Subsections (12) 
and (13); and made minor changes in punctua-
tion and style throughout the section. 
claims for breach of implied contract, inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, tortious 
interference with contract, and negligent em-
ployment. Under the "indispensable element" 
test adopted for determining whether an exclu-
sive statutory cause of action preempts a com-
mon law claim, only those claims for which the 
statutory scheme supplies an indispensable 
element are barred, and discrimination is not 
an indispensable element of these claims. 
Retherford v. AT & T Communications of the 
Mt. States, Inc., 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 21 (1992). 
No independent cause of action found. 
Former county employee's claims of sexual 
harassment and discrimination were pre-
empted by this chapter, even though they were 
cast as violations of other statutes or the Utah 
Constitution. Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 735 
F. Supp. 381 (D. Utah 1990). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R* — Award of front pay under state job 
discrimination statutes, 74 A.L.R.4th 746. 
Damages and other relief under state legis-
34-35-8. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1990, ch. 63, § 3 repeals 
§ 34-35-8, as last amended by Laws 1986, ch. 
47, § 15, relating to judicial review, effective 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law — Legislative Enactments — 
Labor Law, 1988 Utah L. Rev. 284. 
A.L.R. — Private employee's loss of employ-
Cited in Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of Re-
view, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
lation forbidding job discrimination on account 
of handicap, 78 A.L.R.4th 435. 
April 23, 1990. For present comparable provi 
sions, see § 34-35-7.1. 
ment because of refusal to submit to drug test 
as affecting right to unemployment compensa-
tion, 86 A.L.R.4th 309. 
34-38-6. Requirements for collection and testing. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
CHAPTER 37 
DECEPTION DETECTION EXAMINERS 
34-37-1 to 34-37-16. Renumbered. 
Renumbered. — Laws 1993, ch. 234, by L. 1981, ch. 98. § 5, a licensure grandfather 
§§ 201 to 214 renumbered former §§ 34-37-1 clause, effective July 1, 1993. 
to 34-37-3, 34-37-5 to 34-37-13, 34-37-15, and Section 34-37-4 (L. 1973, ch. 94, § 4), relat-
34-37-16, regulating polygraph operators, as ing to qualification for a license to administer 
§§ 53-5-301 to 53-5-314, and § 394 of the act examinations, was repealed by Laws 1977, ch. 
repealed former § 34-37-14, as last amended 153, § 9. 
CHAPTER 38 
DRUG AND ALCOHOL TESTING 
34-38-1. Legislative findings — Purpose and intent of 
chapter. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
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(3) Nothing in this section restricts or precludes any investigative right or 
power given to an agency by another statute. 
History: C, 1953, 63-46b-7, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Discovery, U.R.C.P. 
1987, ch. 161, § 263. 26 et seq. 
63-46b-8. Procedures for formal adjudicative proceedings 
— Hearing procedure. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsections 63-46b-3(d)(i) and (ii), in all formal 
adjudicative proceedings, a hearing shall be conducted as follows: 
(a) The presiding officer shall regulate the course of the hearing to 
obtain full disclosure of relevant facts and to afford all the parties reason-
able opportunity to present their positions. 
(b) On his own motion or upon objection by a party, the presiding offi-
cer: 
(i) may exclude evidence that is irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly 
repetitious; 
(ii) shall exclude evidence privileged in the courts of Utah; 
(iii) may receive documentary evidence in the form of a copy or 
excerpt if the copy or excerpt contains all pertinent portions of the 
original document; 
(iv) may take official notice of any facts that could be judicially 
noticed under the Utah Rules of Evidence, of the record of other 
proceedings before the agency, and of technical or scientific facts 
within the agency's specialized knowledge. 
(c) The presiding officer may not exclude evidence solely because it is 
hearsay. 
(d) The presiding officer shall afford to all parties the opportunity to 
present evidence, argue, respond, conduct cross-examination, and submit 
rebuttal evidence. 
(e) The presiding officer may give persons not a party to the adjudica-
tive proceeding the opportunity to present oral or written statements at 
the hearing. 
(f) All testimony presented at the hearing, if offered as evidence to be 
considered in reaching a decision on the merits, shall be given under oath. 
(g) The hearing shall be recorded at the agency's expense. 
(h) Any party, at his own expense, may have a person approved by the 
agency prepare a transcript of the hearing, subject to any restrictions that 
the agency is permitted by statute to impose to protect confidential infor-
mation disclosed at the hearing. 
(i) All hearings shall be open to all parties. 
(2) This section does not preclude the presiding officer from taking appro-
priate measures necessary to preserve the integrity of the hearing. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-8, enacted by L. Cross-References. — Judicial notice, Utah 
1987, ch. 161, S 264; 1988, ch. 72, § 19. R. Evid. 201. 
Privileges, Utah R. Evid. 501 et seq. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cross-examination. nesses against him resulted in "substantial 
Agency decision revoking social worker's li- prejudice." D.B. v. Division of Occupational & 
cense was reversed and his case was remanded Professional Licensing, 779 P.2d 1145 (Utah 
for a new hearing, because the failure to afford Ct. App. 1989). 
him an opportunity to cross-examine the wit-
63-46b-9. Procedures for formal adjudicative proceedings 
— Intervention. 
(1) Any person not a party may file a signed, written petition to intervene 
in a formal adjudicative proceeding with the agency. The person who wishes 
to intervene shall mail a copy of the petition to each party. The petition shall 
include: 
(a) the agency's file number or other reference number; 
(b) the name of the proceeding; 
(c) a statement of facts demonstrating that the petitioner's legal rights 
or interests are substantially affected by the formal adjudicative proceed-
ing, or that the petitioner qualifies as an intervenor under any provision 
of law; and 
(d) a statement of the relief that the petitioner seeks from the agency. 
(2) The presiding officer shall grant a petition for intervention if he deter-
mines that: 
(a) the petitioner's legal interests may be substantially affected by the 
formal adjudicative proceeding; and 
(b) the interests of justice and the orderly and prompt conduct of the 
adjudicative proceedings will not be materially impaired by allowing the 
intervention. 
(3) (a) Any order granting or denying a petition to intervene shall be in 
writing and sent by mail to the petitioner and each party. 
(b) An order permitting intervention may impose conditions on the 
intervener's participation in the adjudicative proceeding that are neces-
sary for a just, orderly, and prompt conduct of the adjudicative proceed-
ing. 
(c) The presiding officer may impose the conditions at any time after 
the intervention. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
History: C 1953, 63-46b-9, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 161, § 265. 
ANALYSIS 
Requisites for intervention. 
Standing. 
Requisites for intervention. 
Although Subsection (2) does not grant an 
absolute right to intervene, it does establish a 
conditional right to intervene if the requisite 
legal interest is present. That right is subject 
only to the condition that the interests of jus-
tice and orderly conduct of the administrative 
proceedings will not be impaired. Millard 
County v. State Tax Comm'n, 823 P.2d 459 
(Utah 1991). 
Tax commission's denial of a county's motion 
to intervene in a proceeding to redetermine a 
taxpayer's sales tax liability was reversed, be-
cause the county met the requirements for in-
tervention and the commission's contention 
that allowing intervention would clog the en-
tire administrative system was highly exag-
gerated. Millard County v. State Tax Comm'n, 
823 P.2d 459 (Utah 1991). 
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63-46b-14. Judicial review — Exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies. 
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final agency action, 
except in actions where judicial review is expressly prohibited by statute. 
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all administra-
tive remedies available, except that: 
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not exhaust administrative 
remedies if this chapter or any other statute states that exhaustion is not 
required; 
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the require-
ment to exhaust any or all administrative remedies if: 
(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or 
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm dis-
proportionate to the public benefit derived from requiring exhaus-
tion. 
(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency action 
within 30 days after the date that the order constituting the final agency 
action is issued or is considered to have been issued under Subsection 
63-46b-13(3)(b). 
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all other appropriate par-
ties as respondents and shall meet the form requirements specified in this 
chapter. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-14, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 161, § 270; 1988, ch. 72, § 24. 
ANALYSIS 
Administrative review or rehearing. 
Commencement of filing period. 
— Issuance of order. 
Date order issued. 
Exhaustion of remedies. 
"Filing of petition" construed. 
Final appealable order. 
Review of tax commission order. 
Cited. 
Administrative review or rehearing. 
Homeowners association was statutorily re-
quired to first seek review or rehearing by the 
public service commission of its ruling in order 
to invoke the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court 
to review the issue of standby water fees, be-
cause the'commission had not been properly 
afforded the opportunity to address the issue 
on the merits. Hi-Country Homeowners Ass'n 
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 779 P.2d 682 (Utah 
1989). 
Commencement of filing period. 
The 30-day time period to file an appeal com-
mences when the final agency order issues and 
not when received by a party. The period is not 
extended to allow for mailing time. Silva v. 
Department of Emp. Sec., 786 P.2d 246 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990). 
—Issuance of order. 
"Issue," as used in this section, means the 
date the agency action is properly mailed, as 
accurately evidenced by the certificate of mail-
ing, or personally served. This contrasts with 
the rule governing appeals from judicial ac-
tion, the timeliness of which is calculated with 
reference to the date of entry. Wiggins v. Board 
of Review, 824 P.2d 1199 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Date order issued. 
For purposes of determining the time limit 
for filing for judicial review, the date the order 
constituting the final agency action "issues" is 
the date the order bears on its face and not the 
date it is mailed. Dusty's, Inc. v. Auditing Div., 
842 P.2d 868 (Utah 1992). 
Exhaust ion of remedies. 
It was appropriate for plaintiffs to file their 
action for a declaratory judgment in the dis-
trict court to obtain rulings on legal questions 
arising out of administrative proceedings since 
the legal questions could not have been finally 
determined by the commission in an adminis-
307 
63-46b-15 STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
remanding for a determination of whether the 
petitioner should receive medical expenses, 
was not a final appealable order. Sloan v. 
Board of Review, 781 P.2d 463 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). 
An order of the agency is not final so long as 
it reserves something to the agency for further 
decision. Sloan v. Board of Review, 781 P.2d 
463 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Review of tax commission order. 
A petitioner's time limit for filing for judicial 
review of a final tax commission order is pre-
scribed by Subsection (3) of this section and not 
§ 59-1-504, which governs petitions for rede-
termination of deficiencies before the commis-
sion and not petitions for judicial review. 
Dusty's, Inc. v. Auditing Div., 842 P.2d 868 
(UUh 1992). 
Cited in Lopez v. Career Serv. Review Bd., 
834 P.2d 568 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
• Informal adjudicative pro-
ceedings. 
(1) (a) The district courts shall have jurisdiction to review by trial de novo 
all final agency actions resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings, 
except that the juvenile court shall have jurisdiction over all state agency 
actions relating to removal or placement decisions regarding children in 
state custody. 
(b) Venue for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings shall 
be as provided in the statute governing the agency or, in the absence of 
such a venue provision, in the county where the petitioner resides or 
maintains his principal place of business. 
(2) (a) The petition for judicial review of informal adjudicative proceedings 
shall be a complaint governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
shall include: 
(i) the name and mailing address of the party seeking judicial re-
view; 
(ii) the name and mailing address of the respondent agency; 
(iii) the title and date of the final agency action to be reviewed, 
together with a duplicate copy, summary, or brief description of the 
agency action; 
(iv) identification of the persons who were parties in the informal 
adjudicative proceedings that led to the agency action; 
(v) a copy of the written agency order from the informal proceed-
ing; 
(vi) facts demonstrating that the party seeking judicial review is 
entitled to obtain judicial review; 
(vii) a request for relief, specifying the type and extent of relief 
requested; 
(viii) a statement of the reasons why the petitioner is entitled to 
relief, 
(b) All additional pleadings and proceedings in the district court are 
governed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
trative proceeding. Brumley v. Utah State Tax 
Comm'n, 220 Utah Adv. Rep. 45 (Utah 1993). 
"Filing of petition" construed. 
The operative act to commence petitioner's 
appeal is the filing of the petition with the 
clerk. Deposit in the mail does not accomplish 
the act of filing. The act of filing a document 
requires that the document be deposited with 
the court clerk, and not with the post office or 
some other mechanism for delivery. Silva v. 
Department of Emp. Sec, 786 P.2d 246 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990). 
Service of a petition for review or notice of 
appeal on an opposing party does not substi-
tute for nor accomplish the act of filing that 
appeal with the clerk. Silva v. Department of 
Emp. Sec., 786 P.2d 246 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Final appealable order. 
Industrial commission's order adopting an 
administrative law judge's findings of fact, but 
63-46b-15. Judicial review — 
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trative proceeding. Brumley v. Utah State Tax 
Comm'n, 220 Utah Adv. Rep. 45 (Utah 1993). 
"Filing of petition" construed. 
The operative act to commence petitioner's 
appeal is the filing of the petition with the 
clerk. Deposit in the mail does not accomplish 
the act of filing. The act of filing a document 
requires that the document be deposited with 
the court clerk, and not with the post office or 
some other mechanism for delivery. Silva v. 
Department of Emp. Sec, 786 P.2d 246 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990). 
Service of a petition for review or notice of 
appeal on an opposing party does not substi-
tute for nor accomplish the act of filing that 
appeal with the clerk. Silva v. Department of 
Emp. Sec., 786 P.2d 246 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
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administrative law judge's findings of fact, but 
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(3) (a) The district court, without a jury, shall determine all questions of 
fact and law and any constitutional issue presented in the pleadings, 
(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply injudicial proceedings under this 
section. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-15, enacted by L. Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
1987, ch. 161, § 271; 1988, ch. 72, § 25; 1990, ment, effective April 23, 1990, added the excep-
ch. 132, § 1. tion at the end of Subsection (l)(a). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS ant to Subsection (l)(a) of this section. In re 
Topik, 761 P.2d 32 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), cert. 
Final agency action. denied, 773 P.2d 45 (Utah 1989). 
Function of district court. The only appellate jurisdiction statutorily 
Right to judicial proceeding. delegated to the district court is to review in-
Cited, formal agency adjudicative proceedings. State 
_,. , .. v. Humphrey, 794 P.2d 496 (Utah Ct. App. 
Final agency action.
 1 9 9 Q )
 r r r 
Industrial Commission's determination of 
wrongful discharge was not final, and so not Right to judicial proceeding. 
reviewable under this section, because the District court erred in declining a de novo 
commission and the parties had not resolved review of a dentist's claim to licensure by reci-
the issue of reimbursement for lost wages and procity, where there had been no proceeding on 
benefits as required by § 34-28-19(2). Parkdale his application that was sufficiently judicial in 
Care Ctr. v. Frandsen, 837 P.2d 989 (Utah Ct. nature, and he had not yet had the licensing 
App. 1992). agency's action reviewed in a Mtrial-type hear-
_ .. # . . * • * _* *ng-" Kirk v. Division of Occupational & Pro-
Function of district court fessional Licensing, 815 P.2d 242 (Utah Ct. 
Section 63-46b-16(l) provides that all final * 1991) 
agency decisions through formal adjudicative 
proceedings will be reviewed by the Utah Su- Cited in Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance 
preme Court or Court of Appeals. Therefore, v. Board of State Lands & Forestry, 830 P.2d 
the district court will no longer function as in- 233 (Utah 1992); Bonneville Int'l Corp. v. Utah 
termediate appellate court except to review in- State Tax Comm'n, 219 Utah Adv. Rep. 52 (Ct. 
formal adjudicative proceedings de novo pursu- App. 1993). 
63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of 
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required 
by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern 
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial 
review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, sum-
marize, or organize the record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and 
copies for the record: 
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(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to 
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's 
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substan-
tially prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action 
is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any stat-
ute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-mak-
ing process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a 
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or 
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justi-
fies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a 
fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-16, enacted by L. ings before State Tax Commission, jurisdiction 
1987, ch. 161, § 272; 1988, ch. 72, § 26. and standard, §§ 59-1-601, 59-1-610. 
Cross-References. — Review of proceed-
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
trial Comm'n, 855 P.2d 267 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993). 
Applicability of section. 
Subsection (4) deals with judicial relief, not 
judicial review. It does not affect the degree of 
deference an appellate court grants to an 
agency's decision. Rather, it ensures that relief 
should not be granted when, although the 
agency committed error, the error was harm-
less. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Utah State Tax 
Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991). 
Arbitrary action. 
Industrial commission's denial of occupa-
tional disease disability benefits based upon a 
solitary finding regarding the ultimate issue of 
causation failed to disclose the steps by which 
the ultimate factual conclusions, or conclusions 
of mixed fact and law, were reached, and there-
Whether the Industrial Commission acted fore rendered the action arbitrary. Adams v. 
contrary to its own rule is governed by Subsec- Board of Review, 821 P.2d 1 (Utah Ct. App. 
tion (4)(h)(ii) of this section. Ashcrofl v. Indus- 1991). 
ANALYSIS 
Agency action. 
Applicability of section. 
Arbitrary action. 
Conflicting evidence. 
Factual findings. 
Final order. 
Function of district court. 
Jurisdictional hearing by board. 
Prior practice. 
Review. 
Standard of review. 
—Interpretation of statutory term. 
—Questions of law. 
Substantial evidence test. 
Substantial prejudice. 
Whole record test. 
Cited. 
Agency action. 
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Conflicting evidence. 
In undertaking a review, the appellate court 
will not substitute its judgment as between two 
reasonably conflicting views, even though the 
court might have come to a different conclusion 
had the case come before it for de novo review. 
It is the province of the board, not appellate 
courts, to resolve conflicting evidence, and 
where inconsistent inferences can be drawn 
from the same evidence, it is for the board to 
draw the inferences. Grace Drilling Co. v. 
Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). 
Appellate court refers to the assessment by 
the Board of Review of the Utah Industrial 
Commission on conflicting evidence. Albert-
sons, Inc. v. Department of Emp. Sec, 854 P.2d 
570 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Factual findings. 
Under Subsection (4)(d), the appellate court 
will not disturb the board's application of its 
factual findings to the law unless its determi-
nation exceeds the bounds of reasonableness 
and rationality. Pro-Benefit Staffing, Inc. v. 
Board of Review, 775 P.2d 439 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989); Nelson v. Dep't of Emp. Sec., 801 P.2d 
158 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Final order. 
Administrative law judge's denial of motions 
to dismiss petitions of the Division of Occupa-
tional and Professional Licensing allowed the 
proceeding to continue in the agency and was 
not a final order for purposes of judicial review. 
Barney v. Division of Occupational and Profes-
sional Licensing, 828 P.2d 542 (Utah Ct. App.), 
cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1992). 
Nonfinal agency orders do not divest the 
agency of jurisdiction. Maverik Country 
Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 221 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 17 (Ct. App. 1993). 
Function of district court. 
Subsection (1) provides that all final agency 
decisions through formal adjudicative proceed-
ings will be reviewed by the Utah Supreme 
Court or Court of Appeals. Therefore, the dis-
trict court will no longer function as intermedi-
ate appellate court except to review informal 
adjudicative proceedings de novo pursuant to 
§ 63-46b-15(l)(a). In re Topik, 761 P.2d 32 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988), cert, denied, 773 P.2d 45 
(Utah 1989). 
Jurisdictional hearing by board. 
The Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over 
appeal from jurisdictional hearing conducted 
by a hearing officer appointed by the Career 
Service Review Board since the hearing was a 
formal adjudicative proceeding. Lopez v. Ca-
reer Serv. Review Bd., 834 P.2d 568 (Utah Ct 
App. 1992). 
Prior practice. 
Ten agency decisions in which pharmacists 
committed equal or allegedly more significant 
violations of the law, but received substan-
tially lighter penalties than petitioner re-
ceived, raised a question about the consistency 
of his penalty with prior agency practice. 
Pickett v. Utah Dep't of Commerce, 218 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 51 (Ct. App. 1993). 
Review. 
Because POST (Division of Peace Officer 
Standards and Training) did not conduct any 
formal proceedings, and petitioner's filing of a 
"complaint" with POST about an officer did not 
require it to do so, the appellate court did not 
have jurisdiction to review POSTs decision not 
to pursue decertification of POST officer. Niel-
son v. Division of Peace Officer Stds. & Train-
ing, 851 P.2d 1201 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Standard of review. 
Under Subsection (4)(d), it is appropriate for 
a court to review an agency's interpretation of 
its statutorily granted powers and authority as 
a question of law, with no deference to the 
agency's view of the law. The correct ion-of-
error standard will be applied to such an issue 
and the agency's statutory interpretation will 
be upheld only if it is concluded to be not erro-
neous. Bevans v. Industrial Comm'n, 790 P.2d 
573 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Under Subsection (4)(d), a court may grant 
relief based upon an agency's erroneous inter-
pretation of law. This incorporates the correc-
tion-of-error standard previously applied by 
the Utah courts in cases involving agency in-
terpretations of law. Savage Indus., Inc. v. 
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664 (Utah 
1991). 
The legislature in enacting Subsection (4) in-
tended that the same standard used for deter-
mining the harmfulness of error in appeals 
from judicial proceedings should apply to re-
views of agency actions. Under this standard, 
an error will be harmless if it is sufficiently 
inconsequential that there is no reasonable 
likelihood that the error affected the outcome 
of the proceedings. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Utah 
State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991). 
Absent a grant of discretion, a correction-of-
error standard is used in reviewing an agency's 
interpretation or application of a statutory 
term. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Utah State Tax 
Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991); Mor-Flo 
Indus., Inc. v. Board of Review, 817 P.2d 328 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 
516 (Utah 1992). 
An agency's statutory construction should 
only be given deference when there is a grant 
of discretion to the agency concerning the lan-
guage in question, either expressly made in the 
statute or implied from the statutory language. 
Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 
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814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991); Uintah Oil Ass'n v. 
County Bd. of Equalization, 853 P.2d 894 
(Utah 1993). 
Constitutional questions are characterized 
as questions of law, and under Subsection 
(4)(d), agency determinations of general law — 
which include interpretations of the state and 
federal constitutions — are to be reviewed un-
der a correction-of-error standard, giving no 
deference to the agency's decision. Questar 
Pipeline Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 817 
P.2d 316 (Utah 1991). 
Under Subsection (4)(a), the Court of Ap-
peals reviews the constitutionality of the stat-
ute upon which an agency's action is based 
without deference, as a conclusion of law. 
Velarde v. Board of Review, 831 P.2d 123 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Because courts should uphold agency rules if 
they are reasonable and rational, courts should 
also uphold reasonable and rational departures 
from those rules by the agency absent a show-
ing that the departure violated some other 
right. Union Pac. R.R. v. Auditing Div., 842 
P.2d 876 (Utah 1992). 
Deference is given to an agency's statutory 
construction only when there is a grant of dis-
cretion to the agency concerning the language 
in question, either expressly made in the stat-
ute or implied from the statutory language. 
Absent a grant of discretion, a correction-of-
error standard is used in reviewing an agency's 
interpretation or application of a statutory 
term. Horton v. Utah State Retirement Bd., 
842 P.2d 928 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Since § 35-4-5(b)(l) provides that a claimant 
is ineligible for unemployment benefits if the 
individual is "discharged for just cause . . . if 
so found by the commission," the appellate 
court reviews the action of the Board of Review 
of the Utah Industrial Commission under Sub-
section (4)(h)(i) of this section for reasonable-
ness. Albertsons, Inc. v. Department of Emp. 
Sec., 854 P.2d 570 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
—Interpretation of statutory term. 
Absent a grant of discretion, a correction-of-
error standard is used in reviewing an agency's 
interpretation or application of a statutory 
term such as "injuriously exposed to the haz-
ards of such disease" in § 35-2-105. However, 
when the legislature either expressly or im-
plicitly grants the agency discretion to inter-
pret or apply a statutory term, a court will re-
view the agency's interpretation or application 
under a reasonableness standard. Luckau v. 
Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 840 P.2d 
811 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
—Questions of law. 
Intermediate deference should be granted to 
an agency's interpretation or application of 
specific laws when the legislature has explic-
itly or implicitly delegated discretion to the 
agency to interpret or apply that law. If there 
is no explicit delegation of discretion, and the 
issues are questions of constitutional law and 
statutory construction on which the commis-
sion's experience and expertise will be of no 
real assistance, the standard of intermediate 
deference should not be applied. Zissi v. State 
Tax Comm'r, 842 P.2d 848 (Utah 1992). 
Substantial evidence test. 
In applying the "substantial evidence test," 
the appellate court reviews the "whole record" 
before the court, and this review is distinguish-
able from both a de novo review and the "any 
competent evidence" standard of review. Grace 
Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
The "substantial evidence test" of Subsection 
(4)(g) grants appellate courts greater latitude 
in reviewing the record than was previously 
granted under the Utah Employment Security 
Act's "any evidence of substance test." Grace 
Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
"Substantial evidence" is more than a mere 
"scintilla" of evidence, though something less 
than the weight of the evidence. It is such rele-
vant evidence as a reasonable mind might ac-
cept as adequate to support a conclusion. Grace 
Drilling Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
"Substantial evidence" is that quantum and 
quality of relevant evidence that is adequate to 
convince a reasonable mind to support a con-
clusion. First Nat'l Bank v. County Bd. of 
Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163 (Utah 1990). 
The party challenging the findings must 
marshal all of the evidence supporting the 
findings and show that despite the supporting 
facts, the agency's findings are not supported 
by substantial evidence. First Nat'l Bank v. 
County Bd. of Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163 
(Utah 1990); Intermountain Health Care, Inc. 
v. Board of Review, 839 P.2d 841 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992). 
Substantial prejudice. 
Agency decision revoking social worker's li-
cense was reversed and his case was remanded 
for a new hearing, because the failure to afford 
him an opportunity to cross-examine the wit-
nesses against him resulted in "substantial 
prejudice." D.B. v. Division of Occupational & 
Professional Licensing, 779 P.2d 1145 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). 
The "substantial prejudice" phrase in Sub-
section (4) relates to the damage or harm suf-
fered by the person seeking review and was 
written to ensure that a court will not issue 
advisory opinions reviewing agency action 
when no true controversy has resulted from 
that action. The phrase does not relate to the 
degree of deference a court must give an 
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agency decision. Savage Indus., Inc. v. Utah 
State Tax Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664 (Utah 1991). 
Whole record t e s t 
The "whole record test" necessarily requires 
that a party challenging the board's findings of 
fact must marshall all of the evidence support-
ing the findings and show that despite the sup-
porting facts, and in light of the conflicting or 
contradictory evidence, the findings are not 
supported by substantial evidence. Grace Drill-
ing Co. v. Board of Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989). 
Under the "whole record test," a court must 
consider not only the evidence supporting the 
board's factual findings, but also the evidence 
that fairly detracts from the weight of the 
board's evidence. Grace Drilling Co. v. Board of 
Review, 776 P.2d 63 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Cited in Law Offices of David Paul White & 
Assocs. v. Board of Review, 778 P.2d 20 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989); Zimmerman v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 785 P.2d 1127 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); 
Nyrehn v. Industrial Comm'n, 800 P.2d 330 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990); Fred Meyer v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 800 P.2d 825 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); 
Heinecke v. Department of Commerce, 810 
P.2d 459 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); In re SAM Oil, 
Inc., 817 P.2d 299 (Utah 1991V, Salt Lake 
County ex rel. County Bd. of Equalization v. 
State Tax Comm'n, 819 P.2d 776 (Utah 1991); 
Bennion v. ANR Prod. Co., 819 P.2d 343 (Utah 
1991); Johnson-Bowles Cc. v. Department of 
Commerce, 829 P.2d 101 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); 
Department of Air Force v. Swider, 824 P.2d 
448 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Southern Utah Wil-
derness Alliance v. Board of State Lands & 
Forestry, 830 P.2d 233 (Utah 1992); Ferro v. 
Utah Dep't of Commerce, 828 P.2d 507 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992); MCI Telecommunications Corp. 
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 840 P.2d 765 (Utah 
1992); Cross v. Board of Review, 824 P.2d 1202 
(Utah Ct. App. 1992); Giesbrecht v. Board of 
Review, 828 P.2d 544 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); 
Stokes v. Board of Review, 832 P.2d 56 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992); Stewart v. Board of Review, 
831 P.2d 134 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Holland v. 
State Office of Educ, 834 P.2d 596 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992); Anderson v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 
839 P.2d 822 (Utah 1992); Gibson v. Depart-
ment of Emp. Sec., 840 P.2d 780 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992); LaSal Oil Co. v. Department of Envtl. 
Quality, 843 P.2d 1045 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); 
King v. Industrial Comm'n, 850 P.2d 1281 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993); Board of Equalization v. 
Sinclair Oil Corp., 853 P.2d 892 (Utah 1993); 
Niederhauser Ornamental & Metal Works Co. 
v. Tax Comm'n, 219 Utah Adv. Rep. 43 (Ct. 
App. 1993); Thonip Bros. Constr. v. Auditing 
Div. of Utah State Tax Comm'n, 221 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 39 (1993). 
63-46b-17. Judicial review — Type of relief. 
(1) (a) In either the review of informal adjudicative proceedings by the 
district court or the review of formal adjudicative proceedings by an ap-
pellate court, the court may award damages or compensation only to the 
extent expressly authorized by statute. 
(b) In granting relief, the court may: 
(i) order agency action required by law; 
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discretion as required by law; 
(iii) set aside or modify agency action; 
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of agency action; or 
(v) remand the matter to the agency for further proceedings. 
(2) Decisions on petitions for judicial review of final agency action are re-
viewable by a higher court, if authorized by statute. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-17, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 161, § 273. 
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F. "Handicap" means a physical or mental impair-
ment which substantially limits one or more of an 
individual's major life activities. 
1. Being regarded as having a handicap is equiva-
lent to being handicapped or having a handicap. 
2. Having a record of an impairment substantially 
limiting one or more major life activities is equiva-
lent to being handicapped or having a handicap. 
3. Major life activity means functions such as car-
ing for one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, 
seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and 
employment. 
4. An individual will be considered substantially 
limited in the major life activity of employment or 
working if the individual is likely to experience diffi-
culty in securing, retaining, or advancing in employ-
ment because of a handicap. 
5. Has a record of such an impairment means has a 
history of, or has been regarded as having, a mental 
or physical impairment that substantially limits one 
or more major life activity. 
6. Is regarded as having an impairment means: 
a. has a physical or mental impairment that does 
not substantially limit major life activities but is 
treated as constituting such a limitation; 
b. has a physical or mental impairment that sub-
stantially limits major life activities only as a result 
of the attitudes of others toward such an impairment; 
or 
c. has none of the impairments listed in the defini-
tion of physical or mental impairment above but is 
treated as having sucn an impairment. 
G. "He, His, Him, or Himself* shall refer to either 
sex. 
H. 'Investigator" shall mean the individual desig-
nated by the Commission or Director to investigate 
complaints alleging discriminatory or prohibited em-
ployment practices. 
I. "Qualified handicapped individual" means a 
handicapped individual who with reasonable accom-
modation can perform the essential functions of the 
job in question. 
J. "Reasonable accommodation": For the purpose of 
enforcement of these rules and regulations the follow-
ing criteria will be utilized to determine a reasonable 
accommodation. 
1. An employer shall make reasonable accommoda-
tion to the known physical or mental limitations of an 
otherwise qualified handicapped applicant or em-
ployee unless the employer can demonstrate that the 
accommodation would impose an undue hardship on 
the operation of its program 
2. Reasonable accommodation may include: 
a. making facilities used by the employees readily 
accessible to and useable by handicapped individuals; 
and 
b. job restructuring, modified work schedules, ac-
quisition or modification of equipment or devices, and 
other similar actions. 
3. In determining pursuant to Rule R560-1-2.J.1 
whether an accommodation would impose an undue 
hardship on the operation of an employer, factors to 
be considered include: 
a. the overall size of the employer's program with 
respect to number of employees, number and type of 
facilities, and size of budget; 
b. the type of the employer's operation, including 
the composition and structure of the employer's work 
force; and 
c. the nature and cost of the accommodation 
needed. 
4. An employer may not deny an employment op-
portunity to a qualified handicapped employee or ap-
plicant if the basis for the denial is the need to make 
reasonable accommodation to the physical or mental 
limitations of the employee or applicant. 
5. Each complaint will be handled on a case-by-case 
basis because of the variable nature of handicap and 
potential accommodation. 
K. The Division adopts the federal EEOC guide-
lines on sexual harassment as specified in 29 CFR 
Section 1604.11. 
R560-1-3. Procedures—Request for Agency Ac-
tion and Investigation File. 
A. CONTENTS OF REQUEST FOR AGENCY AC-
TION 
A request for agency action as specified in Section 
34-35-7.1, U.C.A., shall be filed at the Division office 
on a form designated by the Division. The completed 
form shall include all information required by Section 
63-46b-3(3), U.C.A. 
B. FILING OF REQUEST FOR AGENCY ACTION 
1. A request for agency action must be filed within 
180 day8 after the alleged discriminatory or prohib-
ited employment practice occurred. 
2. A request for agency action shall be filed either 
by personal delivery or regular mail addressed to the 
Division's office in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
3. Investigators and any other persons designated 
by the Commission, shall be available to assist in the 
drafting and filing of requests for agency action at the 
Division's office during normal business hours. 
C. RESPONSE/ANSWER TO REQUEST FOR 
AGENCY ACTION 
1. The Division shall mail a copy of the request for 
agency action to the charging party and the respon-
dent/employer within ten working days of the filing 
of the request for agency action. 
2. The respondent must answer the allegations of 
discrimination or prohibited employment practice set 
out in the request for agency action in writing within 
ten working days of receipt of the request for agency 
action. The response/answer shall be mailed to the 
Division office. 
D. AMENDMENT OF REQUEST FOR AGENCY 
ACTION 
1. All allegations of discrimination or prohibited 
employment practice set out in the request for agency 
action may be amended, either by the Commission or 
the charging party prior to commencement of an evi-
dentiary hearing and the respondent may amend its 
answer. Amendments made during or after an evi-
dentiary hearing may be made only with the permis-
sion of the presiding officer. The Commission shall 
permit liberal amendment of requests for agency ac-
tion and filing of supplemental requests for agency 
action in order to accomplish the purpose of the Act. 
2. Amendments or a supplemental request for 
agency action shall be in writing, or on forms fur-
nished by the Division, signed and verified. Copies 
shall be filed in the same manner as in the case of 
original requests for agency action. 
3. Amendments or a supplemental request for 
agency action shall be served on the respondent as in 
the case of an original request for agency action. 
4. A request for agency action or a supplemental 
request for agency action may be withdrawn by the 
charging party prior to the issuance of a final order. 
E. MAILING OF REQUEST FOR AGENCY AC-
TION 
The mailing specified in Section 63-46b-3(3), 
U.C.A., shall be performed by the Division and the 
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persons known to have a direct interest in the re-
quested agency action as specified in Section 
63-46b-3(3)(b), U.C.A., shall be the charging party 
and the respondent^employer. 
F. CLASSIFICATION OF PROCEEDING FOR 
PURPOSE OF UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE PROCE-
DURES ACT 
Pursuant to Section 63-46b-4(l), U.C.A., the proce-
dures specified in Section 34-35-7.l(l)-(5), U.C.A., are 
an informal process with no hearing and are gov-
erned by Section 63-46b-5, U.C.A. Any settlement 
conferences scheduled pursuant to Section 
34-35-7.l(3)(a), U.C.A., are not adjudicative hearings. 
G. PRESIDING OFFICER 
For those procedures specified in Section 
34-35-7.1(l)-(5), U.C.A., the presiding officer shall be 
the Director or the Director's designee. The presiding 
officer for the formal hearing referred to in Section 
34-35-7.K6M11), U.C.A., shall be appointed by the 
Commission. 
R560-1-4. Procedures — Initial Decision Making 
and Review. 
The following rules pertain to the procedures speci-
fied in Section 34-35-7.1, U.C.A. 
A. For purposes of requesting review of the initial 
Determination and Order, the following provisions 
and those of Section 63-46b-12, U.C.A., shall apply: 
1. The initial Determination and Order of the Divi-
sion, after the completion of an investigation on a 
charge of discrimination, shall be issued by the Direc-
tor. The Director may request that the Commission's 
legal staff review an investigatory file and make a 
recommendation to the Director prior to the issuance 
of the initial Determination and Order. The Director 
may refer a request for agency action back to an in-
vestigator for further investigation when necessary. 
2. Division Orders, referred to in Rule R560-1-4.A.1 
as the initial Determination and Order, are not final 
Commission Orders until either the time to file a 
written request to the Director for an evidentiary 
hearing to review de novo the Director's Determina-
tion and Order has expired or until the Order is af-
firmed in a Commission Order on review per Section 
63-46b-12, U.C.A. 
3. A request for an evidentiary hearing to review de 
novo the Director's Determination and Order must be 
in writing and submitted to the Director within 30 
days of the date of the initial Determination and Or-
der. 
4. A request for an evidentiary hearing must state 
a reason why the hearing is necessary. A hearing will 
not be considered necessary if the hearing will not 
add to the evidence in the investigatory file or cause 
the evidence in the investigatory file to be viewed 
differently. In most cases, the need to cross-examine 
the individuals who have submitted affidavits sup-
portive of the initial finding or determination of the 
Commission will be considered a valid reason for 
granting a request for a hearing by the Commission. 
5. Either party may file a written request for re-
view of the presiding officer's Order in accordance 
with Section 63-46b-12, U.C.A. 
B. Where the complaint is one of handicap discrimi-
nation, whether risk of future injury or increased cost 
of insurance coverage will be allowed as a defense to 
handicap discrimination will be at the discretion of 
the Division and shall be dealt with on a case-by-case 
basis subject to the following limitations: 
1. The respondent/employer seeking to use the de-
fense of risk of future injury must provide reliable 
medical evidence showing a causal connection be-
tween the increased risk of future injury and the 
handicap alleged to cause the increased risk. 
2. The respondent/employer seeking to use the de-
fense of increased cost of insurance premium must 
show with verified documentary evidence that a sig-
nificant insurance premium increase would occur if 
the charging party were hired or remained in the 
position at issue. 
C. It shall be the practice of the Division to rely on 
federal case law regarding discrimination in inter-
preting the Act in cases where the federal law being 
interpreted by the courts closely parallels the Act and 
where state law interpretation is non-existent. 
R560-1-5. Classification of Proceeding for Pur-
pose of Utah Administrative Procedures Act 
The adjudicative proceeding referred to in Section 
34-35-7.K6M10), U.C.A., is a formal adjudicative 
hearing which shall occur following the investigation 
process referred to in Section 34-35-7.l(l)-(5), U.C.A. 
The formal hearing shall be held after the Director 
sends the request for an evidentiary hearing to the 
Legal Counsel, who will ensure that the require-
ments imposed by Rule R560-1-4.A.3 and 4 have been 
satisfied and that a formal hearing is necessary to 
finally resolve the matter and when it is appropriate 
pursuant to Section 63-46b-4(3), U.C.A. 
R560-1-6. Declaratory Orders. 
A. PURPOSE 
As required by Section 63-46b-21, this rule pro-
vides the procedures for submission, review, and dis-
position of petitions for agency Declaratory Orders on 
the applicability of statutes, rules, and Orders gov-
erning or issued by the agency. 
B. PETITION FORM AND FILING 
1. The petition shall be addressed and delivered to 
the Director, who shall mark the petition with the 
date of receipt. 
2. The petition shall: 
(a) be clearly designated as a request for an agency 
Declaratory Order; 
(b) identify the statute, rule, or Order to be re-
viewed; 
(c) describe in detail the situation or circumstances 
in which applicability is to be reviewed; 
(d) describe the reason or need for the applicability 
review, addressing in particular why the review 
should not be considered frivolous; 
(e) include an address and telephone where the pe-
titioner can be contacted during regular work days; 
(0 declare whether the petitioner has participated 
in a completed or on-going adjudicative proceeding 
concerning the same issue within the past 12 months; 
and 
(g) be signed by the petitioner. 
C. REVIEWABILITY 
The agency shall not review a petition for a Declar-
atory Order that is: 
1. not within the jurisdiction and competence of the 
agency; 
2. trivial, irrelevant, or immaterial; or 
3. otherwise excluded by state or federal law. 
D. PETITION REVIEW AND DISPOSITION 
1. The Director shall promptly review and consider 
the petition and may: 
(a) meet with the petitioner; 
(b) consult with Legal Counsel; or 
(c) take any action consistent with law that the 
agency deems necessary to provide the petition ade-
quate review and due consideration. 
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persons known to have a direct interest in the re-
quested agency action as specified in Section 
63-46b-3(3)(b), U.C.A., shall be the charging party 
and the respondent/employer. 
F. CLASSIFICATION OF PROCEEDING FOR 
PURPOSE OF UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE PROCE-
DURES ACT 
Pursuant to Section 63-46b-4(l), U.C.A., the proce-
dures specified in Section 34-35-7.l(l)-(5), U.C.A., are 
an informal process with no hearing and are gov-
erned by Section 63-46b-5, U.C.A. Any settlement 
conferences scheduled pursuant to Section 
34-35-7. l(3)(a), U.C.A., are not adjudicative hearings. 
G. PRESIDING OFFICER 
For those procedures specified in Section 
34-35-7.1(l)-(5), U.C.A., the presiding officer shall be 
the Director or the Director's designee. The presiding 
officer for the formal hearing referred to in Section 
34-35-7.K6M11), U.C.A., shall be appointed by the 
Commission. 
R560-1-4. Procedures — Initial Decision Making 
and Review. 
The following rules pertain to the procedures speci-
fied in Section 34-35-7.1, U.C.A. 
A. For purposes of requesting review of the initial 
Determination and Order, the following provisions 
and those of Section 63-46b-12, U.C.A., shall apply: 
1. The initial Determination and Order of the Divi-
sion, after the completion of an investigation on a 
charge of discrimination, shall be issued by the Direc-
tor. The Director may request that the Commission's 
legal staff review an investigatory file and make a 
recommendation to the Director prior to the issuance 
of the initial Determination and Order. The Director 
may refer a request for agency action back to an in-
vestigator for further investigation when necessary. 
2. Division Orders, referred to in Rule R560-1-4.A.1 
as the initial Determination and Order, are not final 
Commission Orders until either the time to file a 
written request to the Director for an evidentiary 
hearing to review de novo the Director's Determina-
tion and Order has expired or until the Order is af-
firmed in a Commission Order on review per Section 
63-46b-12, U.C.A. 
3. A request for an evidentiary hearing to review de 
novo the Director's Determination and Order must be 
in writing and submitted to the Director within 30 
days of the date of the initial Determination and Or-
der. 
4. A request for an evidentiary hearing must state 
a reason why the hearing is necessary. A hearing will 
not be considered necessary if the hearing will not 
add to the evidence in the investigatory file or cause 
the evidence in the investigatory file to be viewed 
differently. In most cases, the need to cross-examine 
the individuals who have submitted affidavits sup-
portive of the initial finding or determination of the 
Commission will be considered a valid reason for 
granting a request for a hearing by the Commission. 
5. Either party may file a written request for re-
view of the presiding officer's Order in accordance 
with Section 63-46b-12, U.C.A. 
B. Where the complaint is one of handicap discrimi-
nation, whether risk of future injury or increased cost 
of insurance coverage will be allowed as a defense to 
handicap discrimination will be at the discretion of 
the Division and shall be dealt with on a case-by-case 
basis subject to the following limitations: 
1. The respondent/employer seeking to use the de-
fense of risk of future injury must provide reliable 
medical evidence showing a causal connection be-
tween the increased risk of future injury and the 
handicap alleged to cause the increased risk. 
2. The respondent/employer seeking to use the de-
fense of increased cost of insurance premium must 
show with verified documentary evidence that a sig-
nificant insurance premium increase would occur if 
the charging party were hired or remained in the 
position at issue. 
C. It shall be the practice of the Division to rely on 
federal case law regarding discrimination in inter-
preting the Act in cases where the federal law being 
interpreted by the courts closely parallels the Act and 
where state law interpretation is non-existent. 
R560-1-5. Classification of Proceeding for Pur-
pose of Utah Administrative Procedures A c t 
The adjudicative proceeding referred to in Section 
34-35-7.1(6)-(10), U.C.A., is a formal adjudicative 
hearing which shall occur following the investigation 
process referred to in Section 34-35-7.1UM5), U.C.A. 
The formal hearing shall be held after the Director 
sends the request for an evidentiary hearing to the 
Legal Counsel, who will ensure that the require-
ments imposed by Rule R560-1-4.A.3 and 4 have been 
satisfied and that a formal hearing is necessary to 
finally resolve the matter and when it is appropriate 
pursuant to Section 63-46b-4(3), U.C.A. 
R560-1-6. Declaratory Orders. 
A. PURPOSE 
As required by Section 63-46b-21, this rule pro-
vides the procedures for submission, review, and dis-
position of petitions for agency Declaratory Orders on 
the applicability of statutes, rules, and Orders gov-
erning or issued by the agency. 
B. PETITION FORM AND FILING 
1. The petition shall be addressed and delivered to 
the Director, who shall mark the petition with the 
date of receipt. 
2. The petition shall: 
(a) be clearly designated as a request for an agency 
Declaratory Order; 
(b) identify the statute, rule, or Order to be re-
viewed; 
(c) describe in detail the situation or circumstances 
in which applicability is to be reviewed; 
(d) describe the reason or need for the applicability 
review, addressing in particular why the review 
should not be considered frivolous; 
(e) include an address and telephone where the pe-
titioner can be contacted during regular work days; 
(f) declare whether the petitioner has participated 
in a completed or on-going adjudicative proceeding 
concerning the same issue within the past 12 months; 
and 
(g) be signed by the petitioner. 
C. REVIEWABILITY 
The agency shall not review a petition for a Declar-
atory Order that is: 
1. not within the jurisdiction and competence of the 
agency; 
2. trivial, irrelevant, or immaterial; or 
3. otherwise excluded by state or federal law. 
D. PETITION REVIEW AND DISPOSITION 
1. The Director shall promptly review and consider 
the petition and may: 
(a) meet with the petitioner; 
(b) consult with Legal Counsel; or 
(c) take any action consistent with law that the 
agency deems necessary to provide the petition ade-
quate review and due consideration. 
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persons known to have a direct interest in the re-
quested agency action as specified in Section 
63-46b-3(3)(b), U.C.A., shall be the charging party 
and the respondent/employer. 
F. CLASSIFICATION OF PROCEEDING FOR 
PURPOSE OF UTAH ADMINISTRATIVE PROCE-
DURES ACT 
Pursuant to Section 63-46b-4(l), U.C.A., the proce-
dures specified in Section 34-35-7.1(l)-(5), U.C.A., are 
an informal process with no hearing and are gov-
erned by Section 63-46b-5, U.C.A. Any settlement 
conferences scheduled pursuant to Section 
34-35-7. l(3)(a), U.C.A., are not adjudicative hearings. 
G. PRESIDING OFFICER 
For those procedures specified in Section 
34-35-7.1(l)-(5), U.C.A., the presiding officer shall be 
the Director or the Director's designee. The presiding 
officer for the formal hearing referred to in Section 
34-35-7.1(6)-(11), U.C.A., shall be appointed by the 
Commission. 
R560-1-4. Procedures — Initial Decision Making 
and Review. 
The following rules pertain to the procedures speci-
fied in Section 34-35-7.1, U.C.A. 
A. For purposes of requesting review of the initial 
Determination and Order, the following provisions 
and those of Section 63-46b-12, U.C.A., shall apply: 
1. The initial Determination and Order of the Divi-
sion, after the completion of an investigation on a 
charge of discrimination, shall be issued by the Direc-
tor. The Director may request that the Commission's 
legal staff review an investigatory file and make a 
recommendation to the Director prior to the issuance 
of the initial Determination and Order. The Director 
may refer a request for agency action back to an in-
vestigator for further investigation when necessary. 
2. Division Orders, referred to in Rule R560-1-4.A.1 
as the initial Determination and Order, are not final 
Commission Orders until either the time to file a 
written request to the Director for an evidentiary 
hearing to review de novo the Director's Determina-
tion and Order has expired or until the Order is af-
firmed in a Commission Order on review per Section 
63-46b-12, U.C.A. 
3. A request for an evidentiary hearing to review de 
novo the Director's Determination and Order must be 
in writing and submitted to the Director within 30 
days of the date of the initial Determination and Or-
der. 
4. A request for an evidentiary hearing must state 
a reason why the hearing is necessary. A hearing will 
not be considered necessary if the hearing will not 
add to the evidence in the investigatory file or cause 
the evidence in the investigatory file to be viewed 
differently. In most cases, the need to cross-examine 
the individuals who have submitted affidavits sup-
portive of the initial finding or determination of the 
Commission will be considered a valid reason for 
granting a request for a hearing by the Commission. 
5. Either party may file a written request for re-
view of the presiding officer's Order in accordance 
with Section 63-46b-12, U.C.A. 
B. Where the complaint is one of handicap discrimi-
nation, whether risk of future injury or increased cost 
of insurance coverage will be allowed as a defense to 
handicap discrimination will be at the discretion of 
the Division and shall be dealt with on a case-by-case 
basis subject to the following limitations: 
1. The respondent/employer seeking to use the de-
fense of risk of future injury must provide reliable 
medical evidence showing a causal connection be-
tween the increased risk of future injury and the 
handicap alleged to cause the increased risk. 
2. The respondent/employer seeking to use the de-
fense of increased cost of insurance premium must 
show with verified documentary evidence that a sig-
nificant insurance premium increase would occur if 
the charging party were hired or remained in the 
position at issue. 
C. It shall be the practice of the Division to rely on 
federal case law regarding discrimination in inter-
preting the Act in cases where the federal law being 
interpreted by the courts closely parallels the Act and 
where state law interpretation is non-existent. 
R560-1-5. Classification of Proceeding for Pur-
pose of Utah Administrative Procedures Act 
The adjudicative proceeding referred to in Section 
34-35-7.1(6)-(10), U.C.A., is a formal adjudicative 
hearing which shall occur following the investigation 
process referred to in Section 34-35-7. K1M5), U.C.A. 
The formal hearing shall be held after the Director 
sends the request for an evidentiary hearing to the 
Legal Counsel, who will ensure that the require-
ments imposed by Rule R560-1-4.A.3 and 4 have been 
satisfied and that a formal hearing is necessary to 
finally resolve the matter and when it is appropriate 
pursuant to Section 63-46b-4(3), U.C.A. 
R560-1-6. Declaratory Orders. 
A. PURPOSE 
As required by Section 63-46b-21, this rule pro-
vides the procedures for submission, review, and dis-
position of petitions for agency Declaratory Orders on 
the applicability of statutes, rules, and Orders gov-
erning or issued by the agency. 
B. PETITION FORM AND FIUNG 
1. The petition shall be addressed and delivered to 
the Director, who shall mark the petition with the 
date of receipt. 
2. The petition shall: 
(a) be clearly designated as a request for an agency 
Declaratory Order; 
(b) identify the statute, rule, or Order to be re-
viewed; 
(c) describe in detail the situation or circumstances 
in which applicability is to be reviewed; 
(d) describe the reason or need for the applicability 
review, addressing in particular why the review 
should not be considered frivolous; 
(e) include an address and telephone where the pe-
titioner can be contacted during regular work days; 
(f) declare whether the petitioner has participated 
in a completed or on-going adjudicative proceeding 
concerning the same issue within the past 12 months; 
and 
(g) be signed by the petitioner. 
C. REVIEWABILITY 
The agency shall not review a petition for a Declar-
atory Order that is: 
1. not within the jurisdiction and competence of the 
agency; 
2. trivial, irrelevant, or immaterial; or 
3. otherwise excluded by state or federal law. 
D. PETITION REVIEW AND DISPOSITION 
1. The Director shall promptly review and consider 
the petition and may: 
(a) meet with the petitioner, 
(b) consult with Legal Counsel; or 
(c) take any action consistent with law that the 
agency deems necessary to provide the petition ade-
quate review and due consideration. 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS question had been used for years for grazing 
Driver's license suspension. a n d w a s ""developed sagebrush ground, mea-
Supersedeas bond s u r e w a s t h e v a , u e o f s u c h l a n d rather than the 
-Damages recoverable. v a l u e ° f t h e ! a n d {" agricultural purposes 
Speculative e v e n t n o u 6 n plaintiff had announced that he 
—Failure to file would use the land for agricultural purposes 
Effect on lis pendens. a n d i n f a c t h i s subsequent grantee did so use 
p u r p o s e . the land. Prospective profits to be derived from 
-^  . , .. . a business which is not yet established but one 
Dnver a license suspens.on
 m e r e , j n c o n t e i a t i o n a r e generally too un-
Absent a strong showing of the likelihood of £
 a m J J a t i v e to f o l ^ a hJis for r e . 
success on the merits, the balancing of the fac
 c 0 J e n k i n s v M m U u h 4 8 0 26Q 
tors to be considered in assessing an apphca-
 p «J coo (1953) 
tion for a stay of a driver's license suspension 
under § 41-6-44.10 (implied consent) tips in fa- —Failure to file. 
vor of denying a stay due to important public
 E f f e c t o n Us pendens. 
policy implications. Jensen v. Schwendiman,
 F a i l u r e to f u r n i s h a superSedeas bond had no 
744 P.2d 1026 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
 e f f e c t o n t h e n o t i c e g i v e n b v a r e c o r d ed lis pen-
Supersedeas bond. dens during the time after judgment and pend-
—Damages recoverable. ing appeal. Hidden Meadows Dev. Co. v. Mills, 
Speculative. 5 9 ° P 2 d 1 2 4 4 ( U t a h 1 9 7 9 )-
Where supersedeas bond was filed by defen- —Purpose. 
dant which allowed him to retain real property The purpose of a supersedeas bond is not to 
pending appeal, which appeal was unsuccess- stay the accrual of obligations but to stay the 
ful, plaintiff could recover for temporarily be- execution or enforcement thereof. Lund v. 
ing deprived of use of land. Where the land in Lund, 6 Utah 2d 425, 315 P.2d 856 (1957). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 4 Am Jur. 2d Appeal and C.J.S. — 4A CJ.S. Appeal and Error §§ 625 
Error §§ 364 to 373. to 679. 
Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error *= 458. 
Rule 9. Docketing statement. 
(a) Time for filing. Within 21 days after a notice of appeal, cross-appeal, or 
a petition for review is filed, the appellant, cross-appellate, or petitioner shall 
file a docketing statement with the clerk of the appellate court. An original 
and three copies of the docketing statement shall be filed with the court. 
(b) Purpose of docketing statement. The docketing statement is not a 
brief and should not contain arguments or procedural motions. It is used by 
the appellate court in assigning cases to the Supreme Court or to the Court of 
Appeals when both have jurisdiction, in making certifications to the Supreme 
Court, in classifying cases for determining the priority to be accorded them, in 
making summary dispositions when appropriate, and in making calendar 
assignments. 
(c) Content of docketing statement. The docketing statement shall con-
tain the following information in the order set forth below: 
(1) The date of the judgment or order sought to be reviewed; the date of 
all motions filed pursuant to Rules 50(a) and (b), 52(b), 54(b), or 59, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure; the date and effect of all orders disposing of such 
motions; and the date the notice of appeal or the petition for review was 
filed. 
(2) (A) The specific rule or statutory authority that confers jurisdiction 
on the appellate court to decide the appeal, the petition for review, or, 
in the case of an interlocutory appeal, the date of the appellate court 
order allowing the appeal and the issues which may be appealed 
pursuant to the granting of the interlocutory appeal. 
(B) If an appeal is from an order in a multiple-party or a multiple-
claim case, and the judgment has been certified as a final judgment 
by the trial court pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, 
(i) a statement of what claims and parties remain before the 
trial court for adjudication and 
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(ii) a statement of whether the facts underlying the appeal are 
sufficiently similar to the facts underlying the claims remaining 
before the trial court to constitute res judicata on those claims. 
(3) A concise statement of the nature of the proceeding, e.g., "this ap-
peal is from a final judgment or decree of the court" or 
"this petition is to review an order of administrative 
agency." 
(4) A concise statement of facts material to a consideration of the ques-
tions presented. 
(5) The issues presented by the appeal, expressed in the terms and 
circumstances of the case, but without unnecessary detail. The questions 
should not be repetitious. General conclusions such as "the judgment of 
the trial court is not supported by the law or facts," are not acceptable. 
For each issue appellant must state the applicable standard of appellate 
review and cite supporting authority. 
(6) If the appeal is subject to assignment by the Supreme Court to the 
Court of Appeals, the phrase "Subject to assignment to the Court of Ap-
peals" should appear immediately under the title of the document, i.e., 
"Docketing Statement." 
(7) If the appeal is subject to assignment by the Supreme Court to the 
Court of Appeals, the appellant may set forth concisely in not more than 
two pages why the Supreme Court should decide the case. The Supreme 
Court may, for example, consider whether the case presents or involves 
one or more of the following: 
(A) a substantial constitutional issue not yet decided and, if so, 
what the issue or issues are; 
(B) an issue of first impression in the state and of substantial im-
portance in the administration of justice; 
(C) a conflict in Court of Appeals decisions that needs to be re-
solved by the Supreme Court; 
(D) any other persuasive reason why the Supreme Court should 
resolve the issue. 
(8) Citations to statutes, rules, or cases believed to be determinative of 
the respective issues stated. 
(9) A reference to all related or prior appeals in the case. If the refer-
ence is to a prior appeal, the appropriate citation should be given. 
(d) Necessary attachments. Attached to each copy of the docketing state-
ment shall be a copy of the following: 
(1) The judgment or order sought to be reviewed; 
(2) Any opinion or findings; 
(3) All motions filed pursuant to Rules 50(a) and (b), 52(b), 54(b), and 
59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and orders disposing of such motions; 
and 
(4) The notice of appeal and any order extending the time for the filing 
of a notice of appeal. 
(e) Attachment to indicate date filed. The attachments required by this 
rule must bear a clear representation of the original date of filing by means of 
the trial courts filing seal or mark or a copy conformed to the original by the 
trial court. 
(f) Response to statement regarding assignment. If the appeal is sub-
ject to assignment by the Supreme Court to the Court of Appeals, the appellee 
may file a response to the appellant's contentions in subparagraph (c)(7). The 
response may support or oppose the appellant's position, shall not be more 
than two pages long, and shall be filed within 10 days after service of the 
docketing statement. 
(g) Consequences of failure to comply. Docketing statements which fail 
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to comply with this rule will not be accepted. Failure to comply may result in 
dismissal of the appeal or the petition. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — The content (a) substituted "three" for "seven" and "with 
0f the docket statement has been slightly reor- the court" for "in the Supreme Court" in the 
Aered to first state information governing the second sentence and deleted the third sentence, 
jurisdiction of the court. requiring an original and four copies to be filed 
The docket statement and briefs contain a in the Court of Appeals, and in Subdivision 
new section requiring a statement of the appli- (c)(2) added the (A) and (B) designations and 
cable standard of review, with citation of sup- substituted all the language of Subdivision 
porting authority, for each issue presented on (2KB) after "multiple-claim case" for "Particu-
appeal. lar attention should be paid to the require-
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend- ments of Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
ment, effective October 1, 1992, in Subdivision dure," making a related stylistic change. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS has original appellate jurisdiction over the 
t case. Gregory v. Fourthwest Invs., Ltd., 735 
—Authority for original appellate jurisdiction. P 2 d 3 3 ( U t a h 1 9 8 7 )-
Failure to comply. Failure to comply. 
Content Docketing statements must fully comply 
-Authority for original appellate jurisdic- w i t h t h i s ™le- Failure to comply will result in 
tion. dismissal of the appeal, particularly when 
In all cases appealed after January 1, 1987, counsel ignores the court's request that the 
reference to § 78-2-2 will be considered insuffi- statement be properly amended. Brooks v. De-
cient; instead the appropriate subsection must partment of Emp. Sec, 736 P.2d 241 (Utah 
be included to alert the Supreme Court that it 1987). 
Rule 10. Motion for summary disposition. 
(a) Time for tiling; grounds for motion. Within 10 days after the docket-
ing statement is served, a party may move: 
(1) To dismiss the appeal or the petition for review on the basis that the 
appellate court has no jurisdiction; or 
(2) To affirm the order or judgment which is the subject of review on 
the basis that the grounds for review are so insubstantial as not to merit 
further proceedings and consideration by the appellate court; or 
(3) To reverse the order or judgment which is the subject of review on 
the basis of manifest error. 
(b) Number of copies; form of motion. An original and seven copies of a 
motion made pursuant to this rule shall be filed with the Clerk of the Su-
preme Court. An original and four copies shall be filed with the Clerk of the 
Court of Appeals. The motion shall be in the form prescribed by Rule 23. 
(c) Filing of response. The party moved against shall have 10 days from 
the service of such a motion in which to file a response. An original response 
and seven copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original response 
and four copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. 
(d) Submission of motion; suspension of further proceedings. Upon 
the filing of a response or the expiration of time therefor, the motion shall be 
submitted to the court for consideration and an appropriate order. The time 
for taking other steps in the appellate procedure is suspended pending disposi-
tion of a motion to affirm or reverse or dismiss. 
(e) Ruling of court. The court, upon its own motion, and on such notice as 
it directs, may dismiss an appeal or petition for review if the court lacks 
jurisdiction; or may summarily affirm the judgment or order which is the 
subject of review, if it plainly appears that no substantial question is pre-
sented; or may summarily reverse in cases of manifest error. 
(f) Deferral of ruling. As to any issue raised by a motion for summary 
disposition, the court may defer its ruling until plenary presentation and 
consideration of the case. 
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TITLE III. 
REVIEW AND ENFORCEMENT OF ORDERS OF 
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES, COMMIS-
SIONS, AND COMMITTEES. 
Rule 14. Review of administrative orders: how obtained; 
intervention. 
(a) Petition for review of order; joint petition. When judicial review by 
the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals is provided by statute of an order 
or decision of an administrative agency, board, commission, committee, or 
officer (hereinafter the term "agency" shall include agency, board, commis-
sion, committee, or officer), a petition for review shall be filed with the clerk of 
the appellate court within the time prescribed by statute, or if there is no time 
prescribed, then within 30 days after the date of the written decision or order. 
The term "petition for review" includes a petition to enjoin, set aside, suspend, 
modify, or otherwise review a notice of appeal or a writ of certiorari. The 
petition shall specify the parties seeking review and shall designate the re-
spondents) and the order or decision, or part thereof, to be reviewed. In each 
case, the agency shall be named respondent. The State of Utah shall be 
deemed a respondent if so required by statute, even though not so designated 
in the petition. If two or more persons are entitled to petition for review of the 
same order and their interests are such as to make joinder practicable, they 
may file a joint petition for review and may thereafter proceed as a single 
petitioner. 
(b) Statutory and docketing fees. At the time of filing any petition for 
review, the party obtaining the review shall pay to the clerk of the appellate 
court such filing fees as are established by law, and also the fee for docketing 
the appeal. The clerk shall not accept a petition for review unless the filing 
and docketing fees are paid. 
(c) Service of petition. A copy of the petition for review shall be served by 
the petitioner on the named respondent(s), upon all other parties to the pro-
ceeding before the agency, and upon the Attorney General of Utah, if the state 
is a party, in the manner prescribed by Rule 3(e). The petitioner, at the time of 
filing the petition for review, shall also file with the clerk of the appellate 
court a certificate reflecting service upon all parties to the agency proceeding 
who have been served. 
(d) Intervention. Any person who seeks to intervene in a proceeding under 
this rule shall serve upon all parties to the proceeding and upon all parties 
who participated before the agency, and file with the clerk of the appellate 
court a motion for leave to intervene. The motion shall contain a concise 
statement of the interest of the moving party and the grounds upon which 
intervention is sought. A motion for leave to intervene shall be filed within 40 
days of the date on which the petition for review is filed. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Means of filing petition. 
Time for filing. 
Cited. 
Means of filing petition. 
Commencing petitioner's appeal requires fil-
ing the petition with the clerk. Filing a docu-
ment requires that the document be deposited 
with the court clerk, and not with the post of-
fice or other means of delivery. Silva v Depart-
ment of Emp. Sec, 786 P.2d 246 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). 
Service upon counsel or other parties is re-
quired by this rule, and failure to do so may be 
grounds for appropriate sanctions. However, 
service of a petition for review or notice of ap-
peal on an opposing party does not substitute 
for nor accomplish the act of filing that appeal 
with the clerk. Silva v. Department of Emp. 
Sec, 786 P.2d 246 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Time for filing. 
The appeal time commences when the final 
agency order issues and not when allegedly re-
ceived by a party. Silva v. Department of Emp. 
Sec, 786 P.2d 246 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
The 30-day time period for filing an appeal is 
not extended because the agency's decision was 
mailed to petitioner and was not received by 
393 UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE Rule 18 
petitioner until days after its service. Silva v. Cited in Wiggins v. Board of Review, 824 
Department of Emp. Sec, 786 P.2d 246 (Utah P.2d 1199 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Ct. App. 1990). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 2 Am. Jur. 2d Administra-
tive Law § 553 et seq. 
A.L.R. — Court review of bar examiners' de-
cision on applicant's examination, 39 A.L.R.3d 
719. 
Standing of civic or property owners' associa-
tion to challenge zoning board decision (as ag-
grieved party), 8 A.L.R.4th 1087. 
Standing of zoning board of appeals or simi-
Rules 15, 16. Reserved. 
Compiler's Notes. — Rule 15, relating to 
the contents of the record on review, and Rule 
16, prescribing the procedure for filing a record 
Rule 17. Stay pending review. 
Application for a stay of a decision or order of an agency pending direct 
review in the appellate court shall ordinarily be made in the first instance to 
the agency if the agency is authorized by law to grant a stay. If a motion for 
such relief is made to the appellate court, the motion shall show that applica-
tion to the agency for the relief sought is not practicable, or that application 
has been made to the agency and denied, with the reasons given by it for 
denial. The motion shall also show the reasons for the relief requested and the 
facts relied upon, and if the facts are subject to dispute, the motion shall be 
supported by affidavits or other sworn statements or copies thereof. With the 
motion shall be filed those parts of the record relevant to the relief sought. 
Reasonable notice of the filing of the motion and any hearing shall be given to 
all parties to the proceeding in the appellate court. The appellate court may 
condition relief under this rule upon the filing of a bond or other appropriate 
security. The motion shall be filed with the clerk and normally will be consid-
ered by the court, but in exceptional cases where such procedure would be 
impracticable due to the requirements of time, the application may be consid-
ered by a single justice or judge of the court. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Validity and construction of state suspending professional, trade, or occupational 
statutory provision forbidding court to stay, license, 42 A.L.R.4th 516. 
pending review, judgment or order revoking or 
Rule 18. Applicability of other rules to review. 
All provisions of these rules are applicable to review of decisions or orders of 
agencies, except that Rules 3 through 8 are not applicable. As used in any 
applicable rule, the term "appellant" includes a petitioner in proceedings to 
review the orders of an agency, commission or board. The term "appellee" 
includes the respondent, which may be the agency, commission, or board. The 
term "clerk of the trial court" includes the chief executive officer of the 
agency, commission, or board or the officer's designee. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend- commission or board" for "agency orders" in 
ment, effective October 1, 1992, deleted "and the second sentence, and added the third and 
11 through 13" after "3 through 8" in the first fourth sentences, 
sentence, substituted "the orders of an agency, 
lar body to appeal reversal of its decision, 13 
A.L.R.4th 1130. 
Judicial review of administrative ruling af-
fecting conduct or outcome of publicly regu-
lated horse, dog, or motor vehicle race, 36 
A.L.R.4th 1169. 
Key Numbers. — Administrative Law «= 
651 et seq. 
for review, are repealed effective October 1, 
1992. 
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papers shall be signed by counsel of record or by a party who is not repre-
sented by counsel. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — Paragraph Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
(e) is added to Rule 21 to consolidate various ment, effective October 1, 1992, added the last 
signature provisions formerly found in other sentence in Subdivision (b). 
sections of the rules. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 4 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error *= 
Error §§ 316 to 322. 327(6). 
C.J.S. — 4A C.JS. Appeal and Error 
§ 594(1) et seq. 
Rule 22. Computation and enlargement of time, 
(a) Computation of time. In computing any period of time prescribed by 
these rules, by an order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of 
the act, event, or default from which the designated period of time begins to 
run shall not be included. The last day of the period shall be included, unless 
it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, in which event the period 
extends until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a 
legal holiday. When the period of time prescribed or allowed is less than seven 
days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays shall be excluded 
in the computation. As used in this rule, "legal holiday" includes days desig-
nated as holidays by the state or federal governments. 
(b) Enlargement of time. 
(1) Motions for an enlargement of time for filing briefs beyond the time 
permitted by stipulation of the parties under Rule 26(a) are not favored. 
(2) The court for good cause shown may upon motion enlarge the time 
prescribed by these rules or by its order for doing any act, or may permit 
an act to be done after the expiration of such time, but the court may not 
enlarge the time for filing a notice of appeal or a petition for review from 
an order of an administrative agency, except as specifically authorized by 
law. For the purpose of this rule, good cause includes, but is not limited 
to, the complexity of the case on appeal, engagement in other litigation, 
and extreme hardship to counsel. 
(3) A motion for an enlargement of time shall be filed prior to the 
expiration of the time for which the enlargement is sought. If the enlarge-
ment of time is greater than six days, the motion shall be filed at least 
five days prior to expiration of time for which enlargement is sought, 
unless it is shown that the facts which form the basis for the motion: 
(A) did not exist earlier or 
(B) were not known earlier and with the exercise of diligence could 
not have been known earlier. 
(4) A motion for enlargement of time shall state: 
(A) with particularity the good cause for granting the motion; 
(B) whether the movant has previously been granted an enlarge-
ment of time and, if so, the number and duration of such enlarge-
ments; 
(C) when the time will expire for doing the act for which the en-
largement of time is sought; and 
(D) the date on which the act for which the enlargement of time is 
sought will be completed. 
(5) (A) If the good cause relied upon is engagement in other litigation, 
the motion shall: 
(i) identify such litigation by caption, number and court; 
(ii) describe the action of the court in the other litigation on a 
motion for continuance; 
(iii) state the reasons why the other litigation should take 
precedence over the subject appeal; 
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(iv) state the reasons why associated counsel cannot prepare 
the brief for timely filing or relieve the movant in the other 
litigation; and 
(v) identify any other relevant circumstances. 
(B) If the good cause relied upon is the complexity of the appeal, 
the movant shall state the reasons why the appeal is so complex that 
an adequate brief cannot reasonably be prepared by the due date. 
(C) If the good cause relied upon is extreme hardship to counsel, 
the movant shall state in detail the nature of the hardship. 
(D) All facts supporting good cause shall be stated with specificity. 
Generalities, such as "the motion is not for the purpose of delay" or 
"counsel is engaged in other litigation," are insufficient. 
(c) Ex parte motion. Except as to enlargements of time for filing and 
service of briefs under Rule 26(a), a party may file one ex parte motion for 
enlargement of time not to exceed 14 days if no enlargement of time has been 
previously granted, if the time has not already expired for doing the act for 
which the enlargement is sought, and if the motion otherwise complies with 
the requirements and limitations of paragraph (b) of this rule. 
(d) Additional time after service by mail. Whenever a party is required 
or permitted to do an act within a prescribed period after service of a paper 
and the paper is served by mail, 3 days shall be added to the prescribed period. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — A motion to dance with the pnonty of the case and the date 
enlarge time must be filed prior to the expira- of the completion of briefing Delays m the 
tion of the time sought to be enlarged A spe- completion of briefing will likely delay the date 
cific date on wh^n the act will be completed
 0f oral argument 
must be provided The court may grant an ex- Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
tension of time after the original deadline has
 m e n t > effective October 1, 1992, in Subdivision 
expired, but the motion to enlarge the time
 ( b ) | a d d e d t h e designations and Subdivisions 
must be filed poor to the deadline.
 ( 1 ) a n d ( 5 ) a d d e d t h e seCQnd ^ ^ ^ l n Sub_ 
Counsel should note that there is no penalty
 d i v i g i o n 8 ( 2 ) a n d ( 3 ) s u b s t l t u t e d « ^ ^ ^ 
for seeking an enlargement of time in filing
 r „ „ 0 , , /A^A\ J J 
briefs However, both appellate courts placl f o r , rfasons i n ^T^w a n d m ^ 
appeals in the oral argument queue in accor- s t y h s t l c c h a n * e s t h ™g*out Subdivision (4). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Effect of death of party to divorce 
proceeding pending appeal on time allowed for 
appeal, 33 A L R 4th 47. 
Rule 23. Motions. 
(a) Content of motion. Unless another form is elsewhere prescribed by 
these rules, an application for an order or other relief shall be made by filing a 
motion for such order or relief with proof of service on all other parties. The 
motion shall contain or be accompanied by the following: 
(1) A specific and clear statement of the relief sought; 
(2) A particular statement of the factual grounds; 
(3) If the motion is for other than an enlargement of time, a memoran-
dum of points and authorities in support; and 
(4) Affidavits and papers, where appropriate. 
(b) Response. Any party may file a response in opposition to a motion 
within 10 days after service of the motion; however, the court may, for good 
cause shown, dispense with, shorten or extend the time for responding to any 
motion. 
(c) Reply. The moving party may file a reply only to answer new matter 
raised in the response. The court shall not postpone action on the motion to 
await the reply. 
(d) Determination of motions for procedural orders. Notwithstanding 
the provisions of paragraph (a) of this rule as to motions generally, motions 
for procedural orders which do not substantially affect the rights of the parties 
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remanding the case under this rule on its own motion at any time if the claim 
has been raised and the motion would have been available to a party. 
(b) Content of motion; response; reply. The content of the motion shall 
conform to the requirements of Rule 23. The motion shall include or be accom-
panied by affidavits alleging facts not fully appearing in the record on appeal 
that show the claimed deficient performance of the attorney. The affidavits 
shall also allege facts that show the claimed prejudice suffered by the appel-
lant as a result of the claimed deficient performance. A response shall be filed 
within 20 days after the motion is filed. Any reply shall be filed within 10 
days after the response is filed. 
(c) Order of the court. Upon consideration of the motion, affidavits, and 
memoranda, the court may order that the case be temporarily remanded to 
the trial court for the purpose of entering findings of fact relevant to the claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel. If it appears to the appellate court that the 
attorney of record on the appeal faces a conflict of interest upon remand, the 
court shall direct that counsel withdraw and that new counsel for the appel-
lant be appointed or retained. 
(d) Effect on appeal. Oral argument and the deadlines for briefs shall be 
vacated upon the filing of a motion to remand under this rule. Other proce-
dural steps required by these rules shall not be stayed by a motion for remand, 
unless a stay is ordered by the court upon stipulation or motion of the parties 
or upon the court's motion. 
(e) Proceedings before the trial court. Upon remand the trial court shall 
conduct hearings and take evidence as necessary to enter the findings of fact 
necessary to determine the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Eviden-
tiary hearings shall be conducted without a jury and as soon as practicable 
after remand. The burden of proving a fact shall be upon the proponent of the 
fact. The standard of proof shall be a preponderance of the evidence. The trial 
court shall enter written findings of fact. 
(0 Preparation and transmittal of the record. At the conclusion of all 
proceedings before the trial court, the clerk of the trial court and the court 
reporter shall prepare the record of the supplemental proceedings as required 
by these rules. If the record of the original proceedings before the trial court 
has been transmitted to the appellate court, the clerk of the trial court shall 
immediately transmit the record of the supplemental proceedings upon prepa-
ration of the supplemental record. If the record of the original proceedings 
before the trial court has not been transmitted to the appellate court, the clerk 
of the court shall transmit the record of the supplemental proceedings upon 
the preparation of the entire record. 
(g) Appellate court determination. Upon receipt of the record from the 
trial court, the clerk of the court shall notify the parties of the new schedule 
for briefing or oral argument under these rules. Errors claimed to have been 
made during the trial court proceedings conducted pursuant to this rule are 
reviewable under the same standards as the review of errors in other appeals. 
The findings of fact entered pursuant to this rule are reviewable under the 
same standards as the review of findings of fact in other appeals. 
(Added effective October 1, 1992.) 
Rule 24. Briefs. 
(a) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under 
appropriate headings and in the order indicated: 
(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or 
agency whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where 
the caption of the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties. 
The list should be set out on a separate page which appears immediately 
inside the cover. 
(2) A table of contents, with page references. 
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(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with 
parallel citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with refer-
ences to the pages of the brief where they are cited. 
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court. 
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review and the standard of 
appellate review with supporting authority for each issue. 
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regula-
tions whose interpretation is determinative shall be set out verbatim with 
the appropriate citation. If the pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, 
the citation alone will suffice, and in that event, the provision shall be set 
forth as provided in paragraph (f) of this rule. 
(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly 
the nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the 
court below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for 
review shall follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceed-
ings below shall be supported by citations to the record in accordance with 
paragraph (e) of this rule. 
(8) Summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably 
paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually 
made in the body of the brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the 
heading under which the argument is arranged. 
(9) An argument. The argument shall contain the contentions and rea-
sons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, with citations 
to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on. 
(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought. 
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the 
requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, except that a statement of the 
issues or of the case need not be made unless the appellee is dissatisfied with 
the statement of the appellant. 
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the 
appellee, and if the appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief 
in reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the cross-
appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in 
the opposing brief. The content of the reply brief shall conform to the require-
ments of paragraph (a)(2), (3), (6), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further briefs 
may be filed except with leave of the appellate court. 
(d) References in briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their 
briefs and oral arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such 
designations as "appellant" and "appellee." It promotes clarity to use the 
designations used in the lower court or in the agency proceedings, or the 
actual names of parties, or descriptive terms such as "the employee," "the 
injured person," "the taxpayer," etc. 
(e) References in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the 
pages of the original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 1Kb), to pages of 
the reporter's transcript, or to pages of any statement of the evidence or 
proceedings or agreed statement prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). 
References to exhibits shall include exhibit numbers. If reference is made to 
evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, reference shall be made 
to the pages of the transcript at which the evidence was identified, offered, 
and received or rejected. 
(0 Reproduction of statutes, rules, regulations, documents, etc. If de-
termination of the issues presented requires the study of statutes, rules, regu-
lations, etc., or relevant parts thereof, to the extent not set forth under sub-
paragraph (a)(6) of this rule, they shall be reproduced in the brief or in an 
addendum at the end, or they may be supplied to the court in pamphlet form. 
Copies of those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to 
the determination of the appeal (e.g., the challenged instructions, findings of 
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fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the contract or document 
subject to construction, etc ) shall also be included in the addendum 
(g) Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs 
shall not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefs shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive 
of pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any adden-
dum containing statutes, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as re-
quired by paragraph (f) of this rule 
(h) Briefs in cases involving cross-appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the 
party first filing a notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant for the 
purposes of this rule and Rule 26, unless the parties otherwise agree or the 
court otherwise orders The brief of the appellee shall contain the issues and 
arguments involved in the cross-appeal as well as the answer to the brief of 
the appellant 
d) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellants or appellees. In cases 
involving more than one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated 
for purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and 
any appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of 
another Parties may similarly join in reply briefs 
(j) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant 
authorities come to the attention of a party after that party's brief has been 
filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise 
the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations An origi-
nal letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court. An original 
letter and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals There shall be a 
reference either to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the 
citations pertain, but the letter shall without argument state the reasons for 
the supplemental citations Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing 
and shall be similarly limited. 
(k) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be con-
cise, presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and 
free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters Briefs 
which are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua 
sponte by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the offend-
ing lawyer. 
(1) Brief covers. The covers of all briefs shall be of heavy cover stock and 
shall comply with Rule 27. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992) 
Advisory Committee Note. — The brief Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
must now contain for each issue raised on ap- ment, effective October 1, 1992, added the 
peal, a statement of the applicable standard of third sentence in Subdivision (c) and made sty-
review and citation of supporting authority hstic changes in Subdivisions (a)(5) and (7) 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS sion, the following points should be developed 
Constitutional arguments * n d suPP°*e<* with authority and analysis 
Contents First, counsel should oner analysis of the 
Argument unique context in which Utah's constitution 
-Inappropriate language developed with regard to the issue at hand 
Issues raised Second, counsel should demonstrate that state 
-Statement of facts with citation to record appellate courts regularly interpret even 
Failure to contain textually similar state constitutional provi-
Standard of review sions in a manner different from federal mter-
Failure to file pretations of the United States Constitution 
—Defective appeal anc* t n a t it 1S entirely proper to do so in our 
Properly documented argument federal system Third, citation should be made 
Reply brief to authority from other states supporting the 
Cited particular construction urged by counsel State 
Constitutional argument,. v B o b o - 8 0 3 P 2 d 1 2 6 8 < U t a h C t APP 1 9 9 0 ) 
In order to make an argument for an innova- Contents. 
tive interpretation of a state constitutional A brief must contain some support for each 
provision textually similar to a federal provi- contention State v Wareham, 772 P 2d 960 
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(Utah 1989); State v. Reiners, 803 P.2d 1300 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Extensive quotations from numerous case 
authorities and treatises, while helpful, cannot 
substitute for the development of appellate ar-
guments explicitly tied to the record. West 
Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Appellant's brief was clearly deficient under 
the provisions of this rule because it failed to 
set forth a coherent statement of issues and the 
appropriate standard of review for each issue 
with supporting authority, the "issues" where 
listed did not correlate with the substance of 
the brief, the statement of the case not only 
omitted reference to the course of proceedings 
and disposition in the trial court, but failed to 
provide a statement of the relevant facts prop-
erly documented by citations to the record, and 
defendant's "argument" did not identify any 
error by the trial court, refer to the facts or the 
record, or cite applicable authority, much less 
provide any meaningful factual or legal analy-
sis. State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992). 
—Argument 
Appellants' brief, containing less than a sin-
gle page of assertions and no citations to the 
record, no legal authorities, and no analysis 
whatsoever, was not in compliance with this 
rule, which requires the brief of an appellant to 
contain an argument. Christensen v. Munns, 
812 P.2d 69 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Court declined to consider argument that 
was not adequately briefed. See State v. Yates, 
834 P.2d 599 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
—Inappropriate language. 
Derogatory references to others or inappro-
priate language of any kind has no place in an 
appellate brief and is of no assistance in at-
tempting to resolve any legitimate issues pre-
sented on appeal. State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296 
(Utah 1986). 
—Issues raised. 
—Statement of facts with citation to 
record. 
Failure to contain. 
The Supreme Court need not, and will not, 
consider any facts not properly cited to, or sup-
ported by, the record. Uckerman v. Lincoln 
Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 588 P.2d 142 (Utah 1978). 
The Supreme Court will assume the correct-
ness of the judgment in a criminal trial if coun-
sel on appeal does not comply with the require-
ments as to making a concise statement of 
facts and citation of the pages in the record 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Appeal and 
Error §§ 684 to 690. 
C.J.S. — 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 1311 
et seq. 
where they are supported. State v. Tucker, 657 
P.2d 755 (Utah 1982). 
If a party fails to make a concise statement 
of the facts and citation of the pages in the 
record where those facts are supported, the 
court will assume the correctness of the judg-
ment below. Koulis v. Standard Oil Co., 746 
P.2d 1182 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Steele v. 
Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 204 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 33 (Ct. App. 1993). 
—Standard of review. 
The standard of review requirement in Sub-
division (a)(5) should not be ignored. The pur-
pose of the requirement is to focus the briefs, 
thus promoting more accuracy and efficiency 
in the processing of appeals. Christensen v. 
Munns, 812 P.2d 69 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Failure to file. 
—Defective appeal. 
Where defendant was convicted of operating 
a motor vehicle without insurance, and at-
tempted to file his appeal pro se, but failed to 
file a brief or submit a transcript of the record, 
there was no reversible error presented which 
would permit the appellate court to reverse the 
judgment. State v. Hansen, 540 P.2d 935 (Utah 
1975). 
Properly documented argument 
Brief that was filled with burdensome, emo-
tional, immaterial and inaccurate arguments 
did not set forth a properly documented argu-
ment as required by this rule; therefore the 
court disregarded it. Koulis v. Standard Oil 
Co., 746 P.2d 1182 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Reply brief. 
As a general rule, an issue raised initially in 
a reply brief will not be considered on appeal, 
although the court, in its discretion, may de-
cided a case upon any points that its proper 
disposition may require, even if first raised in 
a reply brief. Romrell v. Zions First Nat'l 
Bank, 611 P.2d 392 (Utah 1980). 
Cited in Weber v. Snyderville West, 800 
P.2d 316 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); State v. Hoyt, 
806 P.2d 204 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); State ex 
rel. M.S. v. Salata, 806 P.2d 1216 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991); State v. Cayer, 814 P.2d 604 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1991); English v. Standard Optical 
Co., 814 P.2d 613 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); 
Hinckley v. Hinckley, 815 P.2d 1352 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991); Larson v. Overland ThriR & Loan, 
818 P.2d 1316 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); State v. 
Davis, 821 P.2d 9 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); State 
v. Garza, 820 P.2d 937 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); 
Johnson-Bowles Co. v. Department of Com-
merce, 829 P.2d 101 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error <*= 755 
to 807. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Tab 4 
This fort It affected by the Privacy Act of 1974; See Privacy Act statement before 
completing this form. D EEOC 35C920418 
Utah Anti-Discrimination Division and EEOC 
State or local Agency, if any 
NAME (Indicate Mr., Ms., Mrs.) 
Mr. Stephen E. Hausknect 
HOWE TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) 
(801) 278-8748 
STREET ADDRESS CITY, STATE AND ZIP CODE 
2158 TERRA LINDA DR. SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84124 
DATE OF BIRTH 
03/03/29 
NAMED IS THE EMPLOYER, LABOR ORGANIZATION, EMPLOYMENT AGENCY APPRENTICESHIP COMMITTEE, 
STATE OR LOCAL GOVERNMENT AGENCY WHO DISCRIMINATED AGAINST ME (ir more than one list below.) 
NAME 
KENNECOTT CORP 
NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES, MEMBERS 
Cat D (501 +) 
TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) 
(801) 322-7000 
STREET ADDRESS CITY, STATE AND ZIP CODE 
1515 MINERAL SQUARE. SALT LAKE, UT 84147 
COUNTY 
03± 
NAME 
DON BABINCHAK 
TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) 
(801) 122-7000 
STREET ADDRESS CITY, STATE AND ZIP CODE 
1515 MINERAL SQUARE SALT LAKE CITY UT 
CAUSE OF DISCRIMINATION BASED ON (Check appropriate box(es)) 
• RACE • COLOR CDSEX • RELIGION • NATIONAL ORIGIN 
• RETALIATION ( S A G E • DISABILITY • OTHER (Specify) 
COUNTY 
DATE D ISCRIMINATION TOOK PLACE 
EARLIEST(ADEA/EPA ) LA TEST (ALL) 
03/25/92 
• 
03/25/92 
CONTINUING ACTION 
THE PARTICULARS ARE (IT additional space is needed, attach extra sheet(s)): 
PERSONAL HARM; I was terminated. 
RESPONDENT'S REASON; I was accused of sexual harassment. 
DISCRIMINATION STATEMENT; I believe that I have been illegally 
discriminated against based upon my age, over 40, in violation of the 
Age Discrimination Act of 1963> as amended: and the Utah 
Anti-Discrimination Act of 1965* a s amended, in that: 
I am over 40. 
Not having any training regarding sexual harassment or what constitutes 
sexual harassment, and without any previous warnings, and having 38 
years service with the respondent, I was terminated, being told that I 
was guilty of sexual harassment. 
I am aware of a male employee, under the age of 40, who was charged with 
sexual harassment who has not been terminated and is still employed by 
the respondent. 
Therefore, I believe that I have been a victim of disparate treatment 
based on my age, which I believe to be a discriu 
£ 3 l also want this charge filed with the EEOC. 
I will advise the agencies If I change my address or telephone 
nunbar and I will cooperate fully with thea In the processing 
of my charge In accordance with their procedures. 
I swear or affirm that I have read t)>e above charge and that 
It Is true to the beit of my knowledge, Information and bell ief. 
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing Is true 
and correct. 
\ 
SIGNATURE OF COMPLAINANT 
!E6C T£sf FMM 5 (6§/6i/§i) 
t/L^u^K^u^-
Charging Party (signature) 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME THIS DATE 
(Day, monttr; and year) 
bUUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION 
r 
Mr. Don Babinchak 
PERSONNEL DIRECTOR 
KENNECOTT CORP 
1515 MINERAL SQUARE 
SALT LAKE, UT 84147 
L_ _J 
Hausknect, Stephen E 
rtHi'S PERSON (check 
Hf l CLAIMS TO BE 
• IS FILING ON 
one) 
AGGRIEVED 
BEHALF OF ANOTHER 
DATE OF ALLEGED VIOLATION 
Earliest 
' 0 3 / 2 5 / 9 2 
PUCE OF ALLEGED VIOLATION 
SALT LAKE, 
EEOC CHARGE NUMBER 
35C920418 
UT 
Most Recent 
0 3 / 2 5 / 9 2 
FEPA CHARGE NUMBER 
92-0393 
NOTICE OF CHARGE OF DISCRIMINATION IN JURISDICTIONS WHERE A FEP AGENCY WILL INITIALLY PROCESS 
(See "EEOC Rules and Regulations" before completing this foraj 
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED THAT A CHARGE OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION UNDER 
• Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
S3 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) 
• The Americans with Disabilities Act 
HAS BEEN RECEIVED BY 
• The EEOC and sent for initial processing to (FEPAgency) 
S3 The Utah A n t i - D i s c r i m i n a t i o n Dlvls ioriand sent to the EEOC for dual f i l ing purposes. 
(FEPAgency) 
While EEOC has jurisdiction (upon the expiration of any deferral requirement i f this is a Ti t le V I I charge) to 
investigate this charge, EEOC may refrain from beginning an investigation and await the issuance of the Agency's 
f ina l findings and orders. These f inal findings and orders w i l l be given weight by EEOC in making i ts own 
determination as to whether or not reasonable cause exists to believe that the allegations made in the charge 
are true. 
You are therefore encouraged to cooperate fully with the Agency. A l l facts and evidence provided by you to the 
Agency in the course of i ts proceedings wi l l be considered by the Commission when i t reviews the Agency's f inal 
findings and orders. In many instances the Commission w i l l take no further action, thereby avoiding the necessity 
of an investigation by both the Agency and the Commission. This likelihood is increased by your active cooperation 
with the Agency. 
5 3 As a party to the charge, you may request that EEOC review the f inal decision and order of the above named 
Agency. For such a request to be honored, you must notify the Commission in writing within 15 days of your 
receipt of the ^ jency's f inal decision and order. I f the ^ jency terminates its proceedings without issuing 
a f inal finding and order, you wi l l be contacted further by the Commission. Regardless of whether the Agency 
or the Commission processes the charge, the Recordkeeping and Non-Retaliation provisions of Title VI I and 
the ADEA as explained in the "EEOC Rules and Regulations" apply. 
For further correspondence on this matter, please use the charge number(s) shown. 
• An Equal Pay Act investigation (29 U.S.C. 206(d)) w i l l be conducted by the Commission concurrently with the 
Agency's investigation of the charge. 
[x] Enclosure: Copy of Charge 
BASIS OF DISCRIMINATION 
• RACE • COLOR • SEX • RELIGION • NAT. ORIGIN • RETALIATION El AGE • DISABILITY • OTHER 
CIRCUMSTANCES OF ALLEGED VIOLATION 
See enclosed Form 5> Charge of Discrimination, 
DATE 
05/12/92 
TYPED NAME/TITLE OF AUTHORIZED EEOC OFFICIAL 
Charles D. Burtner, Director 
EE66t^f P6AM I4I-A' (64/M/ii) 
SIGNATURE 
Yo 
RESPONDENT'S COPY 
Tab 5 
V ^ I J ^ ' 
Norman H Banperter 
Go\ernor 
John \ Medina 
Dnector 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
LABOR / ANTI-DISCRIMINATION DIVISION 
Street Address 
Heber Wells Building 
160 East 300 South Third Floor 
Salt Lake City Utah 84111 
Phone (801) 530 6801 
Mailing Address 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
Anti Discrimination Division 
Salt Lake City Utah 84114 6640 
FAX # (801) 530-7609 
MAY t i 1992 
D. L. BABINCHAK 
Stephen M Hadl/I 
Chan 
Thomas 1 
C rrr1 ^ioner 
Dixie L Min^rn 
Commkasioner 
 hairman 
> R Carlson 
Charging Party: Hausknect, Stephen E 
Charge No.: 92-0393 
Mr. Don Babinchak 
PERSONNEL DIRECTOR 
KENNECOTT CORP 
1515 MINERAL SQUARE 
SALT LAKE, UT 84147 
May 12, 1992 
Dear Mr. Babinchak: 
Your organization is hereby requested to submit information and 
records relevent to the subject charge of discrimination. This agency 
is required by law to investigate charges filed with it, and the 
enclosed request for information does not necessarily represent the 
entire body of evidence which we need to obtain from your organization 
in order that a proper determination as to the merits of the charge can 
be made. Please submit a response to the requested information by the 
deadline cited below. 
You may be assured that any information or explanation supplied by 
your organization will not be made public. 
Sincerely, 
^ 
Jay H. Fowler 
Investigator 
Response Deadline Date: 052692 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
REQUEST FOR INFORMATION 
:hg. Party: Hausknect, Stephen E 
despondent: KENNECOTT CORP 
:harge No.: 92-0393 
Give the correct name and address of the facility named in the charge. 
State the total number of persons who were employed by your organization 
during the relevant period. Include both full and part-time employees. 
How many employees are employed by your organization at the present time? 
Supply an organizational chart, statement, or documents which describe you 
corporate structure, indicating, if any, the relationship between it and 
all superior and subordinate establishments within the organization. 
Supply a statement or documents which identify the principal product or 
service of the named facility. 
State the legal status of your organization, i.e, corporation, partnership 
tax-exempt non-profit, etc. If incorporated, identify the state of 
incorporation. 
State whether your organization has a contract with any agency of the 
federal government or is a subcontractor on a project which receives 
federal funding. Is your organization covered by the provisions of 
Executive Order 11246? If your answer is yes, has your organization been 
the subject of a compliance review by the OFCCP at any time during the pas 
two years? 
Submit a written position statement on each of the allegations of the 
charge, accompanied by documentary evidence and/or written statements, 
where appropriate. Also include any additional information and explanatio 
you deem relevant to the charge. 
Submit copies of all written rules, policies and procedures relating to th 
issue(s) raised in the charge. If such does not exist in written form, 
explain the rules, policies and procedures. 
ssue: DISCHARGE 
If the charging party was discharged, submit the following: 
a. date of discharge, 
b. reason for discharge, 
c. statement of whether the charging party had any right of appeal, and 
whether the charging party made use of any appeal rights, 
d. person recommending the discharge, including name, position held, 
and date of birth,
 r 
e. person making final decision to discharge the charging party, includinc 
name, position held, and date of birth. 
Attach copy of any evaluation or investigation report relating to the 
discharge, and 
f. copies of all pertinent documents in the charging party's personnel 
file relating to -^he subject discharge. 
Explain your discharge procedures in effect at the time of the alleged 
violation. If the procedures are in writing submit a copy. 
Submit copies of all written rules relating to employee duties and conduct. 
Explain how employees learn the contents and rules. 
List all employees who committed the same or substantially similar 
offense(s) that the charging party committed and the disciplinary action 
taken against them. Supply backup documentation for the list. Include 
name, position title, and date of birth. 
List all the employees discharged within the relevant period. For 
each employee, include employee's name, position title, reason for 
and date of discharge, and date of birth, and a copy of the separation not; 
Tab 6 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Keith E Taylor 
James B Lee 
Gordon L Roberts 
F Robert Reeder 
Lawrence E Stevens 
Daniel M Allred 
Roy G Haslam 
Dallin W Jensen 
W Jeffery Fillmore 
KentW Wmterholler 
Barbara K Polich 
Randy L Dryer 
Charles H Thronson 
David R Bird 
Raymond J Etcheverry 
Francis M Wikstrom 
David W Tundermann 
Chris Wangsgard 
James M Elegante 
Val R Antczak 
Patrick J Garver 
Spencer E Austin 
Lee Kapaloski 
Stephen J Hull 
John B Wilson 
Robert C Hyde 
Craig B Terry 
David A Anderson 
Gary E Doctorman 
Kent B Alderman 
John T Anderson 
Kent O Roche 
Patricia J Winmill 
Randv M Gnmshaw 
Lawrence R Barusch 
Maxwell A Miller 
Gary B Hansen 
William D Holyoak 
Paul D Veasy 
Daniel W Hmdert 
Lois A Baar 
Lynn R. Cardey-Yates 
Carolyn Montgomery 
Ronald S. Poelman 
A Professional Law Corporation 
O N E UTAH CENTER 
201 South Mam Street Suite 1800 . Post Office Box 11898 
Salt Lake City Utah 84147-0898 
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June 10, 1992 DECEIVED 
JUN 1 0 19% 
NDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
^^DISCRIMIN/kJIONDIVIS^* 
Mr. Jay H. Fowler 
Inves t igator 
Industr ia l Commission of Utah 
Labor/Anti-Discrimination Divis ion 
160 East 300 South 
Box 510910 
Sa l t Lake City , UT 84151-0910 
Re: Stephen E. Hausknecht v s . Kennecott Corporation 
UADD Number 92-0393 
Dear Mr. Fowler: 
This firm represents Kennecott Corporation in connec-
t ion with the above-referenced charge of age discr iminat ion f i l e d 
by Mr. Hausknecht on May 6, 1992. Although Mr. Hausknecht has 
indicated that age forms the bas i s of h i s claim of d iscr imina-
t i o n , h i s charge of discriminat ion contains no s p e c i f i c a l l e g a -
t ions which support the claim. Our inves t iga t ion demonstrates 
that no l e g a l l y proscribed consideration played any part whatso-
ever in Kennecott1s dec i s ion to terminate the employment of Mr. 
Hausknecht on March 25, 1992. A d e t a i l e d response i s provided 
here for each a l l e g a t i o n which could poss ib ly be construed as a 
b a s i s for a charge of d i scr iminat ion , however. 
Response to Request for Information 
Kennecott s p e c i f i c a l l y responds to the EEOC Request for 
Information which accompanied the Notice of Charge as fo l lows: 
1. Give the correct name and address of the f a c i l i t y named in 
the charge. 
Mr. Jay H. Fowler 
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ANSWER: Kennecott Corporation 
10 East South Temple 
P.O. Box 11248 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147. 
2. State the total number of persons who were employed by your 
organization during the relevant period. Include both full 
and part-time employees. How many employees are employed by 
your organization at the present time? 
ANSWER: For purposes of this request, Kennecott defines the 
"relevant period" as January 1, 1991, through March 31, 
1992, and the "organization" as the organizational unit 
within Kennecott Corporation known as Security and 
Administration in which Mr. Hausknecht was employed. 
On January 1, 1991, the structure was such that the 
services presently performed by Security and Adminis-
tration were covered by two separate organizational 
units known as Security and Administration and Office 
Services. There were 10 employees. On January 1, 
1992, th£ organizational unit was known as Security and 
Administration; there were 12 employees. On March 31, 
1992, there were 13 employees.1 
3. Supply an organizational chart, statement, or documents 
which describe your corporate structure, indicating, if any, 
the relationship between it and all superior and subordinate 
establishments within the organization. 
ANSWER: At the time of the termination of his employment, Mr. 
Hausknecht reported to F.C. Dunford, Manager Office 
Services, who in turn reported to F.L. Fisher, Director 
Security and Administration, who in turn reported to 
D.L. Babinchak, Vice President Human Resources and 
Administration. 
4* Supply a statement or documents which identify the principal 
product or service of the named facility. 
ANSWER: Kennecott Corporation is a minerals company engaged in 
all facets of mineral exploration, mining, concentrat-
ing, and refining. Security and Administration pro-
vides office services for Kennecott headquarters 
1
 Students are employed in intern programs at various times 
and for various periods of time at the Technical Center and their 
numbers are not included here. 
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located at 10 East South Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
and for the Technical Center located at 1515 Mineral 
Square on the University of Utah campus. The Technical 
Center houses portions of the Kennecott Exploration 
Department, a laboratory used by Kennecott Utah Copper, 
and a library reference center. At various times the 
building is used for all types of overflow housing 
needs for various organizational units within 
Kennecott. 
5. State the legal status of your organization, i.e. corpora-
tion, partnership, tax-exempt non-profit, etc. If incorpo-
rated, identify the state of incorporation. 
ANSWER: Kennecott Corporation is a Delaware corporation. 
6. State whether your organization has a contract with any 
agency of the federal government or is a subcontractor on a 
project which receives federal funding. Is your organiza-
tion covered by the provisions of Executive Order 11246? If 
your answer is yes, has your organization been the subject 
of a compliance review by the OFCCP at any time during the 
past two years? 
ANSWER: Kennecott Corporation, as a subcontractor, is subject 
to Executive Order 11246. Kennecott has not been the 
subject of a compliance review by the OFCCP at any time 
during the past two years. 
7. Submit a written position statement on each of the allega-
tions of the charge, accompanied by documentary evidence 
and/or written statements, where appropriate. Also include 
any additional information and explanation you deem relevant 
to the charge. 
ANSWER: 
"PERSONAL HARM; I was terminated." 
Kennecott terminated the employment of Mr. Hausknecht 
on March 25, 1992. 
"RESPONDENT'S REASON; I was accused of sexual harassment." 
Kennecott was advised that Mr. Hausknecht may have 
engaged in conduct described as sexual harassment. 
After a complete and thorough investigation, Kennecott 
determined that in fact Mr. Hausknecht had engaged in 
Mr. Jay H. Fowler 
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conduct which was in violation of Kennecott's sexual 
harassment policy. 
"DISCRIMINATION STATEMENT; I believe that I have been illegally 
discriminated against based upon my age, over 40, in violation of 
the Age Discrimination Act of 1963, as amended: and the Utah 
Anti-Discrimination Act of 1965, as amended, in that: 
I am over 40." 
Kennecott recognizes that Mr. Hausknecht is over 40, but his age 
had no impact on Kennecott1s decision to terminate his employment 
as a result of his pervasive and objectionable conduct towards 
Kennecott1s female employees. 
"Not having any training regarding sexual harassment or what con-
stitutes sexual harassment, and without any previous warnings, 
and having 38 years service with the respondent, I was termi-
nated, being told that I was guilty of sexual harassment." 
It is unbelievable that a person living in the United States in 
the last decade of the 20th century would seek to exculpate him-
self and excuse reprehensible behavior towards female employees 
by claiming that he required specific training regarding sexual 
harassment or what constitutes sexual harassment. It is irrele-
vant whether Mr. Hausknecht received previous warnings regarding 
his conduct. His years of service with Kennecott are irrelevant. 
What is at issue here is whether Mr. Hausknecht1s employment was 
terminated because of his age. Mr. Hausknecht1s employment was 
terminated because of his egregious conduct and his unsatisfac-
tory performance. Mr. Hausknecht1s protests are disingenuous: 
Mr. Hausknecht admitted having seen and having read the sexual 
harassment policy posted on the bulletin boards at the Technical 
Center where he worked. Furthermore, during one incident when 
Mr. Hausknecht backed a female employee into a corner in an iso-
lated part of the building in which he worked and requested a 
kiss in exchange for obtaining a desk, Mr. Hausknecht stated: "I 
guess I can't do this or it would be called sexual harassment." 
"I am avare of a male employee, under the age of 40, who was 
charged with sexual harassment who has not been terminated and is 
still employed by the respondent," 
See answer to Request for Information No. 4 below. 
"Therefore, I believe that I have been a victim of disparate 
treatment based on my age, which I believe to be a discriminatory 
practice," 
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Age played no consideration in the decision to terminate Mr. 
Hausknecht's employment. As noted below, another male employee 
under the age of 40 was also terminated for similar conduct. 
8. Submit copies of all written rules, policies and procedures 
relating to the issue(s) raised in the charge. If such does 
not exist in written form, explain the rules, policies and 
procedures. 
ANSWER: Kennecott's sexual harassment policy is attached as 
Exhibit 1. 
ISSUE: DISCHARGE 
1. If the charging party was discharged, submit the following: 
a. date of discharge, 
ANSWER: a. March 25, 1992. 
b. reason for discharge, 
ANSWER: b. Pervasive sexual harassment of female employees 
and unsatisfactory performance. 
c. statement of whether the charging party had any right 
of appeal, and whether the charging party made use of 
any appeal rights, 
c. Kennecott has no appeal process relating to termi-
nation of employment of non-represented employees. 
person recommending the discharge, including name, 
position held, and date of birth, 
ANSWER: 
d. 
ANSWER: d. E.F. Morrison, Director Employee and Industrial 
Relations, November 27, 1934. 
F.L. Fisher, Director Security and Administration, 
May 10, 1944. 
L.V. Eastlick, Director Human Resources, December 
1, 1947. 
person making final decision to discharge the charging 
party, including name, position held, and date of 
birth. 
Mr. Jay H. Fowler 
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ANSWER: e. D.L. Babinchak, Vice President Human Resources and 
Administration, November 8, 1935. 
f. copies of all pertinent documents in the charging par-
ty's personnel file relating to the subject discharge. 
ANSWER: f. See Exhibit 2.2 
2. Explain your discharge procedures in effect at the time of 
the alleged violation. If the procedures are in writing 
submit a copy. 
ANSWER: The termination of employment of non-represented 
employees is handled on a case-by-case basis. There-
fore, there are no written procedures relating to the 
discharge of non-represented employees at Kennecott 
Corporation. In this case there were charges of impro-
prieties and the charges were investigated both at the 
appropriate management level and within Human 
Resources. 
3. Submit copies of all written rules relating to employee 
duties and conduct. Explain how employees learn the con-
tents and rules. 
ANSWER: Kennecott1s policy on sexual harassment is contained in 
Exhibit 1. In Mr. Hausknecht's work area, the policy 
was posted on bulletin boards located at the front 
lobby, upstairs near the laboratory, and in the base-
ment. Mr. Hausknecht has admitted having read and 
being familiar with the policy on sexual harassment. 
4. List all employees who committed the same or substantially 
similar offense(s) that the charging party committed and the 
disciplinary action taken against them. Supply backup docu-
mentation for the list. Include name, position title, and 
date of birth. 
2
 Kennecott is careful to protect the confidentiality of 
present and former employees. Kennecott will cooperate with the 
agency to the extent necessary for the agency to conduct its 
investigation but believes no useful purpose will be served by 
disclosing the names of employees with whom interviews were con-
ducted during the course of Kennecott1s investigation, particu-
larly where this information may be available to the charging 
party without the protection of an order of confidentiality 
issued by an appropriate federal court. 
Mr. Jay H. Fowler 
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ANSWER: In early 1991, Kennecott terminated the employment of 
Mr. A.,3 a janitor, born May 26, 1958, for unsatisfac-
tory performance and for having engaged in conduct 
described as sexual harassment, including making 
advances to other female employees and cornering a 
female employee in an isolated area to ask for a kiss.4 
There were also elements of his record considered too 
harmful to place him in any other position. 
In November, 1991, Mr. B5, Building Services Tech-
nician, born January 8, 1962, engaged in conduct 
described as sexual harassment in that he on several 
occasions approached one of the female employees whom 
he supervised, engaged in banter of a sexual nature 
with her, and asked for dates with her. The employee 
was reprimanded, demoted to the position of a janitor, 
received a substantial pay cut, and was reassigned so 
as to avoid contact with female employees. 
5, List all the employees discharged within the relevant 
period. For £ach employee, including employee's name, posi-
tion title, reason for and date of discharge, and date of 
birth, and a copy of the separation notice. 
ANSWER: Other than the charging party and the individuals noted 
in the answer to No. 4 above, no persons have been dis-
charged during the relevant period within the organiza-
tional unit. 
GENERAL STATEMENT 
Kennecott believes it is important for the agency to 
understand the background of Mr. Hausknecht's employment with 
Kennecott and of the termination of his employment. 
3
 Kennecott will cooperate with the agency in its investiga-
tion but believes no useful purpose will be served by disclosing 
the name of the referenced employee. See footnote 2 above. 
4
 Kennecott maintains a file with respect to the referenced 
individual, but, as noted above, Kennecott strives to protect the 
confidentiality of its present and former employees. Further-
more, it is unclear exactly what "backup documentation11 is sought 
by or might be of assistance to the agency, and, therefore, the 
file on this individual is not provided here. 
See footnotes 3 and 4 above. 
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Mr. Hausknecht held the position of Supervisor Mainte-
nance Services within Security and Administration at the time of 
his discharge. In 1989, Mr. Hausknecht had been reprimanded for 
disposing of Kennecott property without authorization. Again in 
June of 1991, Mr. Hausknecht was the subject of an internal 
review relating to his work habits. In particular, management 
was concerned that Mr. Hausknecht conducted himself without 
proper authority. In late June 1991, Mr. F.L. Fisher, Director 
Security and Administration, attempted to locate Mr. Hausknecht, 
was unable to do so, and finally determined that Mr. Hausknecht 
had taken vacation without advising that he would do so. At the 
same time Mr. Hausknecht had allowed the summer intern from the 
University of Utah to leave, thus leaving the building without 
security or coverage for services. 
On March 18, 1992, Mr. F.C. Dunford received a tele-
phone call from an employee at the Technical Center indicating 
that the water to the building had been turned off without 
notice, thus significantly inconveniencing the other employees in 
the building. Mr. Dunford located Mr. Hausknecht and pointed out 
to him that he should have advised the personnel in the building 
that the water would be turned off. Angered, Mr. Hausknecht con-
fronted the employee and others in the lunchroom and reproached 
them for having called his boss. Mr. Hausknecht then told them 
that he would retaliate by taking away the medical supplies, such 
as bandaids and headache remedies, which were located in their 
work areas. This display of ill temper and petty retribution was 
apparently the final straw for the women who had to work with Mr. 
Hausknecht. Mr. F.L. Fisher was notified of the problem. Mr. 
Fisher drove to the Technical Center and discussed the matter 
with the employee. At that point the employee raised issues of 
sexual harassment. In essence she pointed out that over an 
extended period of time, Mr. Hausknecht had attempted or had 
actually hugged and kissed many of the women who worked in the 
building. While there were no previous overt threats of retalia-
tion, if the women were not nice to Mr. Hausknecht, they did 
notice differences in the level of services provided them. 
Mr. Fisher contacted Ms. L.V. Eastlick, Director Human 
Resources, and requested her assistance in an immediate investi-
gation of the allegations. Over the course of the following sev-
eral days, Mr. Fisher and Ms. Eastlick conducted numerous inter-
views of women who worked at the Technical Center. They deter-
mined that Mr. Hausknecht had indeed engaged in a long-standing 
and pervasive pattern of activities consistent with sexual 
harassment. Women who worked in the building went to great 
lengths to avoid contact with Mr. Hausknecht because of his 
demands. They determined that Mr. Hausknecht would occasionally 
suggest that he ought to receive a hug or a kiss before giving 
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out supplies; in some instances female employees would go 
together to obtain supplies from Mr. Hausknecht, since they were 
uncomfortable in approaching him alone. Furthermore, Mr. 
Hausknecht engaged in a pattern of petty retribution with those 
women who refused to acquiesce to his demands. For example, Mr. 
Hausknecht had responsibility for assigning parking spaces at the 
technical center. In some instances those women who had not 
cooperated with Mr. Hausknecht1s request to "be nice" found that 
their parking assignments were changed and that they were 
assigned to park in distant areas away from the building. In one 
instance it was determined that an employee who needed a desk had 
made a request to Mr. Hausknecht, whose job it was to procure 
such items. He advised her that he had located a desk and 
invited her into an isolated part of the building to view it. 
Upon reaching the isolated part of the building, he backed her 
into a corner and stated that providing a desk like this for her 
deserved a kiss. 
It was reported during the investigation that Mr. 
Hausknecht*s conduct towards Kennecott1s female employees had 
been observed by ^ennecott's summer interns. 
Detailed minutes of all the interviews are contained in 
Exhibit 2 hereto.6 
On March 20, 1992, Mr. Hausknecht was invited to Kenne-
cott' s headquarters whereupon he was confronted with the allega-
tions. He admitted that he was guilty of hugging and kissing 
Kennecott's female employees and that in connection with the desk 
incident, he had indeed attempted to exact a kiss as payment for 
doing his job. He admitted that he had read Kennecott's policy 
on sexual harassment. Mr. Hausknecht was suspended pending fur-
ther investigation and was instructed not to have any further 
contact with Kennecott's female employees. 
Kennecott conducted further extensive investigation, 
engaged in extensive internal review, and attempted to determine 
whether Mr. Hausknecht could be effectively employed in another 
location. However, there were no jobs requiring his skills which 
could be performed in isolation. Kennecott management determined 
that Mr. Hausknecht*s conduct was disruptive of the workplace, 
that it impinged on employee morale, that it caused resentment, 
that it caused inefficiencies in the workplace, that it provided 
a poor example, and that it may be viewed as illegal. Mr. 
Hausknecht1s age played no part in Kennecott1s decision. Given 
See footnote 2 above. 
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his long-standing propensity to exact special favors from female 
employees particularly when viewed in light of identified perfor-
mance problems, Kennecott felt that it had no choice but to ter-
minate his employment. On Wednesday, March 25, 1992, Kennecott 
informed Mr. Hausknecht that his employment with the company was 
terminated. 
No one has been hired to replace Mr. Hausknecht and 
Kennecott has no intention of replacing him. The duties which he 
previously performed are performed in some respects by Mr. F.C. 
Dunford7 and in other respects by outside independent 
contractors. 
CONCLUSION 
It is clear from the information set forth here that 
Mr. Hausknecht's charge of age discrimination is entirely 
unfounded. We believe the Division should enter a finding of no 
probable cause. If we can provide the Division with further 
information regarding this matter, please do not hesitate to con-
tact us. 
Sincerely, 
James M. ETegante 
Mr. Dunford's date of birth is March 4, 1937. 
EXHIBIT 1 
KENNECOTT HUMAN RESOURCES POLICY MANUAL 
SUBJECT: TITLE: 
HUMAN MSOURCES SEXUAL HARA8SMZKT 
STATIST QFPQUCY 
A. It is the policy of Kennecott to prevent discrimbation based on sex, including sexual harassment of its employees. 
Unwelcome sexual advances, request for sexual favors and oiktr verbal or physical cooduct #f a sexual nature shall 
be deemed to constitute sexual harassment when: 
1. Submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly* term or condition of an indi-viduaTs 
employment. 
2. Submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment dedcions 
affecting such individual. 
3. Such conduct has the purpose or effect of interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an 
intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment. For example, unwanted physical contact, foul language, 
sexual!) oriented propositions, jokes or remarks, obscene gestures or the display of sexually explicit pictures, 
cartoons or other materials may be considered offensive to another employee and, thus, should not occur. 
4 
B. Sexual harassment, as outlined in the preceding Paragraph A, will not be tolerated and may be cause for st\t:c 
disciplinary action, including discharge. 
C. Officials, managers and supervisors are charged with the responsibility of eliminating any conditions which would 
prevent the maintenance of u or king conditions that are free from sexual harassment. 
D. Any employee who feels that he or she has been sexually harassed should immediately report the matter to bis 
or her supervisor. If that person is unavailable or the employee believes that it would be inappropriate to contact 
his or her supervisor, the employee should immediately contact the £ £ 0 Coordinator who is: 
at 
Name Phone Number 
Any supervisor or manager who becomes aware of any possible sexual harassment should immediately advise the 
£ £ 0 Coordinator who will handle such matters in a lawful maimer to ensure that such conduct does not continue. 
All complaints of sexual harassment will be investigated in as discreet and confidential a fashion as possible. No 
person will be adversely affected in employment wiih the Company as a result of bringing complaints of sexual 
harassment. 
E. This policy statement is to be posted on all Kennecott bulletin boards. 
Approved by: 
' /j(>"\oWU^ 0«t«: January 1, 1991 S»f»fM««t: Jan. 1, 1990 
No. 
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Russell C. Babcock. Jr. 
October 20, 1989 
Kennecott 
TO: S. E. Hausknecht 
SUBJECT: Unauthorized Transfer of Kennecott Office 
Furniture to the University of Utah 
We have discussed this subject twice this week and I am writing 
this memo to document our conclusions. 
We agree that the transfer of Kennecott property without preparing 
a property disposal approval form and gaining authorization is 
inappropriate and will not happen again. Unauthorized disposals 
could be considered theft and must be avoided. The consequences 
could lead to disciplinary action and/or dismissal. 
When you have surplus property in the future you will complete a 
PDA form listing the surplus items and recommending their 
disposition. You will give the completed form to Dan O1Brian who 
will review it and obtain the necessary approvals if he concurs 
with your recommendation. You will not dispose of surplus property 
until you have received a copy of the approved PDA form. 
If this memo accurately states our agreement, please confirm by 
signing below. 
R. C. Babcock 
S. E. Hausknecht 
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3. E. Hauaknacht Summary March 24, 1992 
Frank Fitter received complaint froa female employee on March is, 1992: 
Hauaknacht confrontad hor becausa aha had raportad a vatar outage to Fred 
Dunford (aha had baan unabla to locata Hauaknacht to talk to him about it). 
Hauaknacht waa vary angry with har for calling Fred. "Didn't appreciate Pred 
baing called, than Frad getting on him and tailing him hov to do hie job." 
Ha threatened retaliation, "If you complain about ma I'll take away the first 
aid kit and I'll make a complaint about tha files blocking the door to the 
equipment room." Ha did taka itema on top of tha first aid kit and then 
left. 
During tha discussion with Fisher, the female employee said, "And there is 
another problem."! 
Whenever thay naad to obtain any euppllaa or in order to get building 
services work dona, Hauaknacht aaya, "Give ma a little hug," and then he will 
put hia arm around tha woman9a shoulder and bug her. Thia has been going on 
for a long time and a number of othar woman hava experienced the same thing. 
Woman employees are afraid to go over to hia area of the building alone. 
Further discueeio&e with eight women hava revealed the following; 
There waa a broad range of feelings about Hauaknacht expressed by the women 
interviewed. Some of'the women said "Oh, that's juat Steve," or "He's just 
friendly." Others will not go to hia area alone, they "Find it distasteful" 
and will ask other men to get things for them or to get things done rather 
than go to Steve directly. 
Original complainant waa working alone during Christmas, 1991 and went down 
to Hauaknacht'a areaf<i#t*^ He put hia arm around her and leaned down "as if 
to kiaa her." She pushed him away and walked out. He didn't push it any 
further. Said it ia common occurrence for him to walk up and put his arm 
around her ehouldar or waist. 
Incident in January, 1992 - Steve offered to get one woman a larger desk. 
Took her over to vacant aide of the building to ahow her the desk. Pushed up 
aaainat herf put hia arm around her and said, "A favor like this deserves a 
kiaa, but I gueae I can't do thia or it would be called aexual harassment." 
The woman aaid, "Yea, thatfe right, taka your arm off." She did some "fancy 
footwork and left.19 She haa not yet received the deak. 
One incident reported aecond-hand, J00B0 the woman haa since terminated: 
Steve tried to hug her; she "hauled off and slugged him." 
Six of the eight women interviewed have been touched physically. One of the 
aix only had one encounter - he put hia arm around her and gave her a kiss to 
thank her for eome cookiea aha had brought in. Five of the six have been 
approached with comments much aa "Give ua a hug," "Give me a little kiss." 
One woman waa unaware of any problem (aha haa not worked there since early 
1980'a). One haa only heard about the encountera. Situation may have been 
going on a long time. According to original complainant, since 1981. 
Appears women that are "nice* to Steve (those that stop and talk, stroke his 
ego, or oubmit to hugs, etc.) get the service they need. Those that are 
unresponsive or those who complain about service, may not get service or may 
be the recipients of "petty" retaliation: Lights might not get changed; 
boxes may not be moved; furniture may not be moved; mail is late or doesn't 
go out; parking stall is suddenly changed to the top of the hill. Nothing is 
usually said, "just little things happen or don't happen." It was reported 
that petty retaliation does not happen to the men at the Tech Center, 
Hausknechtfs behavior is reported by those who have had a personal encounter 
as "harmless, but annoying" or "an annoyance," or "not proper behavior." 
Advances are described as "unwelcome.• None felt "intimidated" nor were they 
"afraid of physical harm." However, some reported they were afraid he would 
get even with them through patty retaliation, that he "carries a grudge," or 
that he is like a little kid, "stamping his feet." 
None of the women has ever discussed this with any supervisor at the Tech 
Center. Original complainant said she never felt it was a reportable 
incident, "Just something we live with for working up there." Females h^ve 
talked about him among themselves. 
Appears he may feel he has more control at Tech Center than he actually does. 
Many women made reference to him running "his little fiefdom," or his "own 
little domain," or "that's his building." 
employee has a history of questionable performance: 
Not responding to requests for service promptly or ignoring them completely. 
Disposing of furniture, equipment, and files without proper authorization. 
Committing company funds for purchases and repairs to building without proper 
financial authorization. Inadequate control over students: allowing them to 
come and go as they please; allowing them to set own hours; failure to 
supervise their activities appropriately. Frequent "disappearances" from 
building or work area. Pailura to advise supervisor, or anyono else, that he 
would ba on vacation. 
lauskneebt vae interviewed on Friday, March 20, 1992i 
He was confronted with summary of complaints and admitted to the above 
reported female allegations. Also acknowledged that he had read the Sexual 
Harassment policy; He was told in no uncertain terms that his behavior is 
unacceptable and was suspended pending outcome of investigation. 
Investigation,reveals a repeated pattern cf touching female employees as well 
am a series of performance problems which appear to get better for a time, 
but art repeated unless he is continually watched. 
Jtecommend termination effmotive Maroh 25, 1992; continue pay and benefits 
through Maroh 31, 1992. 
L. V. Eastlick F. L. Fisher 
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July 22, 1992 
Mr. Jay H. Fowler 
Investigator 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
Labor/Anti-Di s c ri mi nati on Di vi s i on 
160 East 300 South 
Box 510910 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0910 
Re: Stephen E. Hausknecht v. Kennecott Corporation 
UADD Number 92-0393 
Dear Mr. Fowler: 
I apologize for the delay in submitting Mr. Hausknecht7 s 
reply letter in support of his age discrimination claim. In an 
effort to save time, I have gone through, and for the most part, 
directed my comments solely to the specific points raised in 
Kennecott' s letter of June 10, 1992. The page numbers and 
paragraph numbers refer to the pages and numbers utilized in 
Kennecott' s response letter. 
One or two general comments are in order. Kennecott is 
contending that Mr. Hausknecht was terminated for engaging in 
conduct which may constitute sexual harassment and for 
unsatisfactory work performance. This dual assertion leaves 
Kennecott' s entire answer suspect. Less than one month before he 
was terminated, March 1, 1992 to be exact, Mr. Hausknecht received 
a satisfactory job performance review and a $2,300.00 per year 
raise. At that time, less than one month before he was fired, no 
mention was made of any unsatisfactory areas of performance or that 
he had engaged in any unprofessional behavior or activities. To 
now contend that he was discharged for poor job performance and 
sexual harassment in light of this, is at best disingenuous. More 
likely it reflects the fact that Kennecott used the proffered 
reasons to terminate Mr. Hausknecht so they could reduce their 
staff without having to pay proper severance benefits. 
Mr. Jay H. Fowler 
July 22, 1992 
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Comments regarding the specific issues raised in 
Kennecott's letter follow: 
Page 2 - Paragraph 2: Kennecott indicates in their answer to 
paragraph 2 that there were between 10 and 13 employees in the 
organizational unit where Mr. Hausknecht was employed. We do not 
dispute these figures, except insofar as they are evidently raised 
in an effort to argue that Kennecott should not be covered under 
the state or federal anti-discrimination laws. Obviously, this 
argument has no merit as Kennecott Corporation has far in excess of 
the jurisdictional numbers required under botn the state and 
federal acts. 
Page 3-4 - Paragraph 7: Kennecott states that it is "unbelievable 
that a person living in the United States in the last decade of the 
20th Century [would not understand what constitutes sexual 
harassment]." This is an obvious attempt to shore up the total 
inadequacies of Kennecott' s training programs, or perhaps I should 
say lack of training programs. At no time did Mr. Hausknecht 
receive any training regarding what constitutes sexual harassment. 
Mr. Hausknecht did not know that placing his hand on a female 
employee' s shoulder on a few occasions, could constitute sexual 
harassment, let alone that it would be the basis for termination. 
Further, at no time was any complaint ever made against Mr. 
Hausknecht, or did he receive any warnings prior to the time he was 
called in and terminated. What constitutes the boundaries of 
sexual harassment is not, as Kennecott asserts, clear cut and to a 
large extent reflects changing morays and values of our society. 
It is patently unreasonable for a company to not provide any sort 
of training regarding sexual harassment and then to claim that an 
employee should know or must know what constitutes harassment. 
In regards to the allegations that Mr. Hausknecht backed 
a female employee into a corner, this is untrue. Mr. Hausknecht 
was asked by one of the female employees to make a frame for her 
computer screen. He did so, at which time she asked if they could 
go down and look at some of the desks on the first floor. They did 
so, and during that time Mr. Hausknecht did say to her, in a joking 
manner, "this ought to deserve a kiss, but it might constitute or 
be considered sexual harassment. " Whether such a statement in 
itself constitutes sexual harassment is subject to debate. In any 
event, Mr. Hausknecht certainly did not understand that this 
statement itself might constitute sexual harassment. At no time 
was there any physical threats or physical overtures. 
There must also be reiterated that at no time did Mr. 
Hausknecht ever receive any warning or even any complaints from any 
of the female employees. He admits that on a few occasions he did 
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put his hand or arm on a woman' s shoulder. For example, he recalls 
at a Christmas party he placed his arm on Claudia's shoulder. Her 
response was to laugh and say something to the effect of "Oh, now". 
Again, it is simply not fair to not provide an employee with any 
training or even any warning that their behavior might be 
unacceptable, and then to terminate him. 
Page 6 - Paragraph 4: Kennecott dismisses the fact that it has 
treated younger employees who have been accused of sexual 
harassment in a disparate manner. It is admitted on page seven of 
Kennecott' s reply that E.ldon Jensen did engage in conduct which 
might be described as sexual harassment. However, he was not 
terminated but reassigned. Ironically, Mr. Jensen was the roommate 
of Don Babinchat' s son. Mr. Babinchat was, we believe, involved in 
the decision to terminate Mr. Hausknecht. 
GENERAL STATEMENT 
Page 8 - Paragraph 1:, To reiterate, Kennecott' s contention that 
Mr. Hausknecht' s work performance was unsatisfactory is 
disingenuous at best. On March 1, 1992, he received a favorable 
job review and a $2,300.00 raise. To attempt to counteract this 
fact by referring to the disposal of Kennecott property in 1989, is 
absurd. Ironically enough, the incident in 1989, which did not 
lead to a formal reprimand, involved Mr. Hausknecht giving away one 
desk to the Human Resources Department of the University of Utah. 
This was taken from excess inventory contained in the building, 
which he had been assigned to dispose of. Ironically, at the time 
the incident arose Mr. Hausknecht did give his notes on the matter 
to Fred Dunford who apparently never reviewed them and never said 
anything further to Mr. Hausknecht about it. In regard to the 
allegations regarding unauthorized vacations, these are raised for 
the first time in the reply letter and it is impossible to respond 
to them. As far as Mr. Hausknecht was concerned, he always advised 
Mr. Dunford when he was leaving or planning on taking vacation. 
Lastly, you should be aware that Mr. Hausknecht was allowed by Fred 
Dunford to work flex hours so that he could take time off to 
exercise his back, which had been injured a number of years earlier 
in an industrial accident. 
Kennecott also refers to the March 18, 1992 water 
incident and tries to connect it with some action on the part of 
Mr. Hausknecht. What occurred with the water and medical supplies 
is unrelated. March 18, 1992 Mr. Hausknecht did have to turn off 
the water to parts of the building for approximately 7-10 minutes 
when certain shut-off valves did not work. Later that day, several 
of the women employees, Claudia, Tracy Workman, Sue Sekoltky did 
have a brief conversation with Mr. Hausknecht at which time he told 
them he was sorry if he caused them any inconvenience and then 
asked them why they had called Fred Dunford. Their reply to him 
was, HWe just wanted to know how long we would be without water. " 
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At that time, Mr. Hausknecht did take away certain extra medical 
supplies which had been stock piled. However, the employees were 
left with adequate supplies, only excess supplies were removed. 
Further, Mr. Hausknecht had gotten approval from Mr. Dunford to 
remove the excess supplies at least three days earlier. 
There is also a reference at the top of page 9 to an 
11
 incident" involving a desk. Kennecott provides an inaccurate 
accounting of what occurred. A woman by the name of Candy Mishnir 
(I apologize for the misspelling of her name) did ask Mr. 
Hausknecht to locate a desk for her. However, the desk that she 
wanted didn' t have any drawers and Mr. Hausknecht was unable to 
rebuild it for her use. He told her this and she never said 
anything more about the matter. Again, no physical threats or 
coercion occurred. 
There is also some references on the top of page 9 to 
parking lot assignments. Again, Kennecott is attempting to find a 
correlation between events when there is none. Mr. Hausknecht was 
responsible for assigning spots in the parking lot. On occasion he 
would have to move people as the grade and rank of employees at the 
building changed. He also had to see that stalls were assigned to 
the University of Utah, KUED and the Geological Department, as well 
as setting aside spaces for visitors and other staff. At no time 
were spaces assigned or taken away, either as favors or in 
retribution. 
It was also alleged in page 9 that Mr. Hausknecht was 
guilty of "hugging and kissing Kennecott employees". As I stated 
above Mr. Hausknecht has admitted that on a few occasions he did 
place his arm on the shoulder of a female employee. However, at no 
time was he ever told that this was improper nor did any of the 
women employees ever tell him to stop. As I am sure you are aware, 
for behavior to constitute sexual harassment it must be unwanted. 
Without training, warnings, or even complaints, there is no way for 
Mr. Hausknecht to have any idea that his behavior was unwanted. 
Until he was terminated Mr. Hausknecht did not in any way 
understand that his behavior could even be construed as 
constituting sexual harassment. 
It should be pointed out that at the time of termination 
that Mr. Hausknecht was responsible for maintaining the entire 
Kennecott building at the University. He did this with a staff of 
only three part-time students. He took care of the grounds, 
heating, air conditioning, and virtually all other facilities in 
the 55,000 square foot building. The fact that he was able to 
accomplish this with such a limited staff was remarkable inasmuch 
as at one time he had four full-time custodians plus twelve 
additional individuals who reported to him. Undoubtedly his 
ability to keep this building operational is the reason that he 
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received a favorable job review in the beginning of March of this 
year. 
The reasons proffered for Mr. Hausknecht' s termination 
are at best suspect. At no time was Mr. Hausknecht even warned 
that his behavior was unacceptable. Further, at no time did he 
receive any training regarding sexual harassment or what might 
constitute sexual harassment. Rather, he was led to believe as 
late as March 1, 1992, that his performance was more than adequate 
and worthy of a raise. To now claim otherwise is unavailing. It 
appears that the real reason behind his termination was Kennecott' s 
desire to reduce staff without having to pay the appropriate 
severance benefits an older, long-time employee such as Mr. 
Hausknecht would have received under the terms of Kennecott' s own 
policies and procedures. 
DATED-this 2 ^ d a v of July, 1992. 
ES: cb 
cc: Steve Hausknecht 
F:\cb\fow. Itr 
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Mr. Jay H. Fowler 
I n v e s t i g a t o r 
I n d u s t r i a l Commission of Utah 
Labor/Anti -Discriminat ion Di v 
160 East 300 South 
Box 510910 
S a l t Lake Ci ty , 
Re: Stephen E. Hausknecht 
UADD Number 92-0393 
Kennecott Corporation 
Dear Mr. Fowler: 
We respond here to your l e t t e r 
i n v i t i n g a rebut ta l to the charging party1 
July 22, 1992. 
August 1 1, 1992, 
— ^v statement of 
Iir. Hausknecht fs reply statement amounts to nothing 
more than a p o l o g e t i c s for h i s inappropriate behavior with female 
employees. In e s sence he complains that Kennecott management 
erred in terminat ing h i s employment. He suggests that Kennecott 
had an agenda t o reduce i t s s t a f f by e l iminat ing workers such as 
Mr. Hausknecht. However, he provides the D i v i s i o n with no 
evidence to support h i s claim that age was a fac tor in Kenne-
c o t t 1 s d e c i s i o n to terminate h i s employment. The Age Discrimina-
t i o n in Employment Act and the Utah Ant i -Discr iminat ion Act do 
not p r o t e c t American workers from errors in management's judgment 
in terminat ing the employment of workers unless those errors are 
bottomed on impermissible mot ives . Mr. Hausknecht's complaint 
that i t i s not fai r to terminate an employee for behavior without 
providing t r a i n i n g or warning must be made in a forum other than 
the Utah Ant i -Di scr iminat ion D i v i s i o n . 
Mr, Jay H. Fowler 
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Mr. Hausknecht's own behavior resulted in the termina-
tion of his employment. The assertion that Mr. Hausknecht1 s 
behavior could constitute sexual harassment only if it is 
unwanted is, of course, not consistent with either the law or the 
plain language of Kennecott1s sexual harassment policy, Exhibit 1 
to Kennecott's response. Despite Mr. Hausknecht1s further 
assertion that his behavior is excusable on the basis that 
Kennecott did not provide a bright-line test as to what consti-
tutes sexual harassment in the workplace, the exhibits submitted 
to the Division as part of Kennecott1s response to the charge are 
replete with the comments of female employees for whom Mr. 
Hausknecht created an environment which was less than desirable. 
In his reply, Mr1". Hausknecht refers to a younger 
individual whom he claims was treated differently for similar 
behavior,^ However, in response to the Division's request, 
Kennecott cited, at page 7 of its Response, two individuals who 
were disciplined for behavior similar to that of Mr. Hausknecht. 
Conveniently, Mr. Hausknecht does not refer to that much younger 
33-year-old employee whose employment was terminated for similar 
behavior. It is evident from the information provided by 
Kennecott in its response that age plays no part in Kennecottfs 
decision to retain an employee or to terminate employment where, 
in management's judgment, the behavior and the circumstances 
warrant it. 
Mr. Hausknecht seems suggest that Kennecott has 
failed to reveal the fact that Mr. D.L. Babinchak2 was involved 
in the termination of Mr. Hausknecht. However, in response to 
the Division's specific request to disclose the person making the 
final decision to discharge Mr. Hausknecht, Kennecott forth-
rightly identified Mr. Babinchak. Mr. Hausknecht fails com-
pletely to provide any evidence that Mr. Babinchak's decision was 
motivated by age. 
-The remainder of Mi: , Hausknecht' s rebu11a 1 provides 
nothing more than his convenient version of the facts. Mr. 
Hausknecht's more forthright statements made at the time of the 
investigation were considered by Kennecott in its evaluation of 
the situation. Kennecott was not persuaded that, given his 
1
 It is unfortunate that Mr. Hausknecht has not cared enough 
to follow Kennecott's lead in respecting the confidentiality of 
employees and has referred by name to a particular individual as 
an example of a younger person treated differentiv than he. 
2 in his letter, the charging party ai i -_ refers to Mr. 
Babinchak as "Mr. Babinchat." 
Mr. Jay H. 
August 20, 
Page 3 
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overall performance history and the egregious nature of I lis 
conduct with female employees, Mr. Hausknecht's employment should 
be continued. A mere dispute as to the events generally is 
irrelevant to the issue of whether Kennecott terminated Mr. 
Hausknecht's employment because of his age. Mr. Hausknecht's 
version of the facts does not demonstrate any age bias on the 
part of Kennecott, 
Given the state of the record, the Division should find 
insufficient evidence to support a charge of age discrimination. 
Sincerely, 
James M. E legan te 
JME/sh 
JME/081792F 
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business in the State of Utah 
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* * * * * * * * * 
D E T E R M I N A T I O N 
JURISDICTION 
Under the authority vested in me by the U'tah Anti-Discrimination 
Act, of 1965, as amended, and the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act of 1967, as amended, I issue on behalf of this Division, the 
following Determination as to the merits of the subject charge. 
The jurisdictional requirements have been met as required by the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended, the Utah 
Anti-Discrimination Act of 1965, as amended. 
SUMMARY OF CHARGE 
On May 6, 1992, Stephen E. Hausknecht, hereinafter Charging Party, 
alleged that Kennecott Corp., hereinafter Respondent, discriminated 
against him based upon his age. 
SUMMARY OF RESPONSE 
The Respondent categorically denies that Charging Party was 
subjected to discrimination as a result of his age. 
SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION 
A. Charging Party's Allegations 
Charging Party asserts that he has been i I 1 i'!«i).i  1 1 \ discriminated 
against based upon his age, over 40. 
Charging Party asserts that not having any training regarding 
sexual harassment or what constitutes sexual harassment, and 
without any previous warnings, and having 38 years service with the 
Respondent, he was terminated because he was told he was guilty of 
sexual harassment. 
Charging Party asserts that he is aware of a male employee, under 
the age of 40, who was charged with sexual harassment, who has not 
been terminated, and is still employed by the Respondent. 
Charging Party asserts that less than one month before Charging 
Party was terminated, he received a satisfactory job performance 
review and a $2,300.00 raise. 
Charging Party asserts that he never received any training from 
Respondent regarding what constitutes sexual harassment. Charging 
Party further asserts that at no time was any complaint ever made 
against him, nor did he receive any warnings prior to the time he 
was called in and terminated. Charging Party asserts that at no 
time was there any physical threats or physical overtures. 
Charging Party asserts that the boundaries of sexual harassment is 
not clear cut, and to a large extent reflects changing morays and 
values of our society. 
Charging Party asserts that in regard to the allegation that he 
improperly disposed of Respondent's property, Charging Party never 
received a formal reprimand, and he was assigned to dispose of such 
property. Charging Party asserts that in regard to the alleged 
unauthorized vacations, such were raised for the first time in 
Respondent's reply letter. Charging Party further asserts that he 
always advised Respondent when he was leaving or planning on taking 
vacation. 
Charging Party asserts that he apologized to his fellow employees 
regarding the water incident. Charging Party further asserts that 
he did take away certain extra medical supplies which had been 
stock piled. However, it is asserted that the employees were left 
with adequate supplies, and Charging Party had gotten approval from 
Mr. Dunford to remove such excess at least three days earlier. 
Charging Party admits that he went with a female employee to look 
at a desk, and told her in a joking manner, "this ought to deserve 
a kiss, but it might constitute or be considered sexual 
harassment." Charging Party admits that on a few occasions he did 
place his arm on the shoulder of a female employee. However, 
Charging Party asserts that he was never told that this was 
improper no did any of the female employees ever tell him to stop. 
Charging Party asserts that in order to constitute sexual 
harassment, such behavior must be unwanted, but without any 
training warnings or complaints, there is no way of knowing if 
Charging Party's behavior was unwanted. 
B. Respondent's Answer to Charging Party's Allegations: 
Respondent contends that Charging Party's age had no impact on 
Respondent's decision to terminate his employment as a result of 
his pervasive and objectionable conduct towards Respondent's female 
employees, and his unsatisfactory performance. 
Respondent contends that it was advised that Charging Party may 
have engaged in conduct described as sexual harassment. Respondent 
further contends that after it conducted a complete and through 
investigation, Respondent determined that in fact Charging Party 
had engaged in conduct which was in violation of Respondent's 
sexual harassment policy. Such harassment, it is contended, 
included: (1) When Charging Party went with a female employee to 
look at a desk in an isolated part of the building in which they 
worked, Charging Party backed her into a corner and requested a 
kiss in exchange for a desk. Charging Party stated "I guess I 
can't do this or it would be called sexual harassment."; (2) 
Charging Party treating female employees differently regarding 
assistance, supplies and parking, depending on whether or not they 
had been nice to the Charging Party; (3) Some females co-workers 
stated that Charging Party had actually hugged or kissed or 
attempted to hug and kiss female employees in the building they 
worked at; (4) Charging Party would occasionally suggest that he 
ought to receive a hug or a kiss before giving out supplies, and in 
some instances fepale employees would go together to obtain 
supplies from Charging Party, since they were uncomfortable in 
approaching him alone. 
Respondent contends that Charging Party was not subject to 
disparate treatment. Respondent points out that in early 1991, 
Respondent terminated the employment of a janitor, who was under 
the age of 40, for unsatisfactory performance and for having 
engaged in conduct described as sexual harassment, including making 
advances to other female employees, and cornering a female employee 
in isolated area to ask for a kiss. Furthermore, it is asserted 
that there were also elements in such employee's record considered 
too harmful to place him in any other position. 
Respondent also points out that in November of 1991, a Building 
Services Technician, under the age of 40, engaged in conduct 
described as sexual harassment, in that he on several occasions 
approached one of the female employees whom he supervised, engaged 
in banter of a sexual nature with her, and asked for dates with 
her. Such employee was reprimanded, demoted to the position of a 
janitor, received a substantial pay cut, and was reassigned so as 
to avoid contact with female employees. 
Respondent contends that Charging Party's lack of specific training 
regarding sexual harassment, lack of prior warnings or complaints, 
and his years of service with Respondent are irrelevant to the 
issue of whether or not he was terminated because of his age. 
Respondent contends that Charging Party admitted having seen and 
read Respondent's sexual harassment policy posted on the bulletin 
boards at the Technical Center where he worked. Respondent further 
points out that during one incident when Charging Party backed a 
female employee into a corner in an isolated part of the building 
in which he worked and requested a kiss in exchange for obtaining 
a desk, Charging Party stated "I guess I can't do this or it would 
be called sexual harassment." 
Respondent contends that Charging Party held the position of 
Supervisor Maintenance Services within Security and Administration 
at the time of his discharge. Respondent contends that in 1989, 
Charging Party had been reprimanded for disposing of Respondent's 
property without authorization. Respondent contends that in June 
of 1991, Charging Party was the subject of an internal review 
relating to his work habits, particularly, Charging Party taking a 
vacation without advising Respondent that he would do so. 
Respondent further asserts, that at the same time, Charging Party 
allowed a summer intern to leave, thus leaving the building without 
security or coverage for services. 
It is contended that on March 18, 1992, Respondent received a 
telephone call from an employee at the Technical Center indicating 
that the water to the building had been turned off without notice, 
thus significantly inconveniencing the other employees in the 
building. Respondent located Charging Party and pointed out to him 
that he should have advised the personnel in the building that the 
water would be turned off. It is further contended that Charging 
Party became angered and confronted the employee that had called, 
among others, and told them that he would retaliate by taking away 
the medical supplies, such as band-aids and headache remedies which 
were located in their work areas. Respondent asserts that at that 
point, the employee who had called to report the lack of water, 
reported to Respondent allegations of sexual harassment. 
On March 20, 1992, Charging Party was invited to Respondent's 
headquarters whereupon he was confronted with the allegations, 
wherein Charging Party admitted that he was guilty of hugging and 
kissing Respondent's female employees, and that in connection with 
the desk incident, he had indeed attempted to exact a kiss as 
payment for doing his job. At that interview, it is contended that 
Charging Party admitted that he had read Respondent's policy on 
sexual harassment. Respondent asserts that it thereafter suspended 
Charging Party pending further investigation and was instructed not 
to have any further contact with Kennecott's female employees. 
Respondent contends that it conducted further extensive 
investigation, engaged in extensive internal review, and attempted 
to determine whether Charging Party could be effectively employed 
in another location. Respondent contends that there were no jobs 
requiring Charging Party's skills which could be performed in 
isolation. Therefore, Respondent's contends that its management 
determined that Charging Party's conduct was disruptive of the 
work-place, that it impinged on employee morale, that it caused 
resentment, that it cause inefficiencies in the work-place, that it 
provided a poor example, and that it may be viewed as illegal. 
Respondent asserts that no one has been hired to replace Charging 
Party and Respondent has no intention of replacing him. 
ANALYSIS 
Charging Party has brought this action against Respondent alleging 
violation Utah Anti-Discrimination Act, of 1965, as amended, and 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended. 
A. Prima Facie Case of Age Discrimination 
In order to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination 
Charging Party must allege and prove the following elements: 1) 
that he is a member of a protected class; 2) that he was qualified 
for and was performing her job adequately; 3) that he was subjected 
to an adverse employment decision based upon his age. 
Charging Party is a member of a protected class because he is over 
forty years old. Charging Party was qualified and was performing 
her job adequately with some exceptions. The record indicates that 
a male employee under the age of forty, who was involved in a 
similar type of work as Charging Party, was terminated for engaging 
in similar kinds of sexual harassment as the Charging Party had 
engaged in. The record also indicates that Charging Party was 
aware of and understood the Respondent's sexual harassment policy, 
has admitted putting his arm around female employees, and in at 
least one instance, admitted asking a female employee for a kiss. 
Therefore, Charging Party has failed to establish a prima facie 
case of age discrimination. 
B. Comparison 
Respondent points out that an employee under the age of forty, in 
a similar position as Charging Party, was terminated as a result of 
similar allegations of sexual harassment. 
C. Respondent's Burden 
Although Respondent's burden to articulate a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory reason for its conduct is relieved by Charging 
Party's failure to establish a prima facie case of age 
discrimination, Respondent's arguments are set out for 
completeness. 
Respondent contends that Charging Party was terminated as a result 
of his violation of Respondent's sexual harassment policies. 
Respondent contends that Charging Party has admitted to reading 
Respondent's sexual harassment policies. Respondent further 
contends from Charging Party's statement to a female employee after 
he requested a kiss from her that MI guess I can't do this or it 
would be called sexual harassment,11 implies that Charging Party was 
aware of what constitutes sexual harassment. Furthermore, it is 
contended that Charging Party had attempted to or did hug and/or 
kiss female co-workers. Respondent asserts that Charging Party's 
female co-workers were uncomfortable with being alone with the 
Charging Party. Respondent further contends that Charging Party 
treated his female co-workers differently regarding supplies and 
service, based upon whether or not they were nice to him. 
Respondent points out that in early 1991, Respondent terminated the 
employment of a janitor, who was under the age of 40, for 
unsatisfactory performance and for having engaged in conduct 
described as sexual harassment, including making advance to other 
female employees, and cornering a female employee in isolated an 
area to ask for a kiss. Furthermore, it is asserted that there 
were also elements in such employee's record considered too harmful 
to place him in any other position. 
Respondent also points out that in November of 1991, a Building 
Services Technician, under the age of 40, engaged in conduct 
described as sexual harassment in that he on several occasions 
approached one of the female employees whom he supervised, engaged 
in banter of a sexual nature with her, and asked for dates with 
her. Such employee was reprimanded, demoted to the position of a 
janitor, received a substantial pay cut, and was reassigned so as 
to avoid contact with female employees. 
Respondent asserts that Charging Party's performance was 
unsatisfactory as a result of the following: (1) Charging Party 
disposing of Respondent's property without authorization; (2) 
Charging Party taking a vacation without notifying Respondent; (3) 
Charging Party allowing a co-employee to leave without maintaining 
sufficient support and coverage; (4) Charging Party turning off a 
building's water without first notifying co-workers; and (5) 
Charging Party engaging in sexual harassment of female co-workers. 
Therefore, Respondent has articulated a legitimate 
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. 
D* Summary 
Charging Party has failed to establish a prima facie case of age 
discrimination. Therefore, the facts in the record, viewed in 
their entirety, indicate that there is NO REASONABLE CAUSE to 
believe that Charging Party was subjected to discriminatory 
practices as alleged. This concludes the Division's informal 
investigative adjudication procedure. 
ON BEHALF OF THE DIVISION, 
Randall Phillips, Investigator Date 
Jay Fowler^ vBirector Date 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION DIVISION 
UADD Case No. 92-0393 
EEOC No. 35C-92-0418 
STEPHEN E. HAUSKNECHT * 
COMPLAINANT, * 
* 
vs. * O R D E R 
KENNECOTT CORP., a Delaware * 
Corporation, licensed to do * 
business in the State of Utah * 
RESPONDENT. * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
On November (5$/, 1992, the Anti-Discrimination Division (Division) of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah (Commission) issued a determination of "No 
Reasonable Cause" that the Respondent has not violated the Utah Anti-
Discrimination Act of 1965, Chapter 35, Title 34, Utah Code Annotated, as 
amended, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. 
It is hereby ordered that the Charging Party's request for agency action is 
dismissed in the above captioned case. 
If a party wishes to appeal this Order, a written request for a formal 
hearing must be filed with the Director of the Division within thirty (30) 
days from the date of the issuance of this Order as specified in Section 34-
35-7.1(4)(c), U.C.A., and Administrative Rule R560-1-4.A.3 and 4. A request 
for agency review and a formal hearing will not be considered necessary if 
the hearing will not add to the evidence in the investigatory file or cause 
the evidence to be viewed differently. If the Director receives no timely 
request for a hearing, this Order becomes the final Order of the Commission 
with no further rights of appeal as specified in Section 34-35-7.1(4)(d), 
U.C.A. 
As a party to a complaint filed concurrently under Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, as amended, you have the right to request a Substantial 
Weight Review by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. If you make 
such a request, or pursue any other federal action, you will be barred, 
pursuant to Section 34-35-7.1(16), U.C.A., from commencing or continuing any 
adjudicative proceeding regarding this complaint before the Utah Anti-
Discrimination Division. For a request for a Substantial Weight Review to be 
honored, you mst notify the following within fifteen (15) days of the 
issuance of this Order: 
Antonio DeDios, State & Local Coordinator 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
4520 North Central Avenue, Suite 300, 
Phoenix, Arizona 85012 
Jay Fowle2^\ Acting Director Date 
/ 
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Erik Strindberg (Bar No. 4154) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P. C. 
525 East First South 
Suite 500 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
Attorney for Stephen E. Hausknect 
STATE OF UTAH, INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
LABOR/ANTI-DISCRIMINATION DIVISION 
STEPHEN E. HAUSKNECT, ] 
Complainant, ] 
vs. ] 
KENNECOTT CORPORATION, 
Respondent. 
I NOTICE OF EVIDENTIARY HEARING 
l UADD No. 92-0393 
Complainant, Stephen E. Hausknect (hereinafter 
"Hausknect") by and through his undersigned attorney, and pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann, § 34-35-7. 1(5)(c) and Rule 560-1-4 of the Utah 
Administration Code, hereby requests an Evidentiary Hearing on the 
Determination rendered by Randall Phillips and Jay Fowler in this 
matter. That Determination concludes that complainant Hausknect 
has failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination 
and, therefore, there is "no reasonable cause" to believe 
complainant was subjected to discriminatory practices. Complainant 
Hausknect disagrees with this finding and contends that evidence 
produced at a hearing will show not only that he has established a 
prima facie case of age discrimination, but that the respondent 
Kennecott Corporation is unable to show that a legitimate non-
discriminatory business reason existed for his termination. 
Specific grounds for this Evidentiary Hearing are as 
follows: 
1. An Evidentiary Hearing is necessary so that an 
adequate and complete investigation can be done. The investigator 
concluded that the evidence did not establish a prima facie case of 
age discrimination. However, evidence readily available to the 
investigator would establish that: 
a. Complainant was a member of the protected 
group; 
b. He was discharged; 
c. He was qualified to do the job (having 
received a favorable rating twenty (20) days 
before his discharge); 
d. The work that he performed is now being, 
performed by an outside contractor and by 
certain college-age students. 
It is obvious from the investigator' s failure to uncover this 
evidence that a hearing is needed so that basic evidence can be 
collected and examined; 
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2. An Evidentiary Hearing is also necessary so that 
testimony can be taken from not only the complainant, but from the 
other employees who were involved in the termination decision and 
surrounding facts. The determination of the investigator was made 
solely on the basis of written statements prepared by legal 
counsel. No affidavits were collected nor interviews conducted by 
the investigator. Rule 560-1-4(A)(4) states that "in most cases, 
the need to cross-examine the individuals who have submitted 
affidavits supportive of the initial findings or determination of 
the Commission will be considered a valid reason for granting a 
request for a hearing . . . " Here a hearing is needed so that 
crucial evidentiary testimony can be collected in the first place; 
3. The investigator1 s decision appears to be based 
largely upon the fact that Kennecott, at one time, had also 
terminated an individual under the age of forty (40), who had been 
accused of sexual harassment. However, this analysis ignores two 
crucial facts: First, as the investigator acknowledged, that other 
individual's work performance was unsatisfactory. This is not the 
case with the complainant, who had been success fully employed by 
Kennecott for over thirty-eight (38) years. Secondly, the 
investigator ignores, or brushes aside, the fact that another 
employee under the age of forty (40) was accused of sexual 
harassment was not fired, but merely transferred. An Evidentiary 
3 
Hearing is necessary so that evidence can be produced and explored 
which examines why Mr. Hausknect, a long-time valuable employee was 
treated differently than this younger, much less senior employee, 
and not given the opportunity to transfer. 
4. Evidence was presented in complainant' s charge that 
his termination was motivated by Kennecott' s desire to reduce staff 
in the facility in which the complainant worked prior to closing it 
down. By doing so, Kennecott would not have to pay significant 
severance benefits to the complainant. This issue was not 
investigated at all by the investigator. A hearing would 
facilitate the development of this evidence, including providing 
crucial information on Kennecott' s policies regarding lay-offs, 
benefits and severance pay; 
5. A hearing is also necessary to produce evidence 
regarding Kennecott' s training policy. Kennecott, and the 
investigator relied heavily on Kennecott' s claim that complainant 
knew or should have known that his conduct amounted to sexual 
harassment.- There is no supporting documentation or testimony in 
the form of affidavits to support Kennecott' s contention that 
complainant received any training or counseling in this area. An 
Evidentiary Hearing would allow evidence to be presented on this 
very important issue; 
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6. Lastly, an Evidentiary Hearing is needed to 
adequately investigate the alleged basis for Hausknect' s 
termination (i.e. - that he harassed a certain female employees). 
No affidavits or documentary evidence taken or examined by the 
investigator to support or disprove this key issue (i.e. - that 
there was a legitimate reason for complainant's discharge). An 
Evidentiary Hearing is necessary so that evidence and testimony can 
be taken on this issue as well. 
For these reasons, complainant requests that an 
Evidentiary Hearing in this matter be held and that the initial 
determination of the investigator not become the final Order of the 
Commission. 
DATED this / * day of December, 1992. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P. C. 
Erik Strindberg 
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CERTIFICATE OF HMD-DELIVERY 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document was hand-delivered, on this p day of December, 
1992, to the following: 
James M. Elegante 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
One Utah Center 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
P. O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-08989 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 146615 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114-6615 
Steven E. Hausknecht, 
Charging Party, 
Kennecott Corporation, 
ORDER GRANTING 
FORMAL HEARING 
UPON FURTHER REVIEW 
UADD No. 
EEOC No. 
92-0393 
35C-92-0418 
* 
* 
Respondent. * 
********************************* 
The request for an evidentiary hearing, as well as the 
response of the respondent, in the above entitled matter to review 
de novo the Determination and Order of the Utah Anti-Discrimination 
Division having been duly considered, and it having been determined 
that the CHARGING PARTY has met the requirements of law and does: 
Show that a hearing will add to the evidence in 
the investigatory file, or show that the evidence in the 
file may be viewed differently by the hearing, 
And it appearing that the foregoing constitutes good 
cause for the request, 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the request of the 
CHARGING PARTY be, and the same is hereby, granted. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review or 
specific written objection hereto must be filed with the Commission 
within thirty (30) days from the date of this Order, or it shall be 
the final Order of the Commission, not subject to further review or 
appeal. A Motion for Review must be signed by the party seeking 
review; state the grounds for review and the relief requested; 
state the date upon which it was mailed; and be sent by mail to the 
undersigned, and to each party. 
.len 
iministrative Law Judge 
Certified by the Industrial Commission of 
Utah this^ 
ATTEST: 
Patricia 
1993. 
sion Secretary 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on April^Qjvt"7^
 t 1993, a copy of the 
attached Order Granting Formal Hearing Upon Further Review, in the 
UADD case of Stephen E. Hausknecht vs. Kennecott Corporation, was 
iled to the following persons at the following addresses, postage ma 
paid: 
Stephen E. Hausknecht 
2158 Terra Linda Drive 
SLC, UT 84041 
Erik Strindberg 
Attorney at Law 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
P O Box 11008 
SLC, UT 84147r0008 
Attorney at Law 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
P. 0. Box 11898 
SLC, UT 84147-0898 
Anna R. Jensen 
Director 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
UADD Division 
160 East 300 South 
SLC, UT 84114-6630 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Byl .VICWA PptLiA O \0_ V^ rn 
Wilma Burrows N 
Adjudication Division 
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James M. Elegante (0968) 
of and for 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Respondent 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
STATE OF UTAH, INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
LABOR/ANTI-DISCRIMINATION DIVISION 
* * * * * * * * 
Steven E. Hausknecht ) 
) MOTION FOR REVIEW 
Complainant, ) 
vs. ) 
Kennecott Corporation, ) UADD No. 92-0393 
Respondent. ) EEOC No. 35C-92-0418 
* * * * * * * * 
Respondent Kennecott Corporation, ("Kennecott"), by and 
through its attorneys and pursuant to § 63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann., 
hereby moves the Industrial Commission to review the correctness of 
the Order Granting Formal Hearing Upon Further Review ("Order") 
issued April 26, 1993, grant the charging party a formal hearing. 
This Motion for Review is brought on the grounds that the Order 
does not comply with the requirements of Utah law for granting a 
formal hearing from a determination and order entered by the Anti-
Discrimination Division. Specifically, the Order fails to specify 
the basis upon which it is granted and the record does not support 
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the grant of a formal hearing. 
GROUNDS FOR REVIEW 
Mr. Hausknecht set forth six arguments in support of his 
Request for an Evidentiary Hearing ("Request"). None of those 
arguments provided a basis to warrant a hearing in this case. 
Mr. Hausknecht's first argument was that " [a]n 
evidentiary hearing is necessary so that an adequate and complete 
investigation can be done" and "basic evidence can be collected and 
examined." Request at 2. This argument provided no basis for the 
Order for the following reasons. 
First, the purpose of a hearing is to give the Commission 
the chance to "review de novo the Director's Determination." Utah 
Admin. R. 560-1-4 (3). The purpose of a hearing is not to conduct 
an investigation or collect evidence. That goal is accomplished by 
the Industrial Commission Investigator assigned to the case. The 
fact finding phase of this case is over. A thorough and complete 
investigation took place and there were no deficiencies in the 
investigation. 
Second, Mr. Hausknecht suggested that he failed to 
introduce the evidence at the investigation stage necessary to 
support his claim of discrimination. However, an adequate and 
complete investigation was conducted by Randall Phillips, the 
Industrial Commission Investigator who handled this claim (the 
"investigator") , and extensive evidence was collected and examined. 
In the five months between the date this claim was filed and the 
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date the Division issued its determination, the following evidence 
was collected by the investigator: (1) Kennepott's 10 page 
response which included detailed and complete answers to a lengthy 
set of investigative questions, a general statement, a copy of 
Kennecott's sexual harassment policy, and 58 pages of detailed 
notes related to Kennecott's investigation of Mr. Hausknecht's 
conduct; (2) Mr. Hausknecht's reply to Kennecott's response; and 
(3) Kennecott's detailed response to Mr. Hausknecht's reply letter. 
Thus, more than just "basic evidence" was collected and examined by 
the Division. Indeed, extensive evidence was submitted into the 
record.1 The investigator considered this evidence in making his 
determination. See "SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION" section of the 
Determination. Mr. Hausknecht's first argument was specious at 
best and in fact, Mr. Hausknecht in essence admitted that in this 
case an adequate investigation was conducted and that the necessary 
evidence was submitted, when he stated that evidence related to the 
issues which he claimed must be investigated was "readily available 
to the investigator." Request at 2. 
Third, Mr. Hausknecht had ample opportunity to submit 
1
 This evidence showed inter alia: (1) Mr. Hausknecht's age had nothing to do with 
Kennecott's decision to terminate his employment; (2) Kennecott terminated Mr. 
Hausknecht's employment because he engaged in conduct described as pervasive sexual 
harassment and because his performance was unsatisfactory; and (3) Mr. Hausknecht was 
not subject to disparate treatment (in 1991, Kennecott terminated the employment of a 
janitor who was under 40 years old for engaging in sexual harassment and whose 
performance was unsatisfactory). See Kennecott's June 10, 1992, Response; Kennecott's 
August 20, 1992 Response; November 20, 1992, Determination. 
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evidence at the investigation stage. Nevertheless, Mr. H?usknecht 
submitted only arguments; he failed to submit any facts which 
would give the investigator a basis to rule in his favor. It was 
not through inadvertence that Mr. Hausknecht failed to submit any 
factual evidence to support his claims; the reality is that his 
claim is groundless. 
Therefore, Mr. Hausknecht's first argument failed to 
provide a basis to warrant a hearing in this case as ordered by the 
Administrative Law Judge. 
Mr. Hausknecht's second argument was based on Utah Admin. 
R. 560-1-4(A)(4), which provides: "In most cases, the need to 
cross-examine the individuals who have submitted affidavits 
supportive of the initial finding or determination of the 
Commission will be considered a valid reason for granting a request 
for a hearing by the Commission." (Emphasis added). Mr. 
Hausknecht argued in the Request that "a hearing is needed so that 
crucial evidentiary testimony can be taken in the first place." 
Request at 3. This argument similarly provided no basis for the 
Order for the following reasons. 
First, the purpose of a hearing is not to collect evi-
dence. See discussion above at 2. 
Second, this rule is specifically limited to cases where 
there is a need to cross-examine "the individuals who have 
submitted affidavits supportive of the initial finding or deter-
mination." Utah Admin. R. 560-1-4(A)(4). In the instant case, as 
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Mr. Hausknecht admitted at page 3 of his Request, nc such indi-
viduals or affidavits exist. In this case there is no allegation 
and certainly no proof that evidence was in any way suppressed. 
The investigator gave Mr. Hausknecht ample opportunity to present 
any evidence which he wished in connection with this charge. 
Furthermore, in this case there were no affidavits and counter-
affidavits so that the veracity of a witness would have to be 
determined by a fact finder. The reality is that completely 
unsubstantiated allegations were made by the charging party and 
that the responding party replied with concrete evidence to 
substantiate the reason for the termination of employment. 
Therefore, there is no need for the cross-examination contemplated 
by this rule. 
Third, during the investigation phase, Mr. Hausknecht 
had every opportunity to submit any evidence to support his claim 
of discrimination, including affidavits. Nevertheless, he chose 
not to do so.2 Mr. Hausknecht's complaint that affidavits were not 
collected by the investigator does not advance his argument. If 
Mr. Hausknecht felt that affidavits were necessary, it was his duty 
to submit them into the record. It is not the duty of the 
investigator to go out and obtain affidavits in support of Mr. 
2
 That Mr. Hausknecht would not support his claim with the affidavits of others is 
not surprising: His coworkers, mostly females, were the victims of his sexual misbehavior, 
so they could hardly be expected to provide support for his claim. There are no other 
current or former workers similarly situated to support his specious claim. 
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Hausknecht's claim. 
Therefore, Mr. Hausknecht's second argument failed to 
warrant a hearing in this case as ordered by the Administrative Law 
Judge. 
In his third argument, Mr. Hausknecht asserted that a 
hearing is necessary so that evidence can be produced and explored 
which examines why he was treated differently than a younger 
employee who was the subject of a transfer as a result of his 
sexually oriented misbehavior. Request at 3. This assertion is 
premised on Mr. Hausknecht's claim that his work performance was 
not unsatisfactory. Mr. Hausknecht's third argument likewise 
provided no basis for the Order for the following reasons. 
First, the purpose of a hearing is not to produce new 
evidence. See discussion above at 2. 
Second, Mr. Hausknecht's sexually-oriented conduct was 
pervasive. Kennecott's internal investigation showed that his 
conduct was more egregious than the conduct of the employee whose 
employment was terminated and much more egregious than the conduct 
of the employee who was reprimanded and transferred to another job. 
His sexually-oriented activities in and of themselves provided a 
sufficient basis to terminate his employment. The argument, based 
on a claim that Mr. Hausknecht's work performance was not 
unsatisfactory, is completely contrary to the facts. However, in 
addition to his objectionable sexual behavior, Mr. Hausknecht's job 
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performance was not satisfactory to Kennecott.3 See Kennecott's 
June 10, 1992, Response; Determination. Therefore, the issue is 
whether Kennecott treated Mr. Hausknecht differently chan a younger 
employee who, like Mr. Hausknecht, had engaged in sexual harassment 
and whose work was unsatisfactory. The evidence shows that 
Kennecott terminated the employment of a janitor, who is under the 
age of 40, because he engaged in sexually oriented behavior which 
was unacceptable and because his work performance was 
unsatisfactory. Id. Kennecott's treatment of an employee who had 
engaged in similar behavior but whose job performance allowed 
Kennecott to transfer him to another job has little relevance to 
this case, and a hearing is not necessary to produce and explore 
evidence related to that treatment. 
Third, evidence related to Kennecott's decision to ter-
minate Mr. Hausknecht's employment rather than transferring him has 
already been produced. See Kennecott's June 10, 1992, Response. 
That evidence shows that Kennecott determined that Mr. Hausknecht's 
The determinative issue in this case is whether Kennecott's motivation for 
terminating Mr. Hausknecht's employment was discriminatory, i.e., whether Kennecott 
terminated Mr. Hausknecht's employment because he is over 40 years of age. Whether 
Kennecott actually had good cause to terminate Mr. Hausknecht's employment is not an 
issue. In other words, the correctness or validity of Kennecott's proffered reasons for 
terminating Mr. Hausknecht's employment is irrelevant. Therefore, whether Hausknecht 
was actually guilty of sexually unacceptable behavior and unsatisfactory job performance is 
irrelevant so long as Kennecott believed he was guilty of these things. The dispositive point 
is that Kennecott terminated Mr. Hausknecht's employment for reasons (whether based in 
actual fact or not) other than his age. 
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activities and long-standing propensity to exact special favors 
from female employees provided a sufficient basis in and of itself 
to terminate his employment. 
Fourth and finally, Mr. Hausknecht had ample opportunity 
at the investigation stage to submit evidence, rather than mere 
argument, related to this issue and his claim of pretext, but he 
failed to do so.4 
Therefore, Mr. Hausknecht's third argument failed to 
warrant a hearing in this case as ordered by the Administrative Law 
Judge. 
Mr. Hausknecht's fourth argument was that a hearing is 
necessary to facilitate the development of evidence related to his 
allegation that Kennecott terminated his employment to avoid having 
to pay him severance benefits. Request at 4. This argument fails 
because: (1) the purpose of a hearing is not to produce new 
evidence, see discussion above at 2; (2) the information contained 
in the disclosures made by Kennecott to the investigator 
demonstrated precisely the basis upon which Kennecott terminated 
the employment of Mr. Hausknecht; and (3) Mr. Hausknecht had ample 
opportunity to submit evidence to support his claim relevant to 
this issue at the investigation stage, but he failed to do so. The 
reality is that no evidence was presented by the charging party 
See footnote 2, supra. 
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that his termination was motivated by Kennecotc's desire to reduce 
staff and to save severance benefits. In factf this issue did not 
appear as part of the charge but was merely an argument raised by 
the charging party in his July 22, 1992, reply statement at page 1. 
Indeed the extent of the "evidence" offered was nothing more than 
a bald suggestion of Kennecott's motivation. The facts in the case 
completely refuted the suggestion and the charging party did not 
substantiate the claim in any way. 
Mr. Hausknecht's fifth argument was that a hearing is 
necessary to produce evidence related to Kennecott's sexual 
harassment policy and his knowledge of it. Request at 4. Like the 
other arguments, this argument could not form the basis of the 
Order because: (1) the purpose of a hearing is not to produce new 
evidence, see discussion above at 2; (2) it is irrelevant whether 
Mr. Hausknecht was actually guilty of sexual harassment,5 see 
discussion above at n. 3; (3) evidence related to this issue, 
including a copy of the policy, was submitted during the 
investigation, see Kennecott's June 10, 1992, Response; and (4) Mr. 
Hausknecht had ample opportunity to submit evidence related to this 
issue at the investigation stage, but he failed to do so. 
Mr. Hausknecht7s sixth and final argument was that a 
5
 It is simply incredible that in the face of his admissions that he was guilty of 
hugging and kissing Kennecott's female employees and that in connection with his 
employment he attempted to extract a kiss as payment for doing his job, Mr. Hausknecht 
would now urge the Commission to hold a hearing to gather "crucial evidentiary testimony." 
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hearing is needed to investigate and take evidence <»nd tescimony 
related to one of the alleged bases (sexual harassment) for the 
termination of his employment. Request at 5. This argument fails 
because: (1) the purpose of a hearing is not to investigate and 
produce new evidence, see discussion above at 2; (2) it is 
irrelevant whether Mr. Hausknecht was actually guilty of sexual 
harassment, see discussion above at n. 3; (3) extensive and 
detailed evidence related to the issue of Mr. Hausknecht's sexual 
naughtiness, including 58 pages of notes from Kennecott's inves-
tigation, were submitted at the investigation stage, see Kenne-
cott's June 10, 1992, Response; and (4) Mr. Hausknecht had ample 
opportunity to submit evidence related to this issue at the 
investigation stage, but he did not do so.6 
In sum, none of Mr. Hausknecht's arguments provided any 
basis whatsoever for the Administrative Law Judge to set this case 
for a hearing. The Request for a hearing should have been denied. 
It is not sufficient for an Administrative Law Judge merely to 
recite the law and to find merely that the law has been met when 
specific bases for the formal adjudication have been asserted by 
the charging party and those bases have each been completely 
rebutted by the Responding Party. 
6
 One wonders whether at such a hearing Mr. Hausknecht would attempt now to 
deny that he engaged in his objectionable behavior or whether more evidence of 
unacceptable behavior would surface. 
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RELIEF REQUESTED 
The Commission should issue its order vacating the 
Administrative Law Judged Order Granting Formal Hearing Upon 
Further Review and denying a formal hearing on the charge. 
DATED this \2 — day of May, 1993. 
M. ELECXNT: IES GA E 
of and for 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Respondent 
Kennecott Corporation 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be .nailed, postage 
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR REVIEW 
to the following on this )2*P- day of May, 1993: 
Erik Strindberg 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
525 East 100 South, #500 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-008 
Anna R. Jensen 
Director 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
Antidiscrimination Division 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 146640 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6640 
Stephen Hadley, Chairman 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 146640 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-6640 
53384 
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Erik Strindberg (4154) 
Martha S. Stonebrook (5149) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
525 East First South, 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
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IN THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS 
STEPHEN E. HAUSKNECT, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
KENNECOTT CORPORATION, 
Appellee. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
APPEAL FROM ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 
REVDXW AND ORDER OF CLARD7ICATION ISSUED BY 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH. 
Erik Strindberg (4154) 
Martha S. Stonebrook (5149) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
525 East First South, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
Attorney for Appellant 
James M. Elegante 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
201 South Main Street 
Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
Attorney for Appellee/Kennecott Corp. 
court must grant relief if it finds that the Industrial Commission erroneously interpreted the law 
to appellant's substantial prejudice. Id. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Appellant, Stephen E. Hausknect, filed a charge of age discrimination in 
employment with the UADD on or about May 12, 1992. 
2. The UADD entered a no cause determination on November 20, 1992. 
3. On December 18, 1992, appellant, through his counsel, filed a Notice of 
Evidentiary Hearing pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §34-35-7. l(5)(c) and Rule 560-1-4 of the Utah 
Administration Code, reauesting an evidentiary hearing on the determination rendered by the 
UADD. 
4. On April 26, 1993, Timothy C. Allen, presiding Administrative Law Judge for 
the Industrial Commission of Utah issued an Order granting formal hearing upon further review 
wherein Judge Allen determined that appellant had met the requirements of law necessary to 
show entitlement to a hearing. 
5. On May 12, 1993, Kennecott filed a Motion for Review of Judge Allen's Order 
granting appellant a formal hearing. 
6. On October 26, 1993, the Industrial Commission of Utah issued an Order granting 
Motion for Review which "ordered that the Motion for Review of the Order of the Administra-
tive Law Judge dated April 26, 1993 is hereby denied." 
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7. On November 5, 1993, the Industrial Commission of Utah issued an Order of 
Clarification wherein it "ordered that [Kennecott's] Motion for Review requesting that the 
evidentiary hearing be denied is hereby granted and the decision of the Administrative Law 
Judge to grant the evidentiary hearing is hereby reversed." 
8. Appellant appeals the Industrial Commission of Utah's Order of Clarification 
which reversed the decision of Judge Allen granting appellant an evidentiary hearing. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Industrial Commission's reversal of the Administrative Law Judge's granting of 
appellant's request for an evidentiary hearing violated appellant's right to due process. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE ALJ'S DISMISSAL OF APPELLANT'S 
REQUEST FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING 
VIOLATED APPELLANT'S RIGHT 
TO DUE PROCESS. 
It is well recognized that "implicit in the due process clause of our State Constitution is 
that persons be afforded a hearing to determine their rights under the law." Gribble v. Gribble. 
583 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1978). The Commission's summary dismissal of appellant's request for 
an evidentiary hearing deprived him of his only remedy under the state anti-discrimination laws 
without appellant ever having had a hearing of any kind. As such, the Commission's refusal to 
grant appellant a hearing constitutes a denial of his right to due process. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has stated: 
Due process is not a technical conception with a fixed content 
unrelated to time, place, and circumstances: it is flexible and 
requires such procedural protections as the particular situation 
demands. In an analysis of a procedure an important factor is the 
risk of an erroneous deprivation of a private interest through the 
procedures, and the probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards. 
Worrall v. QgdenCitv Fire Department, 616 P.2d 598, 602 (Utah 1980). Here, there has been 
an erroneous deprivation of appellant's interest by the Commission's refusal to adequately 
consider appellant's request for hearing. 
In Utah, courts have repeatedly reviewed administrative hearings and proceedings to 
determine whether both the procedures are satisfactory and the outcome is fair. For instance, 
in Child v. Salt Lake City Civil Service Commission, 575 P.2d 195 (Utah 1978), the Utah 
Supreme Court was asked to review the decision of the Salt Lake City Civil Service Commission 
upholding the discharge of the Chief of Police. The court noted that the review of the 
Commission's decision was warranted and authorized by the Utah Constitution, Article VIII, 
Section 9. The court then stated that it had the power to grant relief from that decision if it 
found that the Commission had "exceeded its jurisdiction or abused its discretion." The court 
went on to review the decision to determine if the findings and order of the Commission had 
been "arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable." 
In Anderson v. Industrial Commission of Utah. 696 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1985), the Utah 
Supreme Court was asked to overturn the decision of the Industrial Commission on the grounds 
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that the Administrative Law Judge had previously represented one of the parties in the hearing. 
In reaching its conclusion that the decision should be overturned, the court stated: 
One of the fundamental principles of due process is that all parties 
to a case are entitled to an unbiased, impartial judge. 'A fair trial 
in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.' (citation 
omitted) 
Id. at 1221. Here, appellant was denied a fair trial in a fair tribunal and, thus, was denied due 
process. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Bunnell v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 740 P.2d 1331 
(Utah 1987) emphasized the requirement that every person is entitled to a fair hearing: 
. . . every person who brings a claim in a court or at a hearing 
held before an administrative agency, has a due process right to 
receive a fair trial in front of a fair tribunal. Anderson v. 
Industrial Commission. 696 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1985). 
Fairness requires not only an absence of actual bias, but endeavors 
to prevent even the possibility of unfairness. Id. at 1221. . . . 
our review of the record persuades us that the manner in which the 
Administrative Law Judge conducted this hearing was sufficiently 
unfair as to constitute the denial of plaintiffs constitutional right 
to a fair hearing. 
Bunnell, at 1333. Here, it was patently unfair to deny appellant an opportunity to be heard in 
a de novo review hearing. 
This requirement that all hearings, including administrative hearings, comport with 
minimum standards of fairness was further developed in Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney. 
818 P. 2d 23 (Utah App. 1991). There, the plaintiff challenged the results of a grievance hearing 
held before the Salt Lake County Career Service Council on the grounds that hearsay evidence 
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had been admitted. The court concluded that the admission of such evidence was unfair because 
it prevented Tolman from exercising his right to cross-examine witnesses and therefore violated 
his right to due process. The court emphasized: 
Every person who brings a claim in a court or at a hearing held 
before an administrative agency has a due process right to receive 
a fair trial in front of a fair tribunal. Bunnell, 740 P.2d at 1333. 
As a general rule, 'due process demands a new trial when the 
appearance of unfairness is so plain, that we are left with the 
abiding impression that a reasonable person would find the hearing 
unfair.' Id. Note 1. 
Tolman. at 28. 
The Commission's reversal of the Administrative Law Judge's grant of an evidentiary 
hearing does not rise to the basic level of fairness enunciated and required by the Utah Supreme 
Court. The Commission's refusal to allow appellant a hearing to which he was entitled violates 
appellant's fundamental due process right to receive a fair trial in front of a fair tribunal. 
Anderson v. Industrial Commission. 696 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1985). Therefore, appellant 
respectfully submits that the Commission's Order was improper and substantially prejudices him 
by denying him due process of law. As such, the Administrative Law Judge's Order granting 
appellant a hearing should be reinstated. 
n. 
Appellant MADE AN ADEQUATE SHOWING THAT A HEARING 
WOULD ADD TO THE EVIDENCE IN THE FILE AND/OR 
SHOW THAT THE EVIDENCE WOULD BE VIEWED 
DIFFERENTLY AFTER THE HEARING. 
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Timothy C. Allen, presiding Administrative Law Judge, entered his Order granting 
appellant's request for hearing after taking into account both appellant's reasons supporting his 
request and Kennecott's responses in opposition to the request. Specifically, Judge Allen 
determined that appellant had met the requirement of law and had shown "that a hearing will add 
to the evidence in the investigatory file, or show that the evidence in the file may be viewed 
differently by the hearing." In spite of this determination, the Commission reversed Judge 
Allen's Order and essentially accepted the UADD's determination verbatim without giving any 
credence to the reasons enunciated by plaintiff in his request for a hearing. Appellant, 
therefore, files this appeal .on the additional grounds that he sufficiently showed that a hearing 
was warranted and that the Commission, in reversing presiding Administrative Law Judge 
Allen's Order, failed to consider the facts and argument presented by appellant. 
Appellant requested a hearing because the investigation that was conducted in this matter 
was extremely limited. Other than the initial statement submitted by the appellant, no affidavits 
or sworn statements appear to have been provided to the investigator. Because of the extremely 
limited nature of the investigation, an evidentiary hearing on this case is warranted. 
Additionally, a hearing is needed for the following reasons: 
1. Collection of evidence. Other than certain cursory and conclusory statements 
submitted on behalf of the appellant and the respondent, there has been no admissible evidence 
(other than appellant's initial statement) submitted to the investigator. A hearing is necessary 
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so that witnesses can be called, testimony taken and various documentary evidence presented to 
the Commission; 
2. Cross-examination of the witnesses. A hearing is necessary so that individuals 
who have knowledge and information relevant to appellant's claims can be put on the stand and 
cross-examined by the appellant. It is well established that cross-examination of witnesses is a 
minimum requirement of due process. State of Utah v. Stames. 841 P.2d 712 (Utah App. 
1992); 
3. Compel certain witnesses to testify. It is virtually impossible for appellant, in 
support of his UADD claim to contact Kennecott employees who may be able to provide 
testimony which substantiates appellant's claims. Those individuals would understandably be 
reluctant to voluntarily give statements to appellant during the investigation inasmuch as they 
would fear that adverse employment actions might or will be taken against them. The 
investigator never sought testimony from Kennecott's employees. A hearing would provide 
appellant the opportunity to subpoena Kennecott employees who may have testimony favorable 
to his position. 
As set forth above, the Commission's reversal of Judge Allen's Order granting a hearing 
is fundamentally unfair and denies appellant his right to due process and precludes him from 
pursuing its statutory remedies. 
-8-
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, appellant asserts that the Commission's Order reversing 
Judge Allen's Order is fundamentally unfair and denies him his due process right to receive a 
fair trial in front of a fair tribunal. Moreover, the Commission's total reliance on the UADD's 
determination raises the question of whether appellant's Request for Hearing and the facts and 
arguments set forth therein were ever even considered by the Commission before it reversed 
Judge Allen's grant of an evidentiary hearing. 
A de novo evidentiary hearing would add to the scant evidence in the case and would 
show that the evidence in the investigatory file would be viewed differently. Thus, appellant 
respectfully requests that this court overturn the Commission's decision and to order that 
appellant be entitled to an evidentiary hearing to review de novo the Determination and Order 
of the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division. 
DATED this (C day of December, 1993. 
Martha S. Stonebrook 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
Attorneys for Appellant 
(lj/hauskn.brf) 
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IN THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS 
STEPHEN E. HAUSKNECT, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
KENNECOTT CORPORATION, 
Appellee. 
MOTION TO RENAME DOCUMENT 
ENTITLED APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
Stephen E. Hausknect, by and through his undersigned counsel, hereby moves this court 
to rename the document that was entitled "Appellant's Brief" and filed with this court on 
December 6, 1993 to Petition for Review. To aid this court in renaming the document entitled 
Appellant's Brief, Hausknect hereby submits a cover page encaptioned Petition for Review and 
hereby respectfully requests that this court substitute the attached cover sheet for the cover sheet 
encaptioned Appellant's Brief. 
DATED thisy__ day of December, 1993. 
W//f<?fA {sd-<-s><r>< %r / Erik Strindberg 
Martha S. Stonebrook 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
Erik Strindberg (4154) 
Martha S. Stonebrook (5149) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
525 East First South, 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
Attorneys for 
Stephen E. Hausknect 
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KENNECOTT COPPER CORPORATION 
and INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, 
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PETITION FOR REVIEW OF ORDER GRANDING MOTION 
FOR REVffiW AND ORDER OF CLARD7ICATION ISSUED 
BY INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH. 
Erik Strindberg (4154) 
Martha S. Stonebrook (5149) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
525 East First south, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
Attorney for Petitioner 
James M. Elegante 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
201 South Main Street 
Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
Attorney for Kennecott Copper Corp. 
Thomas C. Sturdy 
160 East 300 South, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Industrial Commission of Utah 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was 
mailed, postage fully prepaid, on the/j^t day of December, 1993, to the following: 
James M. Elegante 
Attorney for Kennecott Corp. 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Thomas C. Sturdy 
Attorney for Industrial Commission of Utah 
160 East 300 South, #300 
Salt .Lake City, Utah 84111 
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IN THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS 
STEPHEN E. HAUSKNECT, 
Appellant. 
vs. 
KENNECOTT CORPORATION, 
Appellee. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 
APPEAL FROM ORDER GRANTING MOTON FOR RE-
VIEW AND ORDER OF CLARTFICATION ISSUED BY 
INDUSTRUAL COMMISSION OF UTAH. 
Erik Strindberg (4154) 
Martha S. Stonebrook (5149) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
525 East First south, Suite 500 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
Attorney for Appellant 
James M. Elegante 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
201 South Main Street 
Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
Attorney for Appellee/Kennecott Corp. 
JURISDICTION 
Appellant seeks review of an Order of the Industrial Commission which granted 
Kennecott Copper's Motion for Review and, in so doing, denied appellant's request for an 
evidentiary hearing. (A copy of the Order of Clarification and Order Granting Motion for 
Review are attached hereto in appellant's Addendum as Exhibit "A"). U.C.A. §34-35-7.1(12) 
provides that an Order of the Industrial Commission concerning a written request for review is 
subject to judicial review as provided in U.C.A. §63-46b-16. U.C.A. §63-46b-16 provides: 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of 
Appeals has jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting 
from formal adjudicated proceedings. 
As such, this court has jurisdiction to review the Order of Clarification and Order Granting 
Motion for Review issued by the Industrial Commission of Utah. 
ISSUE FOR REVIEW 
Did the Industrial Commission of Utah err in overturning the Administrative Law Judge's 
Order granting appellant a formal hearing? 
Standard of Review: Pursuant to §63-46b-16(4)(d), this court shall grant relief if 
appellant has been "substantially prejudiced" because the Industrial Commission has "erroneously 
interpreted 01: implied the law." Because this matter presents a question of statutory construction 
and legislative intent, this court may review for correctness and need not defer to the agency's 
interpretation. Crosland v. Board of Review. 828 P.2d 528, 529-30 (Utah App. 1992). This 
court must grant relief if it finds that the Industrial Commission erroneously interpreted the law 
to appellant's substantial prejudice. Id. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Appellant, Stephen E. Hausknect, filed a charge of age discrimination in 
employment with the UADD on or about May 12, 1992. 
2. The UADD entered a no cause determination on November 20, 1992. 
3. On December 18, 1992, appellant, through his counsel, filed a Notice of 
Evidentiary Hearing pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §34-35-7. l(5)(c) and Rule 560-1-4 of the Utah 
Administration Code, requesting an evidentiary hearing on the determi nation rendered by the 
UADD. 
4. On April 26, 1993, Timothy C. Allen, presiding Administrative Law Judge for 
the Industrial Commission of Utah issued an Order granting formal hearing upon further review 
wH determined that appellant had met the requirements of law necessary to 
show entitlement to a hearing. 
5. On May 12, 1993, Kennecott filed a Motion for Review of Judge Allen's Order 
granting appellant a formal hearing. 
6. On October 26,1993, the Industrial Commission of Utah issued an Order granting 
Motion for Review which "ordered that the Motion for Review of the Order of the Administra-
tive Law Judge dated April 26, 1993 is hereby denied/ 
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7. On November 5, 1993, the Industrial Commission of Utah issued an Order of 
Clarification wherein it "ordered that [Kennecott's] Motion tor Review requesting that the 
evidentiary hearing be denied is hereby granted and the decision of the Administrative Law 
Judge to grant the evidentiary hearing is hereby reversed." 
8. Appellant appeals the Industrial Commission of Utah's Order of Clarification 
which reversed the decision of Judge Allen granting appellant an evidentiary hearing. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Industrial Commission's reversal of the Administrative Law Judge's granting of 
appellant's request for an evidentiary hearing violated appellant's right to due process. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE AU'S DISMISSAL OF APPELLANT'S 
REQUEST FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING 
VIOLATED APPELLANT'S RIGHT 
TO DUE PROCESS. 
It is well recognized that "implicit in the due process clause of our State Constitution is 
that persons he afforded a hearing to determine their rights under the law." Gribble v. Gribble. 
583 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1978). The Commission's summary dismissal of appellant's request for 
an evidentiary hearing deprived him of his only remedy under the state anti-discrimination laws 
without appellant ever having had a hearing of any kind. As such, the Comniission's refusal to 
grant appellant a hearing constitutes a denial of his right to due process. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has stated: 
Due process is not a technical conception with a fixed content 
unrelated to time, place, and circumstances; it is flexible and 
requires such procedural protections as the particular situation 
demands. In an analysis of a procedure an important factor is the 
risk of an erroneous deprivation of a private interest through the 
procedures, and the probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards. 
Worrall v. OgdenCitv Fire Department, 616 P.2d 598, 602 (Utah 1980). Here, there has been 
an erroneous deprivation of appellant's interest by the Commission's refusal to adequately 
consider appellant's request for hearing. 
In Utah, courts have repeatedly reviewed administrative hearings and proceedings to 
determine whether both the procedures are satisfactory and the outcome is fair. For instance, 
in Child v. Salt Lake City Civil Service Commission. 575 P.2d 195 (Utah 1978), the Utah 
Supreme Court was asked to review the decision of the Salt Lake City Civil Service Commission 
upholding the discharge of the Chief of Police. The court noted that the review of the 
Commission's decision was warranted and authorized by the Utah Constitution, Article VIII, 
Section 9. The court then stated that it had the power to grant relief from that decision if it 
found that the Commission had "exceeded its jurisdiction or '.bused ics discretion." The court 
went on to review the decision to determine if the findings and order of the Commission had 
been "arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable," 
In Anderson v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 696 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1985), the Utah 
Supreme Court was asked to overturn the decision ofTthe Industrial Commission on the grounds 
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that the Administrative Law Judge had previously represented one of the parties in the hearing. 
In reaching its conclusion that the decision should be overturned, the court stated: 
One of the fundamental principles of due process is that all parties 
to a case are entitled to an unbiased, impartial judge. 'A fair trial 
in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due process.' (citation 
omitted) 
Id. at 1221. Here, appellant was denied a fair trial in a fair tribunal and, thus, was denied due 
process. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Bunnell v. Industrial Commission of Utah. 740 P.2d 1331 
(Utah 1987) emphasized the requirement that every person is entitled to a fair hearing: 
. . . every person who brings a claim in a court or at a hearing 
held before an administrative agency, has a due process right to 
receive a fair trial in front of a fair tribunal. Anderson v. 
Industrial Commission. 696 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1985). 
Fairness requires not only an absence of actual bias, but endeavors 
to prevent even the possibility of unfairness. Id. at 1221. . . . 
our review of the record persuades us that the manner in which the 
Administrative Law Judge conducted this hearing was sufficiently 
unfair as to constitute the denial of plaintiffs constitutional right 
to a fair hearing. 
Bunnell, at 1333. Here, it was patently unfair to deny appellant an opportunity to be heard in 
a de novo review hearing. 
This requirement that all hearings, including administrative hearings, comport with 
minimum standards of fairness w as further developed in Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 
818 P.2d 23 (Utah App. 1991). There, the plaintiff challenged the results of a grievance hearing 
held before the Salt Lake County Career Service Council on the grounds that hearsay evidence 
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had been admitted The court concluded that the admission of such evidence was unfair because 
it prevented Tolman from exercising his right to cross-examine witnesses did tini efore violated 
his right to due process. The court emphasized: 
Every person who brings a claim in a court or at a hearing held 
before an administrative agency has a due process right to receive 
a fair trial in front of a fair tribunal. Bunnell, 740 P.2d at 1333. 
As a general rule, 'due process demands a new trial when the 
appearance of unfairness is so plain, that we are left with the 
abiding impression that a reasonable person would find the hearing 
unfair.' Id. Note 1. 
Tolman, at 28. 
The Commission's reversal of the Administrative Law Judge's grant of an evidentiary 
hearing does not rise to the basic level of fairness enunciated and required by the Utah Supreme 
Court. The Commission's refusal to allow appellant a hearing to which he was entitled violates 
appellant's fundamental due process right to receive a fair trial in front of a fair tribunal. 
Anderson v. Industrial Commission. 696 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Utah 1985). Therefore, appellant 
respectfully submits that the Commission's Order was improper and substannallv prejudices him 
by denying him due process of law. As such, the Administrative Law Judge's Order granting 
appellant a hearing should be reinstated. 
n. 
APPELLANT MADE AN ADEQUATE SHOWING THAT A 
HEARING WOULD ADD TO THE EVIDENCE IN THE 
FILE AND/OR SHOW THAT THE EVIDENCE 
WOULD BE VIEWED DIFFERENTLY 
AFTER THE HEARING. 
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Timothy C. Allen, presiding Administrative Law Judge, entered his Order granting 
appellant's request for hearing after taking into account both appellant's reasons supporting his 
request and Kennecott's responses in opposition to the request. Specifically, Judge Allen 
determined that appellant had met the requirement of law and had shown "that a hearing will add 
to the evidence in the investigatory file, or show that the evidence in the file may be viewed 
differently by the hearing." In spite of this determination, the Commission reversed Judge 
Allen's Order and essentially accepted the UADD's determination verbatim without giving any 
credence to the reasons enunciated by plaintiff in his request for a hearing. Appellant, 
therefore, files this appeal on the additional grounds that he sufficiently showed that a hearing 
was warranted and that the Commission, in reversing presiding Administrative Law Judge 
Allen's Order, failed to consider the facts and argument presented by appellant. 
Appellant requested a hearing because the investigation that was conducted in this matter 
was extremely limited. Other than the initial statement submitted by the appellant, no affidavits 
or sworn statements appear to have been provided to the investigator. Because of the extremely 
limited nature of the investigation, an evidentiary hearing on this case is warranted. 
Additionally, a hearing is needed for the following reasons: 
1. Collection of evidence. Other than certain cursory and conclusory statements 
submitted on behalf of the appellant and the respondent, there has been no admissible evidence 
(other than appellant's initial statement) submitted to the investigator. A hearing is necessary 
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so that witnesses can be called, testimony taken and various documentary evidence presented to 
the Commission; 
2. Cross-examination of the witnesses, A hearing is necessary so that individuals 
who have knowledge and information relevant to appellant's claims can be put on the stand and 
cross-examined by the appellant. It is well established that cross-examination of witnesses is a 
minimum requirement of due process. State of Utah v. S tames. 841 P.2d 712 (Utah App. 
1992); 
3. Compel certain witnesses to testify. It is virtually impossible for appellant, in 
support of his UADD claim to contact Kennecott employees who may be able to provide 
testimony which substantiates appellant's claims. Those individuals would understandably be 
reluctant to voluntarily give statements to appellant during the investigation inasmuch as they 
would fear that adverse employment actions might or will be taken against them. The 
investigator never sought testimony from Kennecott's employees. A hearing would provide 
appellant the opportunity to subpoena Kennecott employees who may have testimony favorable 
to his position. 
As set forth above, the Commission's reversal of Judge Allen's Order granting a hearing 
is fundamentally unfair and denies appellant his right to due process and precludes him from 
pursuing its statutory remedies. 
-8-
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, appellant asserts that the Commission's Order reversing 
Judge Allen's Order is fundamentally unfair and denies him his due process right to receive a 
fair trial in front of a fair tribunal. Moreover, the Commission's total reliance on the UADD's 
determination raises the question of whether appellant's Request for Hearing and the facts and 
arguments set forth therein were ever even considered by the Commission before it reversed 
Judge Allen's grant of an evidentiary hearing. 
A de novo evidentiary hearing would add to the scant evidence in the case and would 
show that the evidence in the investigatory file would be viewed differently. Thus, appellant 
respectfully requests that this court overturn the Commission's decision and to order that 
appellant be entitled to an evidentiary hearing to review de novo the Determination and Order 
of the Utah Anti-Discrimination Division. 
DATED this (Q day of December, 1993. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Oj/hauskn.brf) 
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IN THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS 
STEPHEN E. HAUSKNECT, ] 
Petitioner, ] 
vs. ) 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION and ; 
KENNECOTT CORPORATION, ; 
Respondents. ] 
1 DOCKETING STATEMENT 
> Case No. 930768-CA 
1. Date of entry of Judgment or Order appealed from: Petitioner seeks review 
of the Order of Clarification issued by the Industrial Commission of Utah on November 4, 1993. 
2. Nature of Post-Judgment Motion(s) and Date(s) filed: None. 
3. Date and effect of Order(s) disposing of Post-Judgment Motion(s) and Order 
of Determination of Final Judgment under Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b): None. 
4. Date of filing of Petition for Review: December 6, 1993. 
5. Jurisdiction: This court has jurisdiction over this Petition for Review pursuant 
to §35-1-82.53(2) which provides that an Order of the Industrial Commission on review is final, 
unless set aside by the Court of Appeals. 
6. Name of the agency: This Petition is to review an Order of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah, an administrative agency. 
7. Statement of Facts: 
a. Petitioner, Stephen E. Hausknect, filed a charge of age discrimination in 
employment with the UADD on or about May 12, 1992. 
b. The UADD entered a no cause determination on November 20, 1992. 
This no cause determination was issued by the investigator based on 
information submitted by counsel for both parties. It appears that the 
determination was issued without any interviews with witnesses or other 
testimony being taken by the investigator. 
c. On December 18, 1992, petitioner, through his counsel, filed a Notice of 
Evidentiary Hearing pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §34-35-7. l(5)(c) and 
Rule 560-1-4 of the Utah Administrative Code, requesting an evidentiary 
hearing on the determination rendered by the UADD. 
d. On April 26, 1993, Timothy C. Allen, Presiding Administrative Law 
Judge for the Industrial Commission of Utah issued an Order granting 
formal hearing upon further review wherein Judge Allen determined that 
appellant had met the requirements of law necessary to show entitlement 
to a hearing. 
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e. On May 12, 1993, Kennecott filed a Motion for review of Judge Allen's 
Order granting appellant a formal hearing. 
f. On October 26, 1993, the Industrial Commission of Utah issued an Order 
granting Motion for Review which "ordered that the Motion for Review 
of the Order of the Administrative Law Judge dated April 26, 1993 is 
hereby denied." 
g. On November 5, 1993, the Industrial Commission of Utah issued an 
Order of Clarification wherein it "ordered that [Kennecott's] Motion for 
Review requesting that the evidentiary hearing be denied is hereby granted 
and the decision of the Administrative Law Judge to grant the evidentiary 
hearing is hereby reversed." 
h. On December 6, 1993, petitioner petitioned for review of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah's Order of Clarification which reversed the decision 
of Judge Allen and denied petitioner an evidentiary hearing. 
8. Issue for Review and Standard of Review: 
Issue: Did the Industrial Commission of Utah error in overturning the 
Administrative Law Judge's Order granting petitioner a formal hearing? 
Standard of Review: Pursuant to §63-46b-16(4)(d), this court shall grant relief 
if appellant/petitioner has been "substantially prejudiced" because the Industrial Commission has 
"erroneously interpreted or implied the law." Because this matter presents a question of 
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statutory construction and legislative intent, this court may review for correctness and need not 
defer to the agency's interpretation. Crosland v. Board of Review. 828 P.2d 528, 529-30 (Utah 
App. 1992). This court must grant relief if it finds that the Industrial Commission erroneously 
interpreted the law to petitioner's substantial prejudice. Id. 
9. Determination of Case by Supreme Court: Not applicable. 
10. Determinative Law: This Petition will require review of the Anti Discrimination 
Act, U.CA. §34-35-1 et sea.; the Utah Administrative Procedures Act, 63-46b-l et seq., 
including but not limited to §§ 63-46b-l, 6, 7, and 8; Utah Administrative Code, R560-1-1 et 
seq.: and Article I, §7 of the Constitution of Utah. 
11. Related Appeals: None. 
12. Attachments: Petitioner has attached hereto the documents identified in the 
Statement of Facts, 17. / 
SUBMITTED this / 7 day of February, 1994. 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was 
mailed, postage fully prepaid, on the // day of February, 1994, to the following: 
James M. Elegante 
Alan K. Flake 
Attorney for Kennecott Corp. 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
Thomas C. Sturdy 
Sharon J. Eblen 
Attorney for Industrial Commission of Utah 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
Heb*er M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-6600 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
Stephen E. Hausknect, 
P e t i t i o n e r , 
v . 
The Indus tr ia l Commission, and 
Kennecott Corporation, 
Respondent. 
UWi Court of Appeals 
JAM M 199* 
NOTICE 
Case No. 930768-CA 
TO THE ABOVE PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS: 
This case is being considered for summary disposition, 
pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 10(e), on the 
grounds that the filing fee was not paid within 30 days after 
the date of the written decision to be reviewed. Prowswood, 
Inc. v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 676 P.2d 952 (Utah 1984). 
The parties are requested to file a memorandum, not to 
exceed ten pages, explaining why the petition should or should 
not be dismissed for failure to file the filing fee within 30 
days after the date of the decision to be reviewed. 
The memoranda shall be filed simultaneously and shall be 
due on or before January 27, 1994. 
Dated this y^V^day of January, 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
T. Greenwood, Judge 
RECEIVED 
JAN 1 819M 
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